U.S. SENDS TOUGH, BUT NECESSARY, MESSAGE DURING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000477

SIPDIS

NSC FOR MPHEE, PVROOMAN, STATE FOR MCORBIN, PDELLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PTER CASC IZ XP
SUBJECT: U.S. SENDS TOUGH, BUT NECESSARY, MESSAGE DURING
DETAINEE MEETING

REF: BAGHDAD 448

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. In the February 20 Joint Subcommittee on
Detainee Affairs (JSC-DA) meeting, United States Forces -
Iraq (USF-I) Deputy Commanding General for Detainee
Operations (DCG-DO) MG David Quantock, Co-Chair of the
JSC-DA, delivered a tough message - if the GOI is unable to
provide arrest warrants, detention orders, or conviction
orders on the remaining 1,600 release-eligible detainees in
U.S. custody, the U.S. would have no choice but to begin the
process of releasing these high-threat detainees from U.S.
facilities immediately following the Iraqi national elections
in March. Faced with this threat, and after much heated
debate to include the GOI's request for the U.S. to violate
the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (Security Agreement),the
GOI agreed that the files for those 1,600 detainees would be
submitted in the coming days to an Iraqi investigative judge
for his review and determination as to whether enough
probable cause existed on each case to produce an arrest
warrant. In order to keep the focus on this important issue
and to follow-up on the GOI assurances, USG and GOI officials
agreed to hold another JSC-DA on February 27. End Summary.


2. (S) During the February 20 meeting of the JSC-DA, MG
Quantock urged GOI officials to send the 1,600 remaining
release-eligible detainee files to Judge Al Taie, the Iraqi
investigative judge charged with reviewing U.S.-held detainee
files and producing arrest warrants. (Note: There are 5,825
detainees in U.S. custody at this time. Of this number,
approximately 4,200 are transfer eligible, meaning the GOI
has provided the U.S. arrest warrants, conviction orders, or
detention orders on those individuals. End Note.) MG Quantock
stated that approximately 800 of these release-eligible
detainees (i.e. detainees for whom the GOI has not provided
the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention order, or conviction
order) are very dangerous individuals - AQI- and Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) special groups-affiliated. Further, once
released, these detainees will return to their terrorist
networks and "will pose a grave risk to security in Iraq," MG
Quantock warned. He informed JSC-DA Co-Chair MG Husayn Kamal,
Ministry of the Interior, National Information and
Investigation Agency (NIIA),that if this issue is not
resolved soon, the U.S. would have no choice but to involve
the Prime Minister's office.


3. (S) In response to this plea for action, the GOI
suggested forming a committee that would review the 1,600
detainee case files and make a recommendation to the JSC-DA.
The GOI also asked that, rather than releasing these
high-threat detainees, the U.S. could transfer them to the
GOI without a valid arrest warrant or other transfer
paperwork. (Note and Comment: Article 22 of the Security
Agreement provides, "The United States Forces shall act in
full and effective coordination with the Government of Iraq
to turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi
authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant and
shall release all remaining detainees in a safe and orderly
manner..." If the U.S. were to honor this request by the
GOI, the U.S. would be in violation of the Security
QGOI, the U.S. would be in violation of the Security
Agreement. End Note and Comment.)


4. (SBU) MG Quantock responded to this request by pointing
out the requirements of the Security Agreement and
reiterating the need to transfer the 1,600 detainee case
files to Judge Al Taie for his determination on whether
probable cause exists for an arrest warrant. He stressed that
the U.S. plans to transfer the Taji TIF to the GOI on March
15 (reftel). If at that time, the GOI has not provided
transfer paperwork for these 1,600 detainees, the U.S. has
the option to transfer them to the Cropper TIF. (Note: The
U.S. plans to transfer the Cropper TIF to the GOI on July 15.
End Note.) However, MG Quantock stressed, if the GOI has not
shown any progress on producing transfer paperwork on these
1,600 detainee cases in the next two weeks, the U.S. will
start releasing 400 detainees per month, starting after the
Iraqi national elections and completing the releases of the
1,600 detainees by July. (Note: This would give USF-I DCG-DO
the necessary time to set the Cropper TIF detainee population
in preparation for the July 15 transfer to the GOI.)


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5. (S) The GOI then suggested that the U.S. continue to hold
the 1,600 release-eligible detainees in the Cropper TIF and
send all transfer-eligible detainees, to include high-threat
detainees, to the Taji TIF in time for the transfer of the
TIF on March 15. MG Quantock responded that the U.S. plans
to transfer the Taji TIF with medium-threat detainees only
(reftel),which will allow the Iraqi correction officers
(ICO) to train on a lower threat level detainee population in
preparation for the high-threat level detainees that the U.S.
would transfer with the Cropper TIF on July 15. He stressed
that this lack of progress on the transfer paperwork
threatens to derail the entire process that the U.S. has put
in place. (Note and Comment: After July 15, the U.S. will
maintain a 360-bed space facility in Compound Five, near
Cropper, with a guard force of 100 personnel (reftel). If the
GOI does not produce transfer paperwork on these 1,600
detainees before the transfer of Cropper and the U.S. decides
to maintain custody of these individuals based upon a request
of the GOI, a larger facility and guard force would be
necessary, but is not currently planned. End Note and
Comment.)


6. (SBU) After much debate between the members of the GOI
delegation, the GOI agreed that it would send the 1,600
detainee case files to Judge Al Taie within two days. The
USG and GOI also agreed to meet again on February 27 to get
an update on how far the GOI has progressed with producing
transfer paperwork on these 1,600 release-eligible detainees.


7. (S) Comment. The message delivered by MG Quantock was
tough, but necessary. Time and time again, the U.S. has
raised the threat of the release of AQI-affiliated and other
high-threat detainees from U.S. detention facilities, but to
no avail. The GOI appears concerned at this prospect, but
either does not have the will or the ability to speed up the
transfer paperwork process. At times during the February 20
JSC-DA meeting, the GOI seemed to swing between wanting to
send this problem to the Prime Minister's office, blaming the
investigative judge on the lack of transfer paperwork, and
requesting the U.S. to either transfer the detainees without
transfer paperwork, in violation of the Security Agreement,
or continue to hold them in U.S. custody for some
unforeseeable moment in time. The U.S., however, made it
clear that, although it does not wish to release high-threat
detainees from its facilities, the GOI had a decision to make
- either produce the transfer paperwork in the coming weeks
or prepare for an increase in violence upon the release of
these high-threat detainees. If this warning is not met with
GOI action, we must address this issue with the caretaker
government following the elections, reminding the GOI that
the U.S. is obligated to abide by the Security Agreement and
that the release of high-threat detainees immediately
following the national elections will only serve to increase
violence against Iraqi civilians and governmental entities.
End Comment.
FORD