GOI RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON VISIT OF UNDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000470

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2020
TAGS: PREL SY IZ
SUBJECT: GOI RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON VISIT OF UNDER
SECRETARY BURNS AND COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
BENJAMIN

REF: STATE 13627

Classified By: Charge d'affaires Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Charge delivered reftel demarche to DFM
Labeed Abbawi February 17, regarding the visit to Syria of
Under Secretary Burns and Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Benjamin. Abbawi said the GOI would not have problems with
the visit. Reports in the Arab press that Washington had
decided to appoint an ambassador to Syria after a five-year
hiatus have dominated many of post's recent conversations
with senior Iraqi officials and prepared the way for the
February 17 demarche. In a February 9 conversation, Abbawi
asked DCM about the recent press reports and observed that
Iraqis would not be opposed to an improvement in U.S. -
Syrian relations, as this might give Washington more leverage
with Syria to push on the Iraq issue. On February 11, PM
Maliki's Political Advisor Sadiq Rikabi expressed more
skepticism, telling DCM he was concerned that an
ambassadorial appointment signaled a shift in U.S. policy
toward Syria, at Iraq's expense. DCM stressed our concerns
about Syrian policies remain unchanged. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charge delivered reftel demarche to DFM Labeed Abbawi
February 17, regarding the visit to Syria of Under Secretary
Burns and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Benjamin. Abbawi
said the GOI would not have problems with the visit.
Speaking personally, he said he "was not too concerned." He
said he had confidence the USG was not changing its policy on
Syria in ways that would harm Iraqi interests. He expressed
interest in being informed about any SARG views expressed to
Burns about Syria's relations with Iraq.


3. (C) In the ten-day period before the official
announcement of the SARG granting agrement for the new U.S.
Ambassador, reports in the Arab press that Washington had
decided to appoint an ambassador to Syria after a five-year
hiatus dominated many of post's recent conversations with
senior Iraqi officials. These conversations helped prepare
the way for the February 17 demarche. DFM Abbawi asked DCM
February 9 about recent press reports indicating that
Washington was considering appointing an ambassador to Syria.
He observed that Iraqis would not be opposed to an
improvement in U.S. - Syrian relations, as this might give
Washington more leverage with Syria to push on the Iraq
issue. Abbawi told DCM that Syria is capable of stopping
terror networks that use Syrian territory to target Iraq, but
argued that Damascus lacks the political will to intervene.
He related to DCM his belief that Syrian military
intelligence is aware of Ba'athist networks within Syria that
funnel support to anti-government terror groups in Iraq.

4. (C) On February 12, Assistant Foreign Minister Mohammed
al-Hakim, responsible for Arab affairs, told DCM he was
hopeful that Iraq and Syria could find a reasonable way to
resolve their problems. He suggested that the United States
focus on President Bashar al-Assad and intelligence chief
Mohammed Nassif as the key players in Syria's regional
policy. Hakim, cousin of Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq
(ISCI) party chairman Ammar al-Hakim and former
communications minister, noted that he liked Syrian FM Walid
Moallem as a person, but believed that he was under the thumb
of his intelligence counterparts. He shared an anecdote with
DCM to illustrate the relative power and importance of Nassif
and Syria's intelligence apparatus in foreign policy: all
sides involved in the quadripartite summit between Iraq,
Syria, the Arab League and Egypt after the August 19 2009
Baghdad bombings agreed to limit themselves to two
QBaghdad bombings agreed to limit themselves to two
participants. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem turned up
with his deputy and an intelligence officer. According to
Hakim, Moallem sheepishly told AL chief Amr Moussa that he
had been instructed to bring the intelligence officer. Iraqi
FM Zebari and DFM Abbawi agreed to the arrangement and
brought Hakim to the table to balance the three Syrians with
three Iraqis. Hakim told DCM that the Syrian intelligence
officer refused to sit behind Moallem and positioned himself
to observe his FM's facial expressions during the negotiation.


5. (C) On February 11, PM Maliki's Chief of Staff Tariq
Abdallah and Political Advisor Sadiq Rikabi told DCM they
were concerned that an ambassadorial appointment signaled a
shift in U.S. policy toward Syria, at Iraq's expense.
Abdallah acknowledged that it might be helpful to have a
senior U.S. envoy in Syria, pushing Damascus to exert the
political will to fix the problems that plagued Iraqi-Syrian
relations. Rikabi was skeptical, and wanted to know where
"the Iraq file" ranked on the list of U.S. priorities for
Syria. He asked DCM whether Washington was prepared to put
the peace process ahead of Iraq's security concerns.


6. (C) DCM reminded interlocutors February 11 that the
appointment of an ambassador to Syria was not a foregone


conclusion. He emphasized to DFM Abbawi and the others that
this type of appointment did not signal a change in U.S.
policy or message: the United States had a variety of tough
issues to address in addition to Iraq' security, including
Damascus' support for terror groups like Hezbollah, Hamas,
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Syrian-Lebanese relations, the
future of the peace process and the Golan Heights. DCM
asserted that the only change in Washington's position was
the advent of high-level discussions between Damascus and
Washington spearheaded by Special Envoy George Mitchell. He
explained to all his interlocutors that not having an
accredited ambassador in place has limited the embassy's
contacts in Damascus and the Administration was considering
elevating the level of communication with the Syrian
government to strengthen its own position. DFM Abbawi on
February 17 and PM COS Abdallah on February 20 were visibly
comfortable and relaxed about the Burns visit and the
possible dispatch of a U.S. ambassador to Damascus.
FORD