NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CELL OPERATIONAL BUT

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000466 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IZ SUBJECT: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CELL OPERATIONAL BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a. i., Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Prime Minister created the National Intelligence Cell (NIC) after the December 8 high profile terrorist attacks in Baghdad to consolidate information and work with operational units to prevent future attacks. While it started off slow, it now is beginning to produce results. The NIC must address the availability of sufficiently trained personnel and information sharing to improve its efficiency. Senior members of the NIC are optimistic about the NIC's potential, but acknowledge the challenges ahead. Without active support from the GOI and interagency Iraqi intelligence, the NIC will be marginalized. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- -------------- New Iraqi National Intelligence Cell (NIC) Operational -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) The Prime Minister created the National Intelligence Cell (NIC) after the December 8 high profile terrorist attacks in Baghdad to consolidate information and work with operational units to prevent future attacks. The NIC passed USF-I intelligence and joint analysis to the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) leading to the coordinated BOC-MOI anti-terrorist actions on January 12. Following the operation, the NIC produced an after-action analytical account of security in Baghdad from the point of view of the various intelligence services. The NIC also predicted accurately four recent indirect fire attacks based on intelligence analysis. ¶3. (S/NF) The NIC is designed to coordinate information from the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS),the MOD's Director General of Intelligence Services (DGIS) and the MOD's Military Intelligence (M2),the MOI's National Iraqi Investigation Agency (NIIA),the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG),the Minister of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA),the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) and the BOC. A remaining outlier in the Iraqi intelligence realm, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI),is not part of the formal NIC structure, and reports directly to the Prime Minister's office. Greater coordination amongst Iraqi intelligence services may limit OSI's ability to act unilaterally. Under the day-to-day direction of MG Hasan Da,aeem Ras,n of the MSNSA, the NIC works with the operational commands under the MOD/Iraqi Ground Forces Command and the Office of the Commander in Chief to distribute its intelligence analysis to the appropriate operators. USF-I J2 and Iraq's Train and Assist Mission (ITAM) advisors work in a support capacity to share USF-I intelligence and assist the NIC in the sharing of intelligence amongst GOI agencies. -------------- Challenges Remain -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) The NIC is not without its growing pains. A substantial structural weakness of the NIC is a lack of sufficiently trained personnel. The NIC runs 24/7, but staffing is scaled down considerably after hours. Another complicated issue is information sharing. Intelligence agencies in general, and particularly the fledgling Iraqi services, do not, as a matter of course, share information and intelligence. Competition to prove value, the need for credit, and ingrained security service custom and culture all have a negative effect on passing information. Data systems are by design stove-piped, creating further difficulties in Qare by design stove-piped, creating further difficulties in timely information-sharing. Infrastructure, budget, basic office supplies, and support issues have created a difficult work environment, but U.S. observers expect remaining challenges to be overcome in the near term. Support for the NIC comes through parent agencies due to the lack of an independent budget line for the fusion cell. ¶5. (S/NF) Looking at individual parent agencies, MSNSA has the leadership role and political connections which provide legitimacy within the Iraqi interagency. DGIS provides highly experienced and competent senior analysts, though relationships at the senior level are developing slowly. CTS has a strong tie with the NIC and competent liaison officers that are learning to overcome hesitancy to share actionable intelligence. INIS provides the chief Targeting Officer and third in the NIC chain of command. The targeting section has direct support of clandestine intelligence resources and produce high quality daily and weekly summaries. NIIA retains the ability to access local and federal law enforcement information but must contend with political rivalries that exist within the security ministries and provides limited support to the NIC leadership. The KRG is an active participant but remains on the periphery given the NIC's current Baghdad focus. M2 remains a quiet advocate as the organizations work through lines of operations. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) There is a feeling of optimism by senior members of the NIC, but it is tempered by acknowledgment of the challenges ahead. Not least among these is senior MOD and MOI leader suspicion of MSNSA Chief Wa'eli, deemed a staunch Maliki loyalist and very partisan actor. There is some concern that the NIC will suffer blame for any election-related violence in Baghdad, and that it may be set up as a fall guy for the finger-pointing that will likely occur after a serious incident. The NIC has the potential to serve as a step toward increased interagency intelligence operations and reform. With parent agency acceptance and Ministerial support, nascent institutional will and ability to drive information sharing and transparency exists. Without active support from the GOI and interagency Iraqi intelligence, the NIC will be marginalized. The concepts and problems are not new, and past attempts have not succeeded. Hopefully, the NIC will fare better. FORD