IRAQI SPEAKER ON FUTURE OF THE PRESIDENCY, BUDGET,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000034

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI SPEAKER ON FUTURE OF THE PRESIDENCY, BUDGET,
AND COALITION MANEUVERING

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gary A. Grappo, for reasons
1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR)
Speaker Iyad Sammarra'i confirmed for Pol M/C January 4 that
the Constitution made clear that Iraq's Presidency Council
would not continue after the end of the term of the current
government, and the new President would not have the veto.
He told Pol M/C it might be possible for the COR to vote on a
package of key constitutional amendments (including extending
the Presidency Council) before the end of its session, but he
did not support holding the required national referendum
(within two months of COR passage) at the same time as the
March 7 elections. Regarding the budget, Sammarra'i said
that both he and the PM wanted to see passage as soon as
possible and blamed inaction on lack of discipline at the
COR, which was reflected in poor attendance. Sammarra'i
described the draft Electoral Code of Conduct as important
but possibly losing political support. Shifting into
full-bore political analysis, Sammarra'i assessed the
prospects of various coalitions and noted in particular that
while Iyad Allawi's coalition was poised to do well, it had
political figures that were completely unacceptable to the
key potential post-election coalition partners and was
unlikely to hold together after the elections. End Summary.

PRESIDENCY COUNCIL AND ITS VETO SEEN DISAPPEARING
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Iraqi Speaker of the Council of Representatives (COR)
Iyad Sammarra'i confirmed to Pol M/C January 4 that according
to the Constitution, the Presidency Council would disappear
at the end of the current government, replaced by a single
president who would not have veto power. In his view, this
might possibly pose problems in the government formation
process. A more serious issue to be faced would be the lack
of any check on the power of the prime minister. One
solution he noted would be to increase the authority of the
Speaker, whose power is currently constrained by COR rules of
procedure requiring consensus between the Speaker and the two
deputy speakers on all key issues.

BUT CONSTITUTIONAL FIX NOT YET A HIGH PRIORITY
-------------- -


3. (C) Despite the seriousness of the issue, Sammarra'i said
that he had not been seriously involved in the constitutional
amendments process in the COR, explaining that he had left
the issue to others in the COR and in his political bloc.
The Speaker also made clear that he was not enthusiastic
about seeing expedited action. He told Pol M/C it might be
possible for the COR to vote on a package of key
constitutional amendments (including extending the Presidency
Council) before the end of its session, but he did not
support holding the required national referendum (within two
months of COR passage) at the same time as the March 7
elections. The other option would be to leave the entire
issue for the next COR. Sammarra'i claimed that until now he
had not received crystallized views of the party blocs on how
to proceed but hoped to meet with them in the next few days.
The Speaker expressed significant interest in what Pol M/C
had been told by party bloc leaders and others on the issue,
signaled COR member Selim al-Jebouri as the point person for
his political bloc, Tawafuq, on this issue, and expressed a
willingness to work closely wit the USG on the issue.

BUDGET STILL AN ISSUE
--------------


4. (C) Regarding the budget, Sammarra'i said that both he
and the PM wanted to see passage as soon as possible,
Qand the PM wanted to see passage as soon as possible,
considering it a priority before the end of the session. He
blamed inaction on lack of discipline at the COR, which was
reflected in poor attendance and inability to pass
legislation. He pledged his best efforts in the coming days
to get a quorum at the COR at least once a week, perhaps by
signaling ahead of time to members that a particular day was
the most important for attendance that week.

ELECTORAL CODE OF CONDUCT LOSING SUPPORT
--------------


5. (C) Sammarra'i described the draft Electoral Code of
Conduct as well-intentioned and important, especially in
seeking to place restrictions on the way senior government
officials could use the powers of their office to further
their electoral prospects. He noted that the Minister of
Interior for example controlled large units with significant
powers for arrest and detention and the PM had access to huge
sums of money he could dispense for patronage. However,
Sammarra'i expressed concern that some of the articles in the
law were unconstitutional or otherwise placed unwarranted

restrictions on the government in the lawful exercise of its
functions. The draft law, currently back for review with the
Legal Committee, required amendment to have prospect of
passage but he questioned whether the bill had enough support
to reach that point. According to Sammarra'i, the Kurds, led
by President Talabani, did not support the bill.

6. (C) He expressed concern that the COR had wasted valuable
time on the bill and described it as a victim of the
increasingly complex political calculations that the party
blocs were making in the run-up to the elections. He noted
for example that ISCI had supported the bill early on,
especially during the heated attacks on the electoral
commission (IHEC) in the fall, but that support had cooled as
ISCI seemed to be looking increasingly at partnering up at
some point with the PM's State of Law alliance, which opposed
the bill (septel).

SAMMARRA'I'S QUICK TAKE ON COALITON DATING SCENE
-------------- ---


7. (C) Shifting into full-bore political analysis,
Sammarra'i observed that even as ISCI pursued its potential
alliance with Maliki, it was also cooperating with Iyad
Allawi's Iraqi National Movement (INM). Sammarra'i said that
Maliki had shared some of his internal polling data showing
that the PM's alliance would win 95 seats in the election,
while the ISCI-led Iraqi National Alliance would win 71 and
Allawi's group 61 seats. The Speaker noted that during his
recent trip to Jordan, people had been extremely optimistic
about the Allawi's electoral prospects. While Allawi's
coalition might perform well in the election, it had elements
that were completely unacceptable to the key potential
coalition partners Allawi would need to be a serious
contender for the PM job. Allawi has good relations with the
Kurds and with ISCI (much less so with Maliki and Da'awa).
However, the Kurds will not accept Allawi's political allies
like Osama Najaifi in any larger coalition, and "the Shi'a
will never Sunni MP Saleh al-Mutlaq," noted Sammarra'i. "And
those people are his major political allies." Consequently,
even if Allawi wins a large number of seats, he will not be
able to make a deal with the other groups mobilizing the full
strength of his coalition. Sammarra'i predicted that many of
the key political allies in Allawi's coalition would end up
disappointed, possibly with him leaving them in the lurch to
ally himself with some post-election Shia-Kurdish bloc.
Sammarra'i assessed that ISCI and Maliki's SLA would exploit
this weakness in Allawi's coalition, post-election.


FORD