Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BAGHDAD485
2010-02-23 15:20:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

BABIL TRIBAL LEADER PREDICTS IRAQIYYA COALITION TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL SOCI 
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VZCZCXRO1007
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0485 0541520
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231520Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6788
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000485 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: BABIL TRIBAL LEADER PREDICTS IRAQIYYA COALITION TO
WIN UP TO 100 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT

REF: BAGHDAD 0422

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000485 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI SUBJECT: BABIL TRIBAL LEADER PREDICTS IRAQIYYA COALITION TO WIN UP TO 100 SEATS IN PARLIAMENT REF: BAGHDAD 0422 ¶1. This is a Babil PRT Cable ¶2. Summary. On February 17, Chief Sheikh Adnan Abd al-Munim al-Janabi told PRToff that his public call for a boycott among his predominantly-Sunni 150,000 tribe is mostly for show. He said that he believes the Iraqiyya coalition could win as many as 100 seats (of 325) in the elections, but cautioned that the United States must overtly warn PM Maliki,s State of Law Alliance to cede power without resorting to violence. Adnan al-Janabi,s confidence is supported by an impressive, albeit self described, get-out-the-vote party machine. End summary. ¶3. On February 17, PRToff and 3/3 BCT Commander met with Sheikh Adnan Abd al-Munim al-Janabi, Chief Sheikh for the large al-Janabi tribe. Sheikh Adnan was Minister of State without portfolio during the Iraqi Interim Government from 2004 to 2005 and now is running for national office with the secular Iraqiyya coalition which has, he claims, wide spread support in Babil and as far away as Mosul and Kirkuk. ¶4. Sheikh Adnan complained that the de-Ba,athification exclusion list threatened the credibility of elections (reftel). This credibility is important not only for Sunnis who need to be included, but also for Shi,a who need to know that the election represents all of Iraq. As a result of the exclusion list, Janabi told PRToffs that he asked his supporters to boycott the election, but admitted this is for show. He claimed that he needed to strenuously push for a boycott for its threat to be credible. ¶5. Janabi told PRToff that his coalition, Iraqiyya, expects to win a minimum of eight seats in parliament and could win as many as 100 (out of 325 seats). He sees Prime Minister Maliki,s State of Law alliance (SLA) as the main opposition and calculated that Maliki,s Shi,a-based party would never win any Sunni votes and would have to win 75 percent of the entire Shi,a bloc to win a majority. He compared this to his own secular Iraqiyya alliance, which he predicted would win all of the Sunni votes and as much as 20 percent of the Shi,a. Janabi said that his supporters are going door to door to demonstrate to all 150,000 al-Janabi tribesmen on how to vote. They will furnish all potential voters with instruction cards to take into the polling place, and will transport people to the polling site if needed. ¶6. Predicting victory for his 22-party coalition, Janabi said that the United States must ensure that Maliki cedes power peacefully. Janabi rejected the notion that this is an Iraqi election run by Iraqis, insisting that &everyone knows the United States is influencing the elections8, even as everyone knows Iran has &encouraged8 the de-Ba,athification exclusion list. He said that the recent expulsion of Babil Deputy Governor Iskandar Jawad Hassan Witwit is an example of what will happen if Maliki,s party loses the election. Maliki is continuing to enhance his police and intelligence powers, he alleged, and it will be like a &bloodless coup8 when he decides not to transfer power; people like Witwit will just be &removed8. He added that, whatever the outcome, the forming of a new government will take no less than two months. Janabi flatly rejected the notion that his party would form a post-electoral coalition with other parties. ¶7. On security issues, Janabi said Maliki will continue his intimidation campaign with methods such as the de-Ba,athification exercise, but any overt police intimidation may be met with secular violence. &We have our hot-heads and it may be difficult to stop them in the future.8 ¶8. Comment: Janabi was candid and direct in his statements Q8. Comment: Janabi was candid and direct in his statements to PRToff and 3/3 BCT Commander. His description of his political machine impressed us for its practicality but his description of the United States and Iran,s election role struck us as just short of paranoid. If tribal leaders like Janabi can influence the Sunni community to vote as a bloc for Iraqiyya, Janabi,s stridency could be part of the democratic Iraqi landscape. End comment. FORD

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