CW DESTRUCTION PLAN IN IRAQ: NO MONEY AND SHIFTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000364 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR THE HAGUE FOR BIEK SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN, CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) NSC FOR LUTES WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020 TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IZ SUBJECT: CW DESTRUCTION PLAN IN IRAQ: NO MONEY AND SHIFTING PLAYERS REF: A. 09 HAGUE 738 ¶B. HAGUE 39 ¶C. HAGUE 79 ¶D. MIKULAK-BANAA LETTER OF 4 FEBRUARY 2010 Classified By: PM MinCouns Cameron Munter for reasons 1.4(b) & (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. During a February 7 meeting with PMOff and a United States Forces - Iraq (USF-I) J-3 representative, Dr. Mohammed Al Sharaa, Director General of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (INMD),claimed the GOI did not forward prior chemical munitions find reports to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) because these munitions finds had not been filled with chemical agents. In addition, Dr. Al Sharaa, although admitting the importance of designating key actors to coordinate Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) destruction plans, stated the GOI would not send the technical experts who participated in the January CW destruction plan discussions in The Hague to the February 22-26 follow-up discussions, citing lack of funding. Finally, Dr. Al Sharaa revealed the formation of a GOI inter-ministerial technical expert committee that will review the proposed CW destruction plan and decide whether encapsulation of the Muthanna bunker is a valid option. The Embassy will continue to engage with the GOI on these issue, stressing the importance of participant continuity in destruction planning and the future funding of CW destruction operations. End Summary. -------------- -- GOI CONFUSED OVER WHAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS FINDS NEED TO BE REPORTED TO OPCW -------------- -- ¶2. (SBU) On February 7, PMOff and LTC Steve Creighton, USF-I J-3 CBRNE Fusion Cell Lead, met with representatives from the INMD and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to discuss chemical munitions finds reporting to the OPCW, the proposed CW destruction plan and the upcoming OPCW Executive Council meeting at The Hague. During this meeting, PMOff provided the GOI reports of chemical munitions finds discovered by USF-I between February and August 2009. Although these reports were previously provided by the U.S. to Dr. Al Sharaa and sBG Ali, MoD Chemical Defense Corps, the GOI failed to forward them to the OPCW, as required under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (ref. A). When pressed by the USG for the reasons behind its failure to transmit these reports, Dr. Al Sharaa responded that the GOI would only transmit munitions finds that had been filled with chemical agents. For example, he claimed that the GOI would not need to report munitions that had been rendered unserviceable by UNSCOM. Further, he stated that in order to determine which munitions finds the GOI needed to report to the OPCW, the GOI would need to analyze them in a laboratory. (Note and Comment: The U.S. does not intrusively test recovered rounds for confirmation of agent type or fill. Rather, the U.S. declares rounds that have been identified as having been manufactured as chemical rounds. With this disagreement on the reporting requirements under the CWC, it will be important for GOI representatives, while they are at The Hague in February, to go through these reports with the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS),clarifying the CWC's requirements QTechnical Secretariat (TS),clarifying the CWC's requirements for these and all future chemical munitions finds. End Note and Comment.) -------------- -------------- FEBRUARY HAGUE TRIP: PREVIOUS TECHNICAL EXPERT PARTICIPANTS WILL NOT ATTEND -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In response to PMOff's question regarding Iraqi technical representation at the February OPCW Executive Council meetings, Dr. Al Sharaa, although claiming to agree that key Iraqi actors are necessary to coordinate Iraq's CW destruction plan, admitted the GOI would send different participants to the OPCW to continue the dialogue regarding CW destruction plans in Iraq. (Note: In January, the GOI sent Iraqi technical experts Mohanad Al-Helli, Director, Chemical Activity Department, INMD, and Khalid Al-Janabi, Engineer, to The Hague for discussions with the USG and the OPCW TS on possible options on destroying CW remnants in Iraq (ref. B). End Note.) PMOff stressed the importance of continuity in the destruction plan discussions and the technical expertise of both Mohanad and Khalid (ref. C & D). Dr. Al Sharaa responded by claiming the GOI did not have the money to fund the travel for these two individuals and that he (Dr. Al Sharaa) would be attending the February technical meetings with Jwan Khioka, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA),sBG Mohammed Ali, MoD, and Dr. Essam, INMD. (Comment and Note: Although Dr. Al Sharaa claims he recognizes the importance of these meetings and the need for key GOI actors to coordinate Iraq's destruction plan, his failure to send Mohanad, who works directly for Dr. Al Sharaa, speaks volumes. Rather than sending Dr. Essam from INMD to attend the upcoming meetings, Dr. Al Sharaa could just as easily have sent Mohanad, the head of his Chemical Activity Department, and an individual with both the knowledge and expertise to participate in these important CW destruction planning discussions. In addition to issues within INMD, there appear to be issues with the MoD as well. Minister of Defense Abd Al-Qadr Al-Mufriji has given permission for sBG Ali to travel to The Hague for the February meetings; however, it is unclear whether he will ultimately be allowed to participate in the meetings. Previously, Minister Al-Mufriji rescinded his permission for sBG Ali to depart Iraq without any explanation for this decision, thereby denying the participants an opportunity to consider the Iraqi military's views on CW destruction plans in Iraq. (ref. D). End Comment and Note.) -------------- GOI TECHNICAL EXPERT COMMITTEE FORMED TO REVIEW THE CHEMICAL WEAPON DESTRUCTION PLAN -------------- ¶4. (C) In order to review the CW destruction plan proposed in January, the GOI has formed an inter-ministerial technical expert committee that will determine whether encapsulation of the Muthanna bunker would be sufficient, Dr. Al Sharaa revealed. Although the GOI had not selected him to serve on this committee, Dr. Al Sharaa expressed concern that encapsulation would be insufficient and the contents of the bunker could have a negative environmental effect on neighboring areas. At one point during this discussion, Dr. Al Sharaa claimed there are unexploded ordinances (UXO) in the bunker. (Note and Comment: Dr. Al Sharaa showed U.S. representatives several aerial photos of the Muthanna bunker, which clearly showed a hole in the top of the bunker and chemical munitions scattered on the bunker floor. Dr. Al Sharaa would not allow us to take these photos, claiming they were classified. It is unclear whether this demonstration was meant to suggest the scattered munitions were UXO, as he claimed. However, based upon previous USG assessments, there are no UXO in the Muthanna bunker (ref. B). End Note and Comment.) ¶5. (SBU) After expressing his concerns that encapsulation would not be sufficient, Dr. Al Sharaa then seemed to shift gears, claiming a previously-proposed U.S. plan for destruction was too expensive. He stated he preferred the Qdestruction was too expensive. He stated he preferred the plan that had been proposed by the German government (ref. A),which was not as detailed or as expensive as the U.S. plan. LTC Creighton suggested that another alternative the GOI might consider could be a hybrid of the German and U.S. plan, further suggesting that the GOI break the destruction plan into tasks and request international assistance with each specific task. Further complicating the issue, Dr. Al Sharaa informed the U.S. reps that the GOI does not have the money to fund CW destruction, claiming the GOI budget has already been passed and the earliest the GOI would have money for destruction costs would be in FY 2011. ¶6. (C) Comment: Based upon the failure of the GOI to grasp the importance of sending the same technical expert team to The Hague for further CW destruction plan discussions with the OPCW TS and the U.S. and the statements made by Dr. Al Sharaa that the GOI is unable to fund any CW destruction in the immediate future, there may be concerns that the GOI does not consider compliance with the CWC a priority. What is apparent is that any CW destruction plan would require complete funding by the international community, as the GOI has not made the task of either encapsulating the bunker or breaking the seal and inventorying and destroying the contents of the bunker a fiscal priority. If Iraqi CW destruction implementation is envisioned for any time in the near future, significant buy-in from the international community is required. However, without a clear CW destruction plan and executable tasks that can be communicated by the GOI, complete international funding is uncertain. The Embassy will continue to engage the GOI, stressing the importance of CW destruction funding and the importance of consistent Iraqi participation at international forums. End Comment. HILL