FORMER SPEAKER ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, IRAN, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000347

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER SPEAKER ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, IRAN, AND
POST-ELECTIONS GOVERNMENT FORMATION

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Gary A. Grappo
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1.(C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Former Council of
Representatives (COR) Speaker, and current member of the
secular nationalist "Coalition for Iraq's Unity," Mahmoud
al-Mashhadani criticized the Cassation Chamber's recent
ruling allowing disqualified candidates to participate in the
March 7 elections pending resolution of their appeals.
Mashhadani said the judicial opinion merely postponed a
substantive decision on de-Ba'athification, and worried what
would happen if winning candidates were prevented from taking
seats in the COR for alleged Ba'athist ties. He stated that
Iraqi candidates should criticize Iranian interference in
Iraq, but claimed that they could not do so without American
protection. He hoped a government could be formed within a
month after the election results and said negotiations
between parties were already underway; however, based on
previous experience, he thought at least three to four months
would be necessary. Mashhadani envisioned a strong COR
Speaker and Prime Minister in the new government, with the
presidency limited to a ceremonial role without a veto. He
expected U.S. influence to increase despite the military
withdrawal and hoped for a strong U.S. presence in Iraq until
at least 2020. Masshadani lost much political influence
after being outsted as COR Speaker in late 2008 yet he
reflects the views of at least some in Iraq's Sunni
community. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

JUDICIAL RULING A "POSTPONEMENT," NOT A SOLUTION
-------------- -

2.(C) Former COR Speaker Mashhadani told A/DCM February 4
that the Cassation Chamber ruling of the previous day was not
a solution to the question of disqualified candidates but
merely "postponement" of a difficult decision on
de-Ba'athification. Mashhadani's two main concerns were
that: 1) while Sunnis were at ease with the ruling, Iraqi
Shi'a strongly opposed it, and 2) there was no guarantee that
candidates who won in the election would be able to take
their seats in the COR. Mashhadani said the major lesson of
this episode was that, "You can't interfere more than
necessary." Mashhadani also claimed that the Coalition for
Iraq,s Unity (CIU) had been on the verge of boycotting
elections until the Cassation Chamber decision. (Note: This
contradicted what Mashhadani told Emboff on January 31, when
he said his coalition,s talk of a boycott was an empty
threat meant for political maneuver. END NOTE.)

CHALABI A "SECTARIAN FISH"
--------------

3.(C) Mashhadani condemned de-Ba'athification efforts as
sectarian and called Ahmad Chalabi "a fish that only survives
in a sea of sectarianism. If that dries up, he'll die."
Nevertheless, Mashhadani said the true number of "secret
Ba'athists" in government was much greater than the number of
those accused by the Accountability and Justice Commission
(AJC). Those on the AJC's lists, he said, were Ba'athists
prior to 2003 and thus files of information existed to
condemn them, whereas others had become hard-core Ba'athists
after the U.S. invasion. Mashhadani dismissed the charges
against Sunni hardliner MP Saleh al-Mutlaq, noting that he
had served in parliament for years and, Mashhadani claimed,
had been imprisoned for ties to Iran under Saddam.

THE NEIGHBORS: POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE INVOLVEMENT
-------------- --------------

4.(C) Mashhadani believed the struggle between Turkey, Iran,
Q4.(C) Mashhadani believed the struggle between Turkey, Iran,
and Arab states to exert their influence in Iraq was
intensifying in light of the U.S. military withdrawal. He
welcomed neighbors' involvement in Iraq if it were
"positive," and highlighted Jordan as the only neighbor that
had cooperated fully on security matters. On the other hand,
Iraq would resist "negative" involvement. He believed that
the AJC's de-Ba'athification effort was the result of a
"direct order" from Iran and in that light, he thought Iran
saw the Cassation Chamber decision as a U.S. victory.

5.(C) Iraqis were especially divided over whether to support
Iran or Turkey's activities in Iraq, according to Mashhadani.
He welcomed the Turkish presence in Iraq as mostly positive,
though he criticized Turkey's support for the Iraqi Islamic
Party (IIP) because he thought it added to Sunnis' political
fragmentation. While Mashhadani posited that Iraq could
control Syria through oil, he worried that Iran only
understood power. Iran and Iraq had struggled for two
millennia, he explained, with Tehran considering Iraq part of
its empire. He stated that candidates should decry Iranian

influence in elections, but said they need American
"protection" to do so.

"ALLAWI MANEUVERING TO TOPPLE MALIKI"
--------------

6.(C) Expounding on pre-elections maneuvering, Mashhadani
asserted that PM Maliki's State of Law coalition had wisely
kept its distance from Iran, but that Maliki would lose
office as a result. "Power in Iraq means power to say 'no'
to Iran," Masshadani said. Reflecting his strong dislike for
Iyad Allawi, Mashhadani condemned what he said were Allawi's
efforts to ally with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI) to topple Maliki. If Allawi were against Iran,
Mashhadani asserted, then he would support Maliki's distance
from Tehran. Mashhadani believed that Vice President Abd
al-Mahdi would be completely controlled by Tehran if he won
the premiership, but asserted that Allawi would be the
weakest prime minister of all. Mashhadani was not sanguine
about the prospects for the CIU due to what he said was
Interior Minister Bolani's weak social network and Sunni
opposition to him. On the Kurdish front, Mashhadani thought
President Talabani (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) would stay
close to Iran, while Masoud Barnzani (Kurdish Democratic
Party) and the "Change" list were anti-Iran.

NEW GOVERNMENT IN NO MORE THAN FOUR MONTHS
--------------

7.(C) Mashhadani said that negotiations to form the next
government were already underway; he hoped a new government
would take power within one month after election results.
Based on previous experience, however, he predicted that a
maximum of four to five months might be necessary. He agreed
it was vital to form a new government promptly and warned
that a "revolution of hunger" more dangerous than Iranian
interference could debilitate the country in the absence of
effective government. Mashhadani envisioned a strong Shi'a
Prime Minister and a Sunni Speaker of Parliament that
emphasized their Arab and Iraqi identity above all, with the
presidency relegated to a ceremonial office with no veto
power. He dismissed the Kurdish role in the central
government, saying "no one is worried about the Kurdization
of Iraq."

IRAQ NEEDS STRONG U.S. PRESENCE UNTIL 2020
--------------

8.(C) Mashhadani said Iraq needed strong U.S. influence to
balance competing currents in Iraqi politics until at least

2020. Comparing Iraq to a small child, he said it still
needed the nurture of a mother. In the wake of military
withdrawal, he believed U.S. influence in Iraq would
nevertheless increase because "the presence of friendship is
stronger than the presence of militarism." Over the long
term, he envisioned a strategic bilateral partnership along
the lines of the U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship.

9.(C) COMMENT: Mashhadani lost much of his political
influence after being ousted as COR Speaker. It is unclear
how, given his background, he came to join the CIU.
Mashhadani is at times prone to exaggeration and is not the
most objective observer of Iraqi politics; still, he reflects
the views of at least some within Iraq's Sunni community.
END COMMENT.
HILL