AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO ANBAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000372

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO ANBAR

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During the Ambassador's trip to Anbar
province on February 9, provincial government leaders and
tribal sheikhs implored him to "intervene" more directly
against perceived Iranian domination of the GOI. They
envisioned Anbar as the key to a prosperous, stable, and
united Iraq that enjoyed strong relations with the United
States. At the same time, they worried that Iranian meddling
would preclude free and fair elections and deny Sunnis a
place in Iraq's political future. The Ambassador assured the
Anbaris of continued U.S. engagement, including support for
national elections, and contrasted America's vision of a
strong and internationally engaged Iraq with Iran's
preference for a weak and isolated client state, divided
along sectarian lines. END SUMMARY.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT LEADERS URGE U.S. INTERVENTION
-------------- --------------

2.(C) In a morning meeting with Anbar's provincial
leadership, Acting Governor Fuad al-Karbuli acknowledged the
province's ongoing security challenges to the Ambassador, but
lauded his colleagues' cooperation in reconstituting the
army and police. He was optimistic that Anbari leaders would
be successful in defeating terrorist threats. (Note:
Terrorists have targeted Anbar's Provincial Government Center
multiple times in the last several months, most recently in a
Dec. 30, 2009 incident that killed a Provincial Council
member and security guard and seriously wounded Governor
Qasim al-Fahadawi. End Note.) Karbuli highlighted Provincial
Council (PC) members' support for upcoming parliamentary
elections, and advocated investment and economic development
in Anbar as a means to thwart terrorists' appeal and reduce
dependence on the central government.

3.(C) Continuing Karbuli's point, PC Chairman Dr. Jasim
al-Halbusi praised the "victory" against terrorism in Anbar,
but said that "to consolidate you must offer people
something." The government in Baghdad provided Anbar with an
annual budget of USD $112 million, he said, yet the province
carried a debt of USD $60 million. He noted that some
Anbaris still had only two to four hours of electricity per
day, and that despite previous USG assistance the province
continued to suffer deficiencies in education, agriculture,
and basic infrastructure (notably the sewage system, which he
commented was "poisoning" the Euphrates River). High
unemployment exacerbated the situation. This was despite
Anbar's vast resources and potential: "We have everything
from sand to uranium, sixty percent of Iraq's water, millions
of acres of agricultural land." Halbusi condemned the
"failure of leadership" in Baghdad that led to the
squandering of "billions" of dollars, especially in oil
resources. He asserted that the United States had an
obligation to those Americans and Iraqis who died as a result
of the U.S. invasion of Iraq to intervene with national
authorities and create effective leadership in Baghdad.

4.(C) On de-Ba'athification, Deputy Governor Hikmat
al-Mohamdi said his name was on the Accountability and
Justice Commission's (AJC) disqualification list even though
he had participated in the December 2005 national elections
and had gained the trust of the PC. He said the "sole
choice" that remained for the United States was to force a
review of the AJC's work so that innocent Iraqis could run
for office. (Note: Hikmat told us he had appealed his
inclusion on the de-Ba'athification list to the Cassation
Qinclusion on the de-Ba'athification list to the Cassation
Chamber. End Note.)

SECURITY OFFICIALS CONFIDENT AHEAD OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS
-------------- --------------

5.(C) On the security front, Iraqi Army Major General
Abullah al-Jaburi (who chairs the weekly Anbar Operations
Center meeting to coordinate security matters) said the army
gained substantive experience on elections security in 2005
and was capable of ensuring security for the upcoming
contest. He stated that Anbaris trusted the security forces
and "don't want to return to square one. We'll defy the
terrorists." Interim Provincial Chief of Police Major
General Baha al-Karkhi said that although the police force
had been formed in tough circumstances and "in a hurry," it
was performing well. He called for a more professional
police force but claimed that the "questionable links" (i.e.,
ties to Iran) of Interior Minister Jawwad Bolani hampered
that goal. (Note: PM Maliki appointed Karkhi as interim
provincial police chief after the PC fired Chief Tariq
Abdullah. Karkhi's criticism of Bolani thus likely reflects
his loyalty to Maliki. End Note.)
SHEIKHS CALL FOR MORE U.S. INTERVENTION
--------------

6.(C) Clad in traditional garb, eight tribal sheikhs filtered
into Camp Ramadi for an afternoon session with the
Ambassador. With speech rich in proverb and allegory, each
spoke in turn to express disappointment with the national
government in Baghdad and concern about Iranian interference
in Iraq. All believed that the United States was not
intervening actively enough to address the problems they
thought were brought on by the U.S. invasion. "If you build
a new house, it must be better than the old one," exclaimed
Sheikh Mohammed al-Ilyawi, "But we don't like the new house!
The Shi'a are spoiled and don't let anyone in." Sheikh
Abdullah al-Faraj worried that "the situation is tense and
might result in a civil war." Sheikh Ilyawi added: "You are
the father of Iraq (Abu Iraq)! You created the problems here
and we call on you and the U.S. Embassy to take your rightful
role in fixing them."

7.(C) The sheikhs worried about the effects of the
de-Ba'athification campaign, especially in their
majority-Sunni province. "Seventy-five percent of Iraqis
were Ba'athists," noted Sheikh Hatim al-Nimrawi. "We spent
35 years under that regime." Despite their distaste for the
prevailing political situation, the sheikhs affirmed their
support for the electoral process and a long-term partnership
with the United States. "The mistake of the boycott (of
2005) will not be repeated. We got the word out to everyone
to vote and have been doing this for the past several
months," said Sheikh Sa'ad al-Aethawi. The sheikhs requested
a U.S. consulate for Ramadi and U.S. assistance to build a
provincial airport.


8. (C) COMMENT: Allegations of malign and widespread Iranian
interference in Iraqi affairs are a common refrain in Anbar,
whose residents often feel isolated from and ignored by
Baghdad. Accustomed to patiently hearing complaints and
requests for assistance from their members, the tribal
sheikhs reversed roles in their meeting with the Ambassador,
reflecting their belief that the United States still remains
the ultimate arbiter in Iraqi politics. END COMMENT.
HILL