U.S. FORCES DETAINEE UPDATE; UPCOMING TRANSFER OF

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000448

SIPDIS

NSC FOR MPHEE, PVROOMAN, STATE FOR MCORBIN, PDELLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2020
TAGS: MOPS PHUM PINS PTER CASC IZ XP
SUBJECT: U.S. FORCES DETAINEE UPDATE; UPCOMING TRANSFER OF
TAJI TIF; DETAINEE TRANSFER ISSUES

REF: BAGHDAD 199

Classified By: A/PMCouns W.S. Reid III for reasons 1.4(b) & (d).


1. (S) Summary. At this time, there are 5,830 detainees in
U.S. custody, evenly distributed between the two U.S. theater
internment facilities (TIFs) - Taji and Cropper. United
States Forces - Iraq (USF-I) operations are under way to set
the detainee populations in both the Taji and Cropper TIFs in
preparation for the March 15 transfer of the Taji TIF to the
GOI. The TIF, valued at $107 million, includes Iraqi
correction officer (ICO) housing and dining facilities, water
and sewage treatment plants, and a new entrance check point
(ECP). By transferring the Taji TIF to the GOI, the U.S.
will expand the GOI's detention capabilities by approximately
2,000 bed spaces, which will allow the GOI to transfer
detainees from overcrowded GOI detention facilities to the
new Taji TIF. In addition to the facilities, USF-I plans to
transfer approximately 3,000 medium-threat detainees to the
GOI. Currently, about 1,000 of the Taji TIF detainees are
release eligible, meaning the U.S. cannot transfer them to
the GOI without an arrest warrant, detention order, or
conviction order. As the time for transfer is fast
approaching, the USG will continue to stress to the GOI the
importance of GOI-produced detainee transfer paperwork prior
to the facility transfer and the consequences of its failure
to do so. End Summary.

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USF-I DETAINEE UPDATE
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2. (S) As of February 17, there were 5,830 detainees in U.S.
custody. That number included three third-country nationals,
137 enduring security threats, 1,851 dangerous radicals, and
37 former regime element officials (to include Sultan Hashim,
former Saddam-era Minister of Defense). Since January 1,
2009, USF-I has released 7,985 detainees, transferred to the
GOI 1,655 detainees, captured 286 individuals, and recaptured
33 persons.


3. (S) Approximately 1,600 of the nearly 6,000 U.S.-held
detainees are release eligible (i.e. detainees for whom the
GOI has not provided to the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention
order or conviction order). These release-eligible detainees
include 342 dangerous radicals, 38 enduring security threats,
and 374 medium-threat AQI detainees. If the GOI does not
provide arrest warrants, detention orders, or conviction
orders to the U.S. for these detainees by July 1, USF-I will
be required under the Security Agreement to release many of
these individuals. (Note and Comment: USF-I will transfer
the Cropper TIF to the GOI on July 15 (reftel). In order to
accommodate new captures and some of those detainees who have
been designated as enduring security threats and dangerous
radicals, USF-I will maintain a 360-bed space facility in
Compound Five, located near Camp Cropper. USF-I currently
only plans to maintain a guard force of 100 personnel - only
enough to safely guard 122 detainees, as originally planned.
If a greater detainee population is envisioned, USF-I will
need to deploy a larger guard force. End Note and Comment.)


4. (S) MG David Quantock, Deputy Commanding General -
Detainee Operations (DCG-DO),previously addressed the lack
of detainee transfer paperwork with the GOI (reftel) and
Qof detainee transfer paperwork with the GOI (reftel) and
again will address this issue with Joint Subcommittee on
Detainee Affairs (JSC-DA) Co-Chair MG Husayn Kamal, Ministry
of the Interior, National Information and Investigation
Agency (NIIA),at the next JSC-DA on February 20. At that
time, MG Quantock will stress the importance of the detainee
transfer paperwork and the danger of releasing enduring
security threat and dangerous radical detainees from the U.S.
TIFs without first prosecuting them under the Iraqi justice
system. (Note: Until the Iraqi national elections on March 7,
USF-I will only release low-threat detainees. However, it is
envisioned that USF-I will reassess this release policy after
the elections should the GOI fail to provide detainee
transfer paperwork on those release-eligible detainees in
U.S. custody in preparation for the transfer of the Cropper
TIF in July. End Note.)

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TAJI TIF INFRASTRUCTURE
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5. (SBU) Upon transfer, the Taji TIF will be able to safely
house approximately 5,000 detainees. (Note: Although the TIF
will be transferred with 3,000 detainees, the GOI will gain
an additional 2,000 bed spaces in which to transfer detainees
from other Iraqi detention facilities. End Note.) In addition
to the detainee housing facilities, the TIF includes a water
treatment facility, with a 3-day storage capacity of 1.7
million liters; a sewage treatment plant; a $500,000 kitchen
facility to provide meals to the detainee population; a
$700,000 detainee property warehouse; and 17 generators.
(Note: Although USF-I will provide generators to the GOI, a
project is in place to connect the Taji TIF to the existing
Iraqi power grid at a cost of $4 million. End Note.)


6. (SBU) In order to house and feed the Iraqi correction
officer (ICO) force rotations, USF-I built a $4 million ICO
village and a $8.5 million ICO dining facility (DFAC),which
can serve approximately 1,000 ICOs. The ICO village will
consist of 24 barracks, administrative support facilities,
and morale, welfare and recreation facilities that can be
used by the ICO force during their work rotations.


7. (SBU) Previously, while reviewing the facility, the GOI
complained that it had to cross a USF-I military installation
for access to the TIF and were unable to access the TIF
directly from the main road ("Route Tampa"). To remedy this,
USF-I is in the process of connecting the new ECP to Route
Tampa by a service road. The ECP will have a parking lot,
separate female search trailer, badging trailer, playground,
and waiting area.

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TAJI TIF POPULATION
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8. (S) USF-I currently plans to transfer the Taji TIF to the
GOI with medium-threat detainees only, to include Shia and
low-threat AQI detainees. In order to accomplish this, USF-I
is shifting high-threat detainees and their personal property
from the Taji TIF to the Cropper TIF and at the same time is
shifting low- and medium- threat detainees and their personal
property from the Cropper TIF to the Taji TIF. The shift of
the high-threat detainees is 100% complete, while the shift
of the low- and medium-threat detainees is 80% complete.


9. (S) Once these transfers are complete, Taji TIF will
have a detainee population end state of 2,965, which will
include 1,039 release-eligible detainees and 1,926
transfer-eligible detainees (i.e. detainees for whom the GOI
has provided to the U.S. an arrest warrant, detention order
or conviction order). (Note: At this time, there are
approximately 1,600 detainees in U.S. custody who are release
eligible. End Note.)


10. (S) Comment. It is clear that USF-I, with the transfer
of this top-notch facility, is setting the GOI up for
success. Whether the GOI is able to maintain this momentum
and capitalize on the options this facility provides is
another matter. The GOI has until this time been unable to
provide transfer paperwork on the final 1,600 detainees,
although the USG has stressed over time the importance of
this issue. This failure by the GOI could halt USF-I plans
to transfer its remaining detainee population, minus some
enduring security threats and dangerous radicals, to the GOI
Qenduring security threats and dangerous radicals, to the GOI
in July. It is unclear whether the GOI will focus its
efforts on this issue in the run-up to the March elections,
which are quickly approaching. Following the distraction of
the national elections, there must be a concerted effort to
focus the caretaker government on the necessity of providing
sorely needed transfer documents to facilitate the continued
detention of these high-threat detainees. Should the
caretaker government fail to provide this paperwork, it would
represent a considerable security risk. Consequently, we
would need to place this issue high on the agenda with the
newly-formed government this summer. End Comment.
FORD