Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BAGHDAD477
2010-02-23 06:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

U.S. SENDS TOUGH, BUT NECESSARY, MESSAGE DURING

Tags:  MOPS PHUM PINS PTER CASC IZ XP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0585
OO RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0477/01 0540629
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 230629Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6774
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000477 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR MPHEE, PVROOMAN, STATE FOR MCORBIN, PDELLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PTER CASC IZ XP
SUBJECT: U.S. SENDS TOUGH, BUT NECESSARY, MESSAGE DURING
DETAINEE MEETING

REF: BAGHDAD 448

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000477 SIPDIS NSC FOR MPHEE, PVROOMAN, STATE FOR MCORBIN, PDELLY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020 TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PTER CASC IZ XP SUBJECT: U.S. SENDS TOUGH, BUT NECESSARY, MESSAGE DURING DETAINEE MEETING REF: BAGHDAD 448 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary. In the February 20 Joint Subcommittee on Detainee Affairs (JSC-DA) meeting, United States Forces - Iraq (USF-I) Deputy Commanding General for Detainee Operations (DCG-DO) MG David Quantock, Co-Chair of the JSC-DA, delivered a tough message - if the GOI is unable to provide arrest warrants, detention orders, or conviction orders on the remaining 1,600 release-eligible detainees in U.S. custody, the U.S. would have no choice but to begin the process of releasing these high-threat detainees from U.S. facilities immediately following the Iraqi national elections in March. Faced with this threat, and after much heated debate to include the GOI's request for the U.S. to violate the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (Security Agreement),the GOI agreed that the files for those 1,600 detainees would be submitted in the coming days to an Iraqi investigative judge for his review and determination as to whether enough probable cause existed on each case to produce an arrest warrant. In order to keep the focus on this important issue and to follow-up on the GOI assurances, USG and GOI officials agreed to hold another JSC-DA on February 27. End Summary. ¶2. (S) During the February 20 meeting of the JSC-DA, MG Quantock urged GOI officials to send the 1,600 remaining release-eligible detainee files to Judge Al Taie, the Iraqi investigative judge charged with reviewing U.S.-held detainee files and producing arrest warrants. (Note: There are 5,825 detainees in U.S. custody at this time. Of this number, approximately 4,200 are transfer eligible, meaning the GOI has provided the U.S. arrest warrants, conviction orders, or detention orders on those individuals. End Note.) MG Quantock stated that approximately 800 of these release-eligible detainees (i.e. detainees for whom the GOI has not provided the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention order, or conviction order) are very dangerous individuals - AQI- and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) special groups-affiliated. Further, once released, these detainees will return to their terrorist networks and "will pose a grave risk to security in Iraq," MG Quantock warned. He informed JSC-DA Co-Chair MG Husayn Kamal, Ministry of the Interior, National
Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA),that if this issue is not resolved soon, the U.S. would have no choice but to involve the Prime Minister's office. ¶3. (S) In response to this plea for action, the GOI suggested forming a committee that would review the 1,600 detainee case files and make a recommendation to the JSC-DA. The GOI also asked that, rather than releasing these high-threat detainees, the U.S. could transfer them to the GOI without a valid arrest warrant or other transfer paperwork. (Note and Comment: Article 22 of the Security Agreement provides, "The United States Forces shall act in full and effective coordination with the Government of Iraq to turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi arrest warrant and shall release all remaining detainees in a safe and orderly manner..." If the U.S. were to honor this request by the GOI, the U.S. would be in violation of the Security QGOI, the U.S. would be in violation of the Security Agreement. End Note and Comment.) ¶4. (SBU) MG Quantock responded to this request by pointing out the requirements of the Security Agreement and reiterating the need to transfer the 1,600 detainee case files to Judge Al Taie for his determination on whether probable cause exists for an arrest warrant. He stressed that the U.S. plans to transfer the Taji TIF to the GOI on March 15 (reftel). If at that time, the GOI has not provided transfer paperwork for these 1,600 detainees, the U.S. has the option to transfer them to the Cropper TIF. (Note: The U.S. plans to transfer the Cropper TIF to the GOI on July 15. End Note.) However, MG Quantock stressed, if the GOI has not shown any progress on producing transfer paperwork on these 1,600 detainee cases in the next two weeks, the U.S. will start releasing 400 detainees per month, starting after the Iraqi national elections and completing the releases of the 1,600 detainees by July. (Note: This would give USF-I DCG-DO the necessary time to set the Cropper TIF detainee population in preparation for the July 15 transfer to the GOI.) BAGHDAD 00000477 002 OF 002 ¶5. (S) The GOI then suggested that the U.S. continue to hold the 1,600 release-eligible detainees in the Cropper TIF and send all transfer-eligible detainees, to include high-threat detainees, to the Taji TIF in time for the transfer of the TIF on March 15. MG Quantock responded that the U.S. plans to transfer the Taji TIF with medium-threat detainees only (reftel),which will allow the Iraqi correction officers (ICO) to train on a lower threat level detainee population in preparation for the high-threat level detainees that the U.S. would transfer with the Cropper TIF on July 15. He stressed that this lack of progress on the transfer paperwork threatens to derail the entire process that the U.S. has put in place. (Note and Comment: After July 15, the U.S. will maintain a 360-bed space facility in Compound Five, near Cropper, with a guard force of 100 personnel (reftel). If the GOI does not produce transfer paperwork on these 1,600 detainees before the transfer of Cropper and the U.S. decides to maintain custody of these individuals based upon a request of the GOI, a larger facility and guard force would be necessary, but is not currently planned. End Note and Comment.) ¶6. (SBU) After much debate between the members of the GOI delegation, the GOI agreed that it would send the 1,600 detainee case files to Judge Al Taie within two days. The USG and GOI also agreed to meet again on February 27 to get an update on how far the GOI has progressed with producing transfer paperwork on these 1,600 release-eligible detainees. ¶7. (S) Comment. The message delivered by MG Quantock was tough, but necessary. Time and time again, the U.S. has raised the threat of the release of AQI-affiliated and other high-threat detainees from U.S. detention facilities, but to no avail. The GOI appears concerned at this prospect, but either does not have the will or the ability to speed up the transfer paperwork process. At times during the February 20 JSC-DA meeting, the GOI seemed to swing between wanting to send this problem to the Prime Minister's office, blaming the investigative judge on the lack of transfer paperwork, and requesting the U.S. to either transfer the detainees without transfer paperwork, in violation of the Security Agreement, or continue to hold them in U.S. custody for some unforeseeable moment in time. The U.S., however, made it clear that, although it does not wish to release high-threat detainees from its facilities, the GOI had a decision to make - either produce the transfer paperwork in the coming weeks or prepare for an increase in violence upon the release of these high-threat detainees. If this warning is not met with GOI action, we must address this issue with the caretaker government following the elections, reminding the GOI that the U.S. is obligated to abide by the Security Agreement and that the release of high-threat detainees immediately following the national elections will only serve to increase violence against Iraqi civilians and governmental entities. End Comment. FORD

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -