PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION SECURITY PLANNING - GOI AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000411 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2020 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PTER ASEC IZ SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION SECURITY PLANNING - GOI AND UNAMI PERSPECTIVES REF: A. BAGHDAD 00260 B. BAGHDAD 00368 Classified By: A/PMA S. Reid for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent briefings by the GOI and United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) personnel provided insights into the state of election security planning in advance of the March 7th national poll. On February 11th, the Electoral Supreme Security Committee (ESSC) hosted a second conference (ref A) to specifically address provincial election security planning. While a number of administrative and logistical challenges, chief of which was the possible problem of Iraqi Security Force (ISF) voting during the March 4th Special Needs Voting, were addressed, the overall tenor amongst those present was one of confidence. Two days later, UNAMI,s Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) for the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), Sandra Mitchell, gave a comprehensive update on the status of IHEC preparations for the March 7th national elections. While noting the significant challenges and the heightened political and security risks, Mitchell expects the overall conduct of the general election to be successful. END SUMMARY. -------------- GOI PROVINCIAL SECURITY MEETING -------------- ¶2. (U) A ESSC conference with provincial ISF commanders was held on Thursday February 11th at Camp Iraqi Heroes, a Iraqi military base adjacent to USF-I,s Camp Victory. Senior representatives from IHEC, the ISF, and UNAMI were in attendance. From USF-I, LTG Charles Jacoby, Deputy Commanding General Operations, and the three U.S. Divisional Commanders were the senior officers present. The first couple of hours were taken up with public speeches and with a press conference. Thereafter each of the provincial ISF leaders, mostly Provincial Chiefs of Police and Iraqi Army (IA) Operational Commanders briefed on the state of elections security planning in each of their respective provinces. Some highlights: ¶3. (C) Special Needs Voting. This was the main challenge, identified by the participants. The Special Needs voter list for ISF personnel is incomplete and inaccurate due to the difficulty of compiling accurate data. Commanders were concerned that this would lead to the disenfranchisement of security personnel if they were unable to vote on March 4th. LTG Ayden Khaled Kader, Chairman of the ESSC and Deputy Minister of Interior, suggested that personnel could be released from duty on Election Day to vote at the discretion of operational commanders. However, this suggestion did not fully satisfy those in attendance, especially those with units serving out of their home provinces (e.g., 1st IA Division). COMMENT: All ISF personnel were removed from the March 7th election voter list and placed on the Special Needs Voting list for polling on March 4th. Names of ISF and IP personnel would not appear on the voting list for March 7th. Further, it is not clear how ISF personnel, who are not allowed into polling centers, would actually vote on March 7th. END COMMENT ¶4. (C) Curfew. The timings and parameters of the pre-election curfew is a big concern to ISF leaders. However, the details will not be released until closer to the election primarily for security reasons. After the conference, Bob Langridge, UNAMI Election Security Advisor, told POLOFF that LTG Ayden is very mindful of the need to strike an appropriate balance between creating a secure Qstrike an appropriate balance between creating a secure environment without impeding voter freedom of movement. Landridge felt that if a pre-election curfew was imposed it was likely that it would be lifted prior to the poll. ¶5. (C) Iran. An ISF representative from Basra was quite concerned about diplomatic personnel from the Iranian Consulate interfering with the election process. LTG Ayden stated that only election observers properly accredited by IHEC would be allowed to function as election observers. ¶6. (U) International Election Observers. LTG Ayden stressed the importance of providing protection/security for international election observers. ¶7. (C) Logistical/Administrative concerns. Some commanders reported a lack of concrete barriers and concertina wire; a lack of trained female searchers; and a lack of fuel. COMMENT: USF-I was asked and has provided barrier material in certain provinces. END COMMENT. ¶8. (C) Facility Protection Service (FPS). The conference participants struggled to define the role of the FPS in the overall elections security effort. Indeed, no one present expressed any confidence in the FPS,s ability to contribute in a meaningful way to creating a secure environment. The consensus was to assign FPS personnel the task of guarding the entrances to the polling centers but not to allow them inside. ¶9. (C) Forces Assigned. With minor exceptions, every commander seemed content with the number of security forces assigned for the mission. ¶10. (C) Kirkuk/Disputed Internal Borders (DIB). One gentleman attempted to bring this up but the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) Commander intervened and the discussion ended promptly likely due to the sensitivity and uncertainty regarding election security planning for this key northern area. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: By U.S. military standards, the briefings lacked details and provided little insight into the actual state of provincial security preparations for the election. It may be that the meeting was held primarily for the benefit of the media coverage it provided and to placate U.S. and international observers. Nevertheless, the Iraqi leaders in the room seemed reasonably content with the security situation and the overall tone was relaxed. The challenges, noted above should be viewed in the context of this overall sense of confidence and not unduly weighted. END COMMENT. -------------- UNAMI ELECTION DAY VISUALIZATION -------------- ¶12. (U) On Saturday February 13th, UNAMI,s Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) for the IHEC, Sandra Mitchell, briefed USF-I and Embassy personnel on the state of elections planning. Mitchell spoke to a wide audience regarding IHEC,s preparation for the election, UNAMI,s critical advisory role, and the turbulent political environment. With regard to election security matters, Mitchell, accompanied and supported by Bob Langridge, UNAMI Election Security Advisor, made several salient points: ¶13. (C) Movement of critical election material. Routes will be coordinated with the ISF; USF-I will detail Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets in support. Mitchell pointed out that election materials have been arriving in the country for several weeks now without incident. ¶14. (C) Attacks against IHEC facilities. Providing physical security to election warehouses, nearly 9,000 polling centers, Government Election Offices, count centers, and conditional polling stations during a multi-day event presents a formidable challenge. Of these sites, Mitchell keyed on the absolute importance of securing the warehouses, where ballots and election materials will be stored. ¶15. (C) Assassinations of candidates and attacks on political party headquarters. LTG Ayden has offered to provide protective services for candidates running for office. ¶16. (C) ISF disenfranchisement. Mitchell was concerned that potential problems with ISF voting during the Special Needs Voting would adversely impact the psyche, of the security forces. To that end, she is working with IHEC to avert the bad optic of soldiers and police being turned away from the polling centers. The use of a conditional voting mechanism is an option that may mitigate this risk but no final decision has been made. The UNAMI CTA pointed out that the Qdecision has been made. The UNAMI CTA pointed out that the March 4th polling could foreshadow the main election and therefore it was important that it go smoothly. ¶17. (C) Female Suicide Bombers. Mitchell reported that IHEC was especially concerned with the threat posed by female suicide bombers. To address this, the commission has pledged to have at least two female searchers at each polling center. More than five thousand tents are being manufactured in Baghdad to facilitate searches of female voters throughout the country. COMMENT: Hereto, IHEC has been resistant to having two female searchers at each polling center citing resource constraints. However, after continued discussion with the ESSC and relevant security agencies, it appears that the commissioners have agreed to support the additional layer of security. END COMMENT. ¶18. (C) High Profile Attacks (HPA). In the event of a HPA or other significant disruptions, Mitchell said that IHEC has the authority to suspend voting in a particular area for a number of hours or even for a day ) such events need not halt voting or the conduct of the general election in and of themselves. ¶19. (C) Mitchell said that IHEC is technically and operationally in good shape, and is better prepared than it was for the January 2009 provincial elections. However, she is worried about the tense security and political situation. With so much more at stake, the political intensity is far greater for this election than the January 2009 poll and as a result, IHEC is under great pressure. The commissioners, in contrast to the provincial election, are more anxious than excited. But in conclusion, Mitchell said she expects the election to be successful. FORD