FORMER SPEAKER ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, IRAN, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000347 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020 TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ SUBJECT: FORMER SPEAKER ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, IRAN, AND POST-ELECTIONS GOVERNMENT FORMATION Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1.(C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Former Council of Representatives (COR) Speaker, and current member of the secular nationalist "Coalition for Iraq's Unity," Mahmoud al-Mashhadani criticized the Cassation Chamber's recent ruling allowing disqualified candidates to participate in the March 7 elections pending resolution of their appeals. Mashhadani said the judicial opinion merely postponed a substantive decision on de-Ba'athification, and worried what would happen if winning candidates were prevented from taking seats in the COR for alleged Ba'athist ties. He stated that Iraqi candidates should criticize Iranian interference in Iraq, but claimed that they could not do so without American protection. He hoped a government could be formed within a month after the election results and said negotiations between parties were already underway; however, based on previous experience, he thought at least three to four months would be necessary. Mashhadani envisioned a strong COR Speaker and Prime Minister in the new government, with the presidency limited to a ceremonial role without a veto. He expected U.S. influence to increase despite the military withdrawal and hoped for a strong U.S. presence in Iraq until at least 2020. Masshadani lost much political influence after being outsted as COR Speaker in late 2008 yet he reflects the views of at least some in Iraq's Sunni community. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. JUDICIAL RULING A "POSTPONEMENT," NOT A SOLUTION -------------- - 2.(C) Former COR Speaker Mashhadani told A/DCM February 4 that the Cassation Chamber ruling of the previous day was not a solution to the question of disqualified candidates but merely "postponement" of a difficult decision on de-Ba'athification. Mashhadani's two main concerns were that: 1) while Sunnis were at ease with the ruling, Iraqi Shi'a strongly opposed it, and 2) there was no guarantee that candidates who won in the election would be able to take their seats in the COR. Mashhadani said the major lesson of this episode was that, "You can't interfere more than necessary." Mashhadani also claimed that the Coalition for Iraq,s Unity (CIU) had been on the verge of boycotting elections until the Cassation Chamber decision. (Note: This contradicted what Mashhadani told Emboff on January 31, when he said his coalition,s talk of a boycott was an empty threat meant for political maneuver. END NOTE.) CHALABI A "SECTARIAN FISH" -------------- 3.(C) Mashhadani condemned de-Ba'athification efforts as sectarian and called Ahmad Chalabi "a fish that only survives in a sea of sectarianism. If that dries up, he'll die." Nevertheless, Mashhadani said the true number of "secret Ba'athists" in government was much greater than the number of those accused by the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC). Those on the AJC's lists, he said, were Ba'athists prior to 2003 and thus files of information existed to condemn them, whereas others had become hard-core Ba'athists after the U.S. invasion. Mashhadani dismissed the charges against Sunni hardliner MP Saleh al-Mutlaq, noting that he had served in parliament for years and, Mashhadani claimed, had been imprisoned for ties to Iran under Saddam. THE NEIGHBORS: POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE INVOLVEMENT -------------- -------------- 4.(C) Mashhadani believed the struggle between Turkey, Iran, Q4.(C) Mashhadani believed the struggle between Turkey, Iran, and Arab states to exert their influence in Iraq was intensifying in light of the U.S. military withdrawal. He welcomed neighbors' involvement in Iraq if it were "positive," and highlighted Jordan as the only neighbor that had cooperated fully on security matters. On the other hand, Iraq would resist "negative" involvement. He believed that the AJC's de-Ba'athification effort was the result of a "direct order" from Iran and in that light, he thought Iran saw the Cassation Chamber decision as a U.S. victory. 5.(C) Iraqis were especially divided over whether to support Iran or Turkey's activities in Iraq, according to Mashhadani. He welcomed the Turkish presence in Iraq as mostly positive, though he criticized Turkey's support for the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) because he thought it added to Sunnis' political fragmentation. While Mashhadani posited that Iraq could control Syria through oil, he worried that Iran only understood power. Iran and Iraq had struggled for two millennia, he explained, with Tehran considering Iraq part of its empire. He stated that candidates should decry Iranian influence in elections, but said they need American "protection" to do so. "ALLAWI MANEUVERING TO TOPPLE MALIKI" -------------- 6.(C) Expounding on pre-elections maneuvering, Mashhadani asserted that PM Maliki's State of Law coalition had wisely kept its distance from Iran, but that Maliki would lose office as a result. "Power in Iraq means power to say 'no' to Iran," Masshadani said. Reflecting his strong dislike for Iyad Allawi, Mashhadani condemned what he said were Allawi's efforts to ally with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to topple Maliki. If Allawi were against Iran, Mashhadani asserted, then he would support Maliki's distance from Tehran. Mashhadani believed that Vice President Abd al-Mahdi would be completely controlled by Tehran if he won the premiership, but asserted that Allawi would be the weakest prime minister of all. Mashhadani was not sanguine about the prospects for the CIU due to what he said was Interior Minister Bolani's weak social network and Sunni opposition to him. On the Kurdish front, Mashhadani thought President Talabani (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) would stay close to Iran, while Masoud Barnzani (Kurdish Democratic Party) and the "Change" list were anti-Iran. NEW GOVERNMENT IN NO MORE THAN FOUR MONTHS -------------- 7.(C) Mashhadani said that negotiations to form the next government were already underway; he hoped a new government would take power within one month after election results. Based on previous experience, however, he predicted that a maximum of four to five months might be necessary. He agreed it was vital to form a new government promptly and warned that a "revolution of hunger" more dangerous than Iranian interference could debilitate the country in the absence of effective government. Mashhadani envisioned a strong Shi'a Prime Minister and a Sunni Speaker of Parliament that emphasized their Arab and Iraqi identity above all, with the presidency relegated to a ceremonial office with no veto power. He dismissed the Kurdish role in the central government, saying "no one is worried about the Kurdization of Iraq." IRAQ NEEDS STRONG U.S. PRESENCE UNTIL 2020 -------------- 8.(C) Mashhadani said Iraq needed strong U.S. influence to balance competing currents in Iraqi politics until at least ¶2020. Comparing Iraq to a small child, he said it still needed the nurture of a mother. In the wake of military withdrawal, he believed U.S. influence in Iraq would nevertheless increase because "the presence of friendship is stronger than the presence of militarism." Over the long term, he envisioned a strategic bilateral partnership along the lines of the U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship. 9.(C) COMMENT: Mashhadani lost much of his political influence after being ousted as COR Speaker. It is unclear how, given his background, he came to join the CIU. Mashhadani is at times prone to exaggeration and is not the most objective observer of Iraqi politics; still, he reflects the views of at least some within Iraq's Sunni community. END COMMENT. HILL