UPDATE #4: NINEWA PROVINCIAL GOV FILES PETITION

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000413 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2025 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KJUS IZ SUBJECT: UPDATE #4: NINEWA PROVINCIAL GOV FILES PETITION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE - RELEASE OF DETAINEES NO LONGER IMMINENT REF: A. BAGHDAD 381 ¶B. BAGHDAD 375 ¶C. BAGHDAD 369 Classified By: Political Counselor Yuri Kim for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Ninewa Provincial Governor (PGOV) Nujaifi filed a petition requesting a change of venue from Tal Kayf back to Mosul for the 9 detainees (reftels A, B, C), citing concern for his personal safety to appear in Tal Kayf for the investigative hearing. In doing so, the anticipated February 14 release of the remaining 9 detainees did not occur, and we have no certainty as to when they will be released. PGOV admitted that 7 of 9 detainees are likely innocent of firing at his convoy. However, Nujaifi alleged that they implicated four additional individuals who allegedly did use firearms. Subsequently, the Tal Kayf investigative judge issued arrest warrants for four Kurds (residents of Wanna, Tal Kayf). PGOV revealed his plan to keep the 9 detainees in custody until the four Kurds can be located and arrested. SANI, USF-I and PRT TL strongly objected, warning Nujaifi he would be perceived as operating outside the rule of law. When SANI briefed Mosul Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Chief Keshro Goran about the turn of events, Goran indicated that he traveled to Erbil with Serbast Terwanishi and other KDP district chiefs to meet Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani, after which he was taking on the responsibility to cooperate and find a way to calm things down. Although highly skeptical of Nujaifi's antics, Goran did not impose any ultimatums or deadlines for the release of the detainees but continues to link the KRG's participation in the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) to the detainee release. Deputy Prime Minister Issawi pressed PGOV to immediately release the detainees, pointing out that PGOV placed them both in an embarrassing situation with the USF-I for backing out of his promise to release the detainees on February 14. PGOV notified USF-I CG that 7 or 9 detainees would be released on February 15, which did not take place. USF-I CG is directly communicating with KRG President Masoud Barzani to apprise him of the detainees' welfare and status. END SUMMARY. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 14, Tal Kayf Judge Mohamad Najim received notice that PGOV's Chief PSD filed an Article 142 petition requesting transfer of venue in the detainee case/investigation from Tal Kayf back to Mosul. The petition cited PGOV's inability to travel to Tal Kayf to testify. Judge Najim became aware of the petition before he could act on the detainee bond/bail issue (the petition has the force of an interlocutory appeal; removing authority from Judge Najim and placing it solely within the power of the Trial/Appellate Court). Mosul Chief Investigative Judge (IJ) Ibrahim Ali Ali affirmed that the petition was reasonable and proper based on safety/security issues. The PRT Rule of Law Advisor spoke with PGOV's lead counsel, Faris, who refused to acknowledge that the PGOV was a party to the petition but reiterated that the PGOV would not interfere in judicial decisions/deliberations concerning release of the detainees. PGOV NUJAIFI - WORKING THE LEGAL SYSTEM -------------- ¶3. (C) Another marathon round of engagements with key leaders started with a morning meeting with Nujaifi, who did not mention that he had filed a petition to block the Qnot mention that he had filed a petition to block the transfer/release of the detainees. Once it became known that Nujaifi had filed a petition, SANI, PRT Team Leader, and USF-I officers returned for a second meeting. Although all signs indicate that the integrity of the judicial review remains intact, Nujaifi demonstrated for the first time that he was employing legal tactics to manipulate the disposition of the detainees. More significantly, Nujaifi linked the fate of the 9 remaining detainees to suspects now named in arrest warrants, offering at one point that the 9 (who provided testimony leading to alleged organizers of the effort to obstruct his convoy) would only be released when the four suspects are arrested. SANI, USF-I, and the PRT all pushed back very hard on this, pointing out that his actions might keep innocents in confinement and unnecessarily instigate larger, regional problems. Nujaifi grew defensive, insisting that he had not interfered with the judicial process but rather taken measures that supported his legal right to pursue justice in response to what he continues to call an assassination attempt. He nonetheless observed that he could make the problem go away by withdrawing his complaint (which forms the basis for existing charges/detention),but said he was not inclined to do so because his "supporters" expect him to react to the attack, and that he would not be able to rein them in if they took measures into their own hands. He also said that he could drop his complaint if the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) met several vague conditions, most notably by not using the February 1 movement/detainee issue as fodder for a media campaign against him. (Comment: The latter musing was not presented as an articulate quid pro quo, but more as an offhand notion that he wants the detainee issue to produce some sort of dividend for him: punishment of those who attacked him or some ill-defined concession from the KDP. End Comment.) KESHRO GORAN - NO MORE ULTIMATUMS -------------- ¶4. (C) When USG interlocutors briefed Mosul KDP Chief Keshro Goran on the status of the detainees, Goran reported that he and KDP Head of Western Ninewa Serbast Terwanishi had just met with President Barzani in Dohuk. (SANI, the PRT, and USF-I met with hard-line Terwanishi on February 13 to discuss the possibility of Nujaifi's trip to Sinjar and his threat that Nujaifi would encounter his downfall.) Goran relayed that there had been further emphasis from KRG leadership on getting the detainees released before any renewed Kurdish Security Forces (KSF) engagement with USF, ISF, or the CCC. Goran added that KRG leadership had also reaffirmed a road closure/economic embargo of Ninewa province absent a release of the detainees. Goran did not cite a deadline or ultimatum, however, intimating that Erbil was expecting an imminent release which would open the door for re-engagement and make countermeasures moot. He offered that Erbil would not be pleased when he reported his observations on the legal process, namely that legal wrangling over jurisdiction would preclude releases for at least 1-2 days at the earliest, if at all. Although he remained consistent in his anti-Nujaifi rhetoric, Goran was considerably more subdued than in previous engagements, suggesting that he did not believe a further deterioration was good for KDP interests and that he would pursue efforts in Erbil to push off implementation of any KRG countermeasures. Perhaps owing to Barzani's instruction, the KRG released the Sheikh and his son, who were taken by the Assayesh and held in Dohuk (allegedly per Goran's instruction). THE WANNA NINE DETAINEES -------------- ¶5. (C) The PRT Rule of Law Advisor visited all nine detainees incarcerated at Mosul Trans Jail on February 14. Even though the KDP continues to claim torture and mistreatment, the detainees continue to be in excellent physical condition and in good spirits. DPM PRESSES FOR DETAINEE RELEASE -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) On February 14, DPM and Nujaifi's national coalition partner, Rafe al-Issawi pressed Nujaifi to release those detainees that were of no concern to the case. Issawi told Nujaifi that he put both of them in an embarrassing situation by reneging on their promise to release the detainees on February 14 and avoid the appearance that he misled USG interlocutors. On the morning of February 15, Nujaifi sent a message to USF-I CG indicating that 7 of the 9 detainees would be released. PGOV alleged that the one of the remaining detainees had fired on his convoy and the other Qthe remaining detainees had fired on his convoy and the other had a text message on his phone with instructions to "Kill Atheel." (Note: Nujaifi's claim that he can drop the original complaint and release the detainees is not necessarily true. Legally, even if he drops the charges, the judiciary has no choice but to act on the original complaint. What is possible, however, is that he withdraws his petition to relocate the case back to Mosul, which would keep the case under Tal Kayf jurisdiction where the judge has already indicated a likely release decision. End Note.) ¶7. (C) COMMENT: It is hard to predict Barzani's reaction if the release of the detainees is delayed further. Since this continues to be a point of honor with Barzani, "countermeasures" are still very much on the table. As for Nujaifi, while everything he appears to be doing is within his legal rights, and in theory not interference with the rule of law, he made it clear he has some discretion and that he is not inclined to walk away under any scenario that paints him as weak or outdone by the KDP. END COMMENT. FORD