UPDATE #5: ASSAYESH TAKE CAPTIVES - SIX DETAINEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000451 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2025 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM IZ SUBJECT: UPDATE #5: ASSAYESH TAKE CAPTIVES - SIX DETAINEES GET RELEASED REF: A. BAGHDAD 413 ¶B. BAGHDAD 381 ¶C. BAGHDAD 375 ¶D. BAGHDAD 369 Classified By: Political Counselor Yuri Kim for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On February 16, a Mosul detention facility (Trans Jail) released 6 of 9 Wanna detainees. Although it was a welcome relief for all concerned, the release was in advance of the legal paperwork. Judges have become increasingly aware of the tensions between Provincial Governor Nujaifi (PGOV) and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities and have some trepidation in taking on this case. The paperless release may also have been in reaction to the Assayesh, who on February 15, kidnapped four police officers and possibly detained approximately 40 civilians in Tal Kayf. Only after senior IP and USF-N intervention were the police officers released. Perhaps unrelated, but contributing to heightened fears of multiple kidnappings, Tal Kayf's Mayor then reported that the Assayesh took 11 civilians captive and transferred them to Dohuk. Additional reports of KSF kidnappings have surfaced in disputed Hamdaniya district east of Mosul. Senior Advisor to Northern Iraq (SANI) traveled to Erbil to meet with KRG Chief of Staff Fuad Hussein and stress the need for full cooperation and warned that any "hostage takings" by the Assayesh are considered provocative, instigating fear and instability. Hussein agreed and requested that SANI bring any reports of Assayesh misbehavior to his immediate attention. END SUMMARY. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) A few hours after notifying the KRG that the detainees would not be released on February 15 as anticipated, the Ninewa Provincial Department of Police (PDOP) reported that the Assayesh came to the Tal Kayf Police Department Headquarters (DHQ) and "kidnapped" three police officers and then went to the DHQ Commander's home and took him as well. Assayesh held the four officers at a Kurdish party HQ in Tal Kayf. A senior IP police official from Mosul visited the scene, resulting in the release of the Tal Kayf police chief. Ninewa Operations Command (NiOC) IA Commander, accompanied by USF-N, traveled to Tal Kayf in the middle of the night, and after a cursory "negotiation," Assayesh released the police officers. Commanding officers from the Assayesh at the scene claimed that they had detained the four IP in exchange for release of the Wanna 9, as well as to deter the rumored travel to Tal Kayf district of PGOV Nujaifi o/a February 15/16. There was additional speculation, unconfirmed, that Assayesh had also detained 40 civilians, also released during the night. ¶3. (C) On the evening of February 16, the Mosul Trans Jail facility released 6 of the 9 Wanna detainees. However, Chief Investigative Judge (IJ) Ibrahim Ali Ali -- who by this point had received the investigation, due to the granting of Governor Nujaifi's change of venue petition -- said he would likely release six on bail, at the earliest on February 17, pending continued investigation. The remaining three would likely be kept in custody as the investigation continued. Among the three, there is preliminary evidence that two may have been involved in the discharge of weapons on February 1, while one was in possession of a text message referencing an alleged plan to assassinate the PGOV. The judge planned to continue the release order process the next day regardless of the February 16 release of the six. Qthe February 16 release of the six. ¶4. (C) The PRT received a report from Tal Kayf Mayor Bassim Bello, a credible source these past weeks, that Assayesh also detained 11 civilians from Wanna on the evening of Feb 15, including a member of the IIP political party. According to Bassim, the Kurdish Security Forces transferred these 11 individuals, who had participated in the PGOV's February 1 visit to Wanna, to a location in Dohuk where they remain in custody. Perhaps there is no connection between the February 15 temporary detention of the four IP officers/40 civilians but it certainly spiked tensions. FOLLOW THE PETITION -------------- ¶5. (C) On February 15, the PRT met with Chief IJ Ibrahim Ali Ali, who informed that when the change of venue petition is granted, the investigation will be transferred to Mosul. Speaking bluntly, Judge Ali expressed concerns that the investigation has become extremely "political" and most judges are reluctant to take the case. He added that the judges had become aware of tensions between PGOV and KRG authorities, and no judge wanted to fall under scrutiny of political officials. The lead judge assigned to the petition, Judge Ausama Ali Rawai, informed PRT that he had not physically received the file but estimated that it should "take no more than two or three days" to rule on the petition. We await proper release orders to be issued after the fact. THE GORAN - NUJAIFI SHOW -------------- ¶6. (C) After hearing the news of the Assayesh taking captives, PRT Leader met with local KDP chief Keshro Goran to remind him that he said he would take responsibility for calming tensions on the KRG side. In response, Goran alluded that there are division within the KRG, insisting that the KDP did not carry out these countermeasures. Goran said he was appalled by the February 15-16 events in Tal Kayf, calling the IP officers "hostages" of the Assayesh. He said he had worked on the issue through much of the night, engaging directly KRG President Barzani and KRG Chief of Staff Fuad Hussein, recommending that all efforts be undertaken to release the officers and stand down from such "inappropriate behavior." Goran agreed that the action was dangerous and outside the rule of law. He seemed exasperated, explaining that there are many government and security entities in the KRG and that he believed the Assayesh were acting independently from the KDP and President Barzani. (Comment: Goran, who was previously unapologetic about his own role in organizing efforts to obstruct the PGOV's February 1 convoy, seemed credible in his description of the latest events in Tal Kayf. End Comment.) ¶7. (C) Contradicting IJ Ali, on February 16, PGOV Nujaifi told USG interlocutors that he dropped his complaint against 7 of the remaining 9 detainees and pointed out he actually expedited the judicial process. (Note: The actual number of detainees released was six. End Note.) Nujaifi then claimed he blocked the transfer of the case from Mosul to Tal Kayf on February 14 because he had received intelligence reports that peshmerga were lying in wait at a checkpoint between Mosul and Tal Kayf with the intention to forcibly release all detainees during transfer. (Note: Nujaifi never mentioned this before. End Note.) PGOV believes the KRG is planning for action after the election. PRT Leader pushed back and said that unnecessary delays in the judicial process only exacerbated gathering all security forces together to discuss the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) procedures and principles. The PGOV recognized that the situation was much more dangerous than a temporary kidnapping. Nujaifi views the KRG as preparing for a DIBs land grab if the March elections do not produce results favorable for the KDP and Kurds. He and the VPGOV also complained about KSF extrajudicial detentions and independent checkpoints. USF-I underscored the need to implement all aspects of the CSM. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: We can expect the KRG to continue to Be fixated on getting the three remaining Wanna detainees released and linking it to participation in the CSM. We can also expect the KRG to resort to rash "countermeasures" if they do not perceive any progress with the case. At least with the release of 6 of the detainees, for now, KRG President Barzani is in a better position with the Kurdish QPresident Barzani is in a better position with the Kurdish public to consider re-engaging on the CSM. END COMMENT. FORD