DE-BA'ATHIFICATION AND THE ELECTIONS: A COMPLEX

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000422 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: DE-BA'ATHIFICATION AND THE ELECTIONS: A COMPLEX AND MUDDIED PROCESS REF: A. BAGHDAD 053 ¶B. BAGHDAD 071 ¶C. BAGHDAD 072 ¶D. BAGHDAD 109 ¶E. BAGHDAD 121 ¶F. BAGHDAD 144 ¶G. BAGHDAD 285 Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Yuri Kim for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The disqualification of election candidates by the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) and the resulting appeals process appears to have been heavily influenced by political considerations. Efforts to prevent the barring of candidates until after a transparent, thorough review process crumbled as Shi'a politicians could ill afford to appear soft on Ba'athists given strong support for the AJC's decisions among Shi'a voters. Notwithstanding the Cassation Court's assertions, questions about the legal authority of the AJC linger, while its inner workings, dominated by Ahmed Chalabi and his ally Ali al-Lami, remain opaque. The appeals process for disqualified candidates, who were not able to review or directly rebut the evidence against them, fell decidedly short of Western standards, but no one apart from the aggrieved parties and their supporters appears to have any appetite to revisit this sordid chapter in Iraq's electoral saga. END SUMMARY. HOW DID WE GET HERE? -------------- ¶2. (C) Reports of the disqualification of election candidates on de-Ba'athification grounds first appeared in local media on January 7 (ref A). At the time, it was unclear what body had made such a determination since the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) had not issued a public statement; some reports indicated that recommendations for disqualification had been made by the Accountability and Justice Committee at the Council of Representatives (COR). In a January 10 meeting, PM Maliki advisor Sadiq Rikabi insisted that the PM's office had been taken by surprise by this development, and that no one in the Da'wa party had been involved in the AJC's efforts to disqualify candidates (ref B). Later comments by Maliki confidantes reiterated this position. ¶3. (C) From the outset, commissioners for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) were reportedly under pressure from both the Shi'a-led Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and Maliki's State of Law alliance (SLA) to abide by the AJC's determination. IHEC Chairman Faraj al-Haydari told Pol M/C as early as January 11 that IHEC was too weak to stand up to the political pressure and that a majority of its commissioners, including the representative of the Sunni-dominated Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),supported accepting the AJC's actions without question (ref C). On January 14, IHEC officially de-certified some 500 election candidates within hours of receiving a letter from Ahmed Chalabi, acting on behalf of the AJC (ref D). ¶4. (C) Efforts to find a political solution to the de-Ba'athification issue, led by Badr Organization head Hadi al-Amiri with the backing of ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim, appeared to gain traction initially (ref E),but then floundered. Anti-Ba'athist sentiment in the Shi'a south, whipped up by the disqualification controversy, made questioning the AJC's actions political poison for Shi'a politicians, while the formation of the Cassation Chamber to hear appeals from candidates seemed to provide a legal way out of the crisis. Reflecting this evolution of events, PM Maliki expressed support on January 19 for a plan to install new AJC commissioners and postpone the appeals of at least some cases until after the elections (ref F),but appears to have taken no further action to promote this option. He Qhave taken no further action to promote this option. He later defended the AJC's authority and its disqualifications in statements to the press, as did representatives of the rival INA. ¶5. (C) The February 3 Cassation Chamber ruling directing IHEC to allow disqualified candidates to remain on the ballots pending a post-election review of their appeals (ref G) was welcomed by the secular Sunni-majority Iraqiyya coalition and other parties/alliances hit hard by the AJC lists. The INA, SLA and even President Talabani immediately blasted the ruling as unconstitutional and threatened to "withdraw confidence" via a COR vote from the Cassation Chamber for overstepping its authority. In the faced of this backlash, the Chamber reversed itself, announcing that there were fewer cases than previously thought and that it would decide all appeals on or about February 12 (the official start of the election campaign). (Note: In an open letter to Federal Supreme Court (FCS) Chief Justice Medhat, 140 Iraqi attorneys condemned the pressure political entities had placed on the Cassation Chamber. End Note.) Of the 177 appeals on file, the Cassation Chamber reinstated 26 candidates and denied the appeals of the rest, including prominent MPs Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dhafer al-Ani, both in the Iraqiyya coalition. THE AJC: LEGALLY EMPOWERED TO ACT? -------------- ¶6. (C) The AJC was established in 2008 by the Law of the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice to "replace" the de-Ba'athification Commission (aka Supreme National Council for De-Ba'athification headed by Ahmed Chalabi. According to the law, the AJC is to be made up of seven commissioners, nominated by the Council of Ministers and approved by the COR, drawn from all components of Iraqi society. Decisions of the AJC are to be adopted by a majority vote of four or more commissioners. The COR, however, has never filled any of the commissioner positions. A slate of candidates for the AJC, the first names put forward for consideration, was rejected by the COR in November 2009. ¶7. (C) Defenders of the disqualification process claim that the old de-Ba'athification Commission legally morphed into the AJC upon adoption of the 2008 law and that in the absence of COR-approved AJC commissioners, Chalabi, Ali al-Lami (the executive director),and staff have assumed the Commission's duties and authority. Except for Chalabi, the remaining commissioners of the former de-Ba'athification Commission have not claimed to have inherited the titles and powers of commissioners of the AJC. Moreover, they do not appear to be directly involved in the current de-Ba'athification process. COR Speaker Samarrai'e told Pol M/C that forming a special three-MP oversight committee for the AJC provided the body as currently constituted with enough legal authority to perform its functions. These arguments are tenuous, but cannot be rejected out of hand given ambiguities in the AJC law, including the uncertain meaning of the provision stating that "the designation (AJC) shall replace the designation (de-Ba'athification Commission)." ¶8. (C) Supporters of disqualified candidates, in contrast, argue that the de-Ba'athification Commission was stripped of its powers when it was replaced by the AJC. They further contend that even if the de-Ba'athification Commission did transform into the AJC, it still cannot legally act without commissioners. "How can decisions of the AJC be adopted by a majority of commissioners when there are no commissioners?" asked one Iraqiyya contact. This view has decidedly stronger legal merit. ¶9. (C) Several leading politicians have long questioned the statutory authority of the AJC, as formed from the de-Ba'athification Commission, given its lack of new commissioners. Chief Justice Medhat had declined to issue a ruling or opinion in response to several direct and indirect requests for guidance from President Talabani, Vice President Hashimi, Speaker Samarrai'e, MP Saleh al-Mutlaq, and others. Medhat also refrained from providing a clear response to inquiries from the Embassy, but hinted broadly to Pol M/C prior to February 3 that the AJC's legal status was highly questionable. While the Cassation Chamber never released a public decision on the AJC's status, the Embassy obtained late February 16 a copy of the Chamber's ruling on an individual appeal dated February 11 (apparently sent only to Qindividual appeal dated February 11 (apparently sent only to the AJC) which squarely addresses this issue. In the ruling, the judicial panel determined that the AJC was the proper entity for reviewing candidates for de-Ba'athification purposes and that Chalabi's de-Ba'athification Commission was a "regular care taker committee" in the absence of COR-approved AJC commissioners. The court concluded that "because of the absence of clear text in the (AJC law) to dissolve the above mentioned (de-Ba'athification Commission), and as Article 28 of the same law stipulated to replace the name of the commission as the (AJC) ... the cassation panel sees that the work of the (AJC) acquired legitimacy based on the above mentioned reasons." (Comment: It is very possible that political considerations influenced the Chamber's decision. End Comment.) SHROUDED DECISION-MAKING -------------- ¶10. (C) The inner workings and decision-making process of the AJC are opaque. According to PUK MP Abdullah Aliyawi, one of three MPs chosen to provide oversight of the AJC, Chalabi is the AJC Chairman but does not normally participate in the organization's operations. Instead, Lami effectively directs and manages the AJC. Lami relies on two internal AJC committees, the Legal Committee and Follow-up Committee, staffed in part by lawyers, to review the documents and files of individuals identified for de-Ba'athification and make recommendations. Lami then prepares written decisions to present to Chalabi for signature. Aliyawi said that Chalabi authorized Lami to sign certain decisions and papers on his behalf. ¶11. (C) Aliyawi continued that when he and the two other MPs (Falah Shansal, Sadrist, and Rasheed al-Azzawi, IIP) began their review of the AJC's work, more than 1,320 election candidates had been selected for disqualification. (Note: According to Speaker Samarrai'e, this initial list was generated by running candidate names against a large database maintained by the AJC; many candidates were mistakenly identified due to having names similar to persons in the database. End Note.) The MPs, working with AJC staff, reduced this number down to 511. Aliyawi confirmed that he and his COR colleagues signed off on the final list of names. ¶12. (C) Aliyawi declined to give the criteria used for individual de-Ba'athification determinations; Chalabi has asserted publicly that all AJC decisions are taken in accordance with the Iraqi constitution. (Note: Article 7 of the constitution bars from the political process any "entity" that "facilitates, glorifies, promotes or justifies ... the Saddamist Ba'ath in Iraq" as regulated by law. Article 135 makes clear that "mere membership in the dissolved Ba'ath Party" is an insufficient basis to refer an individual to court. End Note.) Speaker Samarrai'e stated publicly at a campaign rally February 13 that current MPs excluded from the elections were disqualified not for being former Ba'athists, but for making statements that extolled the Ba'ath Party. Criticizing this approach, Samarrai'e elaborated that while he did not agree with such statements, the Iraqi constitution ensured each MP the right of free speech, protected by parliamentary immunity. (Note: Per Article 64(2)(A) of the constitution, this immunity only applies to statements made while the COR is in session. End Note.) THE APPEALS PROCESS -------------- ¶13. (C) The 2008 AJC law provides for the formation of a seven-judge Cassation Chamber to "consider the claims" by individuals identified for de-Ba'athification; appeals must be filed within 30 days from the notification of an AJC decision to a concerned party or the date in which he/she is considered notified. While stating that the Chamber must issue appeal decisions (which are to be treated as "final and definitive") within a period of 60 days, the law is silent on the procedures and standards to be used for the appeals process. As such, it does not prescribe a burden of proof, provide for an open forum, or guarantee appellants the right to see the evidence against them. ¶14. (C) In a February 13 telephone conversation with Emboff, FSC Chief Justice Medhat declined to provide the Embassy with a copy of the Cassation Chamber's final decision on candidate disqualification appeals. He confirmed that the judicial panel did not provide a written decision to any of the concerned candidates. In contrast to its February 3 rulings, the Cassation Chamber sent its appeals decision only to the AJC and not to IHEC. (Note: From the appeal decision obtained by the Embassy for one individual case, it appears that the Cassation Chamber issued separate rulings for each appellant using a standard template. Only the following two Qappellant using a standard template. Only the following two sentences address this candidate's particular case: "After reviewing the appeal submitted by the appellant and the original and copied documents which were adopted by the (AJC) in issuing its decision, the panel found the evidence is sufficient and convincing as the appellant was a member of the Iraqi Intelligence Service under the previous regime. Therefore, the panel rejects his appeal and supports the contested decision issued against him." End Note.) ¶15. (C) Asked whether candidates had the opportunity to review the evidence underlying the AJC's determinations, Medhat replied "no" and explained that the appeals process was not akin to a regular court proceeding. Instead, the Cassation Chamber only reviewed the sufficiency of the information provided by the AJC in conjunction with written statements furnished by the candidates with their appeals. (Comment: It appears that the candidates' only opportunity to participate in the appeals process was via the written statements appended to their appeals; the evidence against them was not aired in a forum open to the candidates or otherwise made available to them. End Comment.) ¶16. (C) Mutlaq told PolCouns February 16 that he first learned he had been barred from the elections by the AJC from the media. Only two weeks later did he receive a notice from IHEC of his disqualification. Mutlaq said that requests from both him and his second attorney (his first lawyer resigned after receiving threats) to review the evidence against him went unanswered or were denied. Mutlaq said MP Falah Shansal had shown him, in confidence and as a personal favor, the letter from Deputy COR Speaker Arif Tayfour that had triggered Mutlaq's de-Ba'athification. Mutlaq asserted to PolCouns that the contents of the letter were false and railed that he had never been formally informed of the accusations against him so that he could formulate an effective response. Dhafer al-Ani told PolCouns that he, too, had never received formal notification of any actions, other than to learn from news reports that he was disqualified as a Ba'athist. (Note: Iskander Witwit, the Deputy Governor of Babil province and one of the 26 election candidates who won his appeal, told PRToff that he was aware of the contents of the AJC file against him. However, it is unknown how he might have obtained access to the documents. Witwit alleged that INA MP Qaiser Witwit (no relation) threatened to put him on the de-Ba'athification list if he joined the Iraqiyya coalition. End Note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (C) Certain parties, organizations, and foreign powers might very well have benefited from the de-Ba'athification crisis, but there is still no hard evidence that any of these beneficiaries directed Chalabi and Lami to disqualify election candidates. It is certainly evident that their bold actions have burnished their electoral appeal in the Shi'a community and discredited secular or cross-sectarian parties competing against them. It is also evident that both IHEC and the Cassation Chamber were too weak to resist the political pressure exerted on them, and that Shi'a political leaders -- in the midst of a heated electoral season -- chose to ride the wave of anti-Ba'athist sentiment rather than expose themselves to criticism for fighting against it. The AJC appeals process certainly fell short of Western standards of due process and transparency, but no one besides the aggrieved parties and their supporters appears to have any appetite to revisit this painful chapter of the electoral saga. END COMMENT. FORD