DIWANIYAH PROVINCE: PUSHING FURTHER ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000446

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: DIWANIYAH PROVINCE: PUSHING FURTHER ON
DE-BA,ATHIFICATION

REF: BAGHDAD 0310

Classified By: PRT Diwaniyah TL Michael Klecheski for Reason 1.4 (b) an
d (d)

This is a PRT Diwaniyah cable.

1. (C) SUMMARY: Diwaniyah Province officials continue to
press their de-Ba,athification campaign, and some of them
view their province as a trailblazer in the effort.
Governor Salim Alwan led a February 9 demonstration to
protest against allowing former Ba,athists to run in the
upcoming elections. Then, on February 11, the PC passed
legislation prohibiting former Ba,athists from holding
management positions in the provincial government. The PC
also is planning to push ahead with measures to take land
leases away from former Ba,athists and auction the land off
to the public. We have been meeting with PC members and
others to underscore the U.S. position of non-interference in
the Iraqi election process and support for
de-Ba,athification conducted in accordance with Iraqi law.
Most have accepted our arguments, although a Provincial
Council (PC) member with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI),who is among the leaders of the de-Ba,athification
effort, told PRToffs that former Ba,athists were seeking to
manipulate the U.S. for their purposes and that if the U.S.
ended up helping such people return to power, she would turn
from viewing us as &friends8 to seeing us as &invaders.8
We have heard a range of views on the impact of
de-Ba,athification on the elections, with a PC member with
the Fadhila party telling us the effort resonates with the
public while locals in a small town tell us that it is a
cynical move that only distracts from key issues such as
unemployment. END SUMMARY
ANOTHER ANTI-BA,ATH DEMONSTRATION

2. (C) The de-Ba,athification campaign, which had been
gaining steam (reftel) in predominantly Shi,a Diwaniyah
Province, gained further momentum over the last week. On
February 9, the provincial media reported that some six
hundred demonstrators, led by Governor Salim (Da,wa),
Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Jubair Salman Awfi (State of
Law, independent) and many other PC members marched to the
Governate Center in protest of the national Cassation
Court,s February 3 decision to delay processing of
de-Ba,athification appeals until after the upcoming national
election. (The demonstration took place despite the fact
that this decision was withdrawn on February 7.) PC Health
Committee Chair Thamir Naji Shkale (elected on the State of
Law ticket but identifying himself as independent),who took
part in the demonstration, estimated to us that as many as
2,000 people participated. The media also reported that
staff of government offices took part. Indeed, a PRT staffer
who had gone to the offices of the Director General of
Agriculture to conduct training on that day found that many
DG staffers were away, reportedly at the demonstration; those
who remained behind suggested to our employee that their
management had encouraged the staff to take part in the
march.
ANTI-BA,ATHISTS MEASURES

3. (C) The PC had announced in late January that all former
Ba,athists must return weapons they had received during the
Saddam era, although they had left unclear how that policy
would be implemented. A local PRT employee reported that,
based on his conversations with at least a dozen locals of
varying political stripes, there was support for the general
idea of taking away Ba,athist weapons but much uncertainty
about how this could be done unless the Ba,athists complied
voluntarily. PC member Zainab Khamza Abaid (Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq - ISCI) told us she strongly supported that
QCouncil of Iraq - ISCI) told us she strongly supported that
measure but downplayed its practical significance. She
commented that everyone was &allowed8 a pistol and
Kalashnikov in their homes, just no heavy weapons. Governor
Salim had told us previously that it would affect only seven
former Ba,athists in Diwaniyah, and had been vague on its
implementation. Other PC members with whom we have spoken
have been equally vague about implementation.

4. (C) Meanwhile, the PC continued its de-Ba,athification
drive on February 11, when it passed legislation dismissing
all former Ba,ath members from leadership positions in the
provincial administration. PC member Abaid initially told us
that this and other de-Ba,athification measures applied only
to formerly &active,8 higher-ranking members of that party,
but later suggested that it applied to rank-and-file members
as well. She said that office directors and others in
leadership posts could retain their salaries but would lose
their positions, although they could work in lower-level
positions. She said that officials could not appeal the
decision to remove or demote them. A local PRT employee
suggested the public is skeptical that all former Ba,athists
would be fired or downgraded, since many hold important posts
suggesting strong political connections. The deputy editor
of the Governor,s newspaper, for instance, is a former
Ba,athist, and his removal is far from certain given that he

is well connected politically, the PRT employee speculated.
PLANS TO TAKE LAND AWAY FROM BA,ATHISTS

5. (C) PC member Abaid told us the PC is also preparing
measures to implement legislation the PC passed in late
January that would terminate the land leases of former
Ba,athists. She estimated that in Diwaniyah Province, a few
hundred Ba,athists had gotten such leases in the Saddam era;
they had retained those leases, which are renewed annually,
while renting out the lands to others at a significant
profit. The new move, which would be carried out under the
supervision of the Director General of Agriculture and the PC
Committees on Accountability and Justice, would terminate the
leases as they come up for renewal over the course of the
coming year, with the land to be auctioned off to the public.
Asked if former Ba,athists could appeal that decision,
Abaid responded that most were no longer even residing in the
province and were not likely to return from abroad.
Diwaniyah is a small province in which everyone knows who was
a Ba,athist, she continued, making challenges even more
unlikely. In any case, she concluded, the PC did not
anticipate a mechanism for filing appeals.

6. (C) Abaid suggested that the land issue was of prime
importance in this heavily agricultural province, and that
Ba,athist leases were a sore point with the public. She
noted ) with evident pride ) that Diwaniyah was leading the
way in taking land away from Ba,athists in this way, and
predicted that most other provinces (&except maybe those in
the north8) would follow suit.
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. ROLE

7. (C) The conversations with these and other interlocutors
came as part of PRT Diwaniyah,s continued engagement with
leading politicians about U.S. views on the elections and
de-Ba,athification. We highlighted that the U.S. is not
interfering in Iraqi electoral processes, sees the importance
of ensuring Iraqi citizens protection of due process during
de-Ba,athification, and supports de-Ba,athification
conducted in accordance with Iraqi law. Most of our
interlocutors have told us they understand and accept our
arguments, and have said they view the U.S. as playing a
generally positive role in supporting free and fair elections
in Iraq.

8. (C) PRToffs have heard some expressions of skepticism,
however. PC Committee on Coordination and Relations Chairman
Ayad Tulai (Fadhila) told us he recognized that the U.S. was
not actively seeking to interfere, much less to help restore
the Ba,athists to power. While he understood the argument
that the USG was not interfering, however, Tulai said that
the fact that the USG was actively promoting strong views on
the elections gave the impression that the U.S. was still
trying to make decisions for Iraq. Iraqis had to take tough
decisions on their own, Tulai continued, and the U.S. should
steer clear of the entire issue. ISCI PC member Abaid, who
noted that the Saddam regime had killed nine of her close
relatives, spoke with particular passion on the issue. She
accepted our argument about U.S. non-interference and said
that she viewed the U.S. as a &friend.8 She expressed
concern, however, that former Ba,athists were manipulating
the U.S. to serve their goals, adding that if we ended up
helping bring Ba,athists back to power or even on to the
ballot, she would view the U.S. as &invaders.8
VIEWS ON DE-BA,ATHIFICATION

9. (C) ISCI PC member Abaid expressed impassioned support for
the de-Ba,athification campaign, saying that unless former
Ba,athists were excluded from running for office, the
upcoming elections would be widely viewed as &false.8
Qupcoming elections would be widely viewed as &false.8
Several of our interlocutors have taken issue with this
position. Independent PC member Shkale, while acknowledging
that he marched in the February 9 demonstration, told us the
de-Ba,athification campaign was ill-timed, appearing to be a
political move; de-Ba,athification should have been
accomplished several years ago, but it should now wait until
after the elections. Fadhila member Tulai said he disagreed
with his own party on the issue and commented that
de-Ba,athification should not be carried out right before
the elections. Tulai added, however, that the campaign would
resonate with many people in the province and would therefore
hurt the prospects of former PM Allawi,s party in Diwaniyah.
At least one conversation that a PRToff held in the small
town of Saniyah called into question the de-Ba,athification
campaign,s resonance with the public: several university
students told PRToff they were tired of the issue. (&Enough
of the de-Ba,athification debate, we want to feed our
families.8) The students expressed frustration that the
candidates had no economic platforms and said they saw little
point in voting. 10. (C) Views on de-Ba,athification also
are tempered by the sentiment, which we hear with some
regularity from a range of contacts, that for all its
brutality, the Saddam regime provided the public with
essential services more effectively than the current
government is doing. A leading tribal figure in Mahniwiyah,
for instance, expressed this view to us. Diwaniyah,s
Director General of Education told us that many teachers felt

that the educational system had worked better under the
Saddam regime. He has instructed his entire staff not to
discuss de-Ba,athification in order to stay out of trouble.

11. (C) On the other hand, the recent bombings in Najaf and
Karbala, in which a number of Diwaniyah citizens were killed
or injured, have reinforced anti-Ba,athist passions. The
Governor and other officials have publicly blamed the
Ba,athists and, as our U.S. military partners find in their
engagements with locals in the province, there is a
widespread belief that Ba,athists did indeed engineer these
attacks. The provincial media has been full of reports about
the attacks and the victims who hailed from Diwaniyah.
COMMENT

12. (C) The de-Ba,athification effort is gaining steam
rapidly in Diwaniyah. For some, like PC member Abaid who
lost nine of her relatives to the Saddam regime, the motives
are no doubt sincere. For others, it is likely driven
primarily by political motives. Judging by our conversations
with elites and others, it is far from clear whether the
effort will have the political effect desired by those who
are driving it. Some locals apparently see all former
Ba,athists as culpable for the crimes of the Saddam regime,
while others blame only higher-ups or &active8 members.
This could create tensions, particularly given that the PC,s
latest measures appear to be vague about which of those
groups they apply to and how the measures will be
implemented. The lack of an appeals mechanism is of
particular concern in that regard. Further complicating the
issue is that, while most of the public in Diwaniyah remains
bitter toward the Saddam regime, even some of those who are
embittered believe that the regime provided services to the
public more effectively that does the current government.
FORD