THE VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSSES PRE- AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000305 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020 TAGS: KDEM PGOV IZ SUBJECT: THE VICE PRESIDENT DISCUSSES PRE- AND POST-ELECTION IRAQ WITH UNAMI Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (U) January 23, 2010; 9:30 a.m.; Baghdad, Iraq. ¶2. (C) Participants: United States: Vice President Joseph Biden Ambassador Christopher R. Hill GEN Raymond Odierno, Commanding General USF-I Tony Blinken, National Security Advisor, OVP Jeff Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Gary A. Grappo, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Puneet Talwar, NSC Senior Director Colin Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Herro Mustafa, Special Advisor to the Vice President Peter Vrooman, National Security Council Director of Near East Affairs Emma Sky, Political Advisor to General Odierno Kate Wiehagen Leonard, Embassy Notetaker United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq: Ad Melkert, Special Representative for the Secretary General, UNAMI Sandra Mitchell, Chief Technical Advisor, UNAMI Electoral Assistance Team -------------- Summary -------------- ¶3. (C) SRSG Ad Melkert told the Vice President that UNAMI seeks to help the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and the GOI to resolve the De-Ba'athification process and establish a final list of election candidates by January ¶31. He also said that UNAMI aims to set an agenda for Arab-Kurd relations in the year ahead, and pressed the Vice President to encourage Iraqi leaders to plan post-election engagements on Arab-Kurd issues. Melkert also warned the Vice President that the government formation period "may get complicated" and cautioned against an Electoral Code of Conduct currently being considered in the Council of Representatives (COR). The Vice President reviewed these issues with Melkert and also expressed U.S. support for the SRSG and UNAMI's ongoing efforts and assistance to Iraq. De-Ba'athification and the March Election -------------- ¶4. (C) The Vice President remarked that everyone had privately told him that they want to conclude the De-Ba'athification debate. SRSG Ad Melkert agreed, and emphasized to the Vice President that UNAMI recommends that IHEC finalize the candidate list (for official printing) no later than January 31. Melkert advised that Iraq needs to find a formula for dealing with appeals; he emphasized the importance of the appeals process and recommended that the Supreme Court remain closely involved with the final solution for De-Ba'athification. The Vice President expressed doubt that the courts could find a way to address the issue before the elections; Melkert replied that he did not rule it out. ¶5. (C) Melkert commented that, of all of the players involved with the De-Ba'athification issue right now, he was least certain of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. He added that, in private, Maliki seems cooperative on the issue, but in public he is "remarkably subdued" on De-Ba'athification. In Melkert's view, Maliki's behavior is likely part of an overall choreography between the Iraqi National Alliance and State of Law coalitions. The Vice President said Maliki told him he favored the idea that candidates disqualified under De-Ba'athification rules might take an oath denouncing the Ba'ath party as part of a process that would allow them to stand for the March election. Melkert responded that, while the oath was fine, he worried about what might happen afterward. He noted to the Vice President that if a candidate was disqualified as a Ba'athist after the election, IHEC would be required to draw the replacement candidate from the same coalition -- but not necessarily the same the Qthe same coalition -- but not necessarily the same the political party. Mitchell added that, though this procedure would adhere to election rules under the open list system, political actors would not favor this outcome. ¶6. (C) The Vice President told Melkert that, in the past, he had found Maliki to be initially standoffish when discussing a proposal -- only to be the first to embrace it later. In this case, the Vice President noted, he thought Speaker Samarrai'e would embrace his De-Ba'athification proposal immediately, but was surprised when Samarrai'e proved to be the most cautious. The Vice President said this was a healthy shift, reflecting the growing stature of Iraq's parliament, and he was strongly encouraged by Samarrai'e's reaction. A/DCM commented that Samarrai'e's affiliation with the Iraq Islamic Party (IIP) likely added to his hesitation to engage on the Vice President's De-Ba'athification proposal given IIP's desire to see the other major Sunni-dominant coalition (Iraqiyya) weakened in this process. Arab-Kurd Relations -------------- ¶7. (C) SRSG Melkert explained to the Vice President that he hoped to set an agenda for Arab-Kurd relations in the year ahead, including a possible framework to address problems in the Disputed Internal Boundaries. Melkert explained that some 10-20 days after the election, he hoped to gather 5-6 key advisors of the leaders of the major political blocs in an informal process to work together on Arab-Kurd concerns. Melkert pressed the Vice President to encourage Iraqi leaders to plan post-election engagements on these issues. The Vice President affirmed Melkert's idea, and suggested that, at some point after the election, key players should be identified to start discussions with UNAMI, as the facilitator, on Arab-Kurd matters. Government Formation -------------- ¶8. (C) The Vice President offered a comment that Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi made to him on his recent trip to Washington. Mahdi told the Vice President that it is already "ninety percent clear" which coalitions will win seats after March 7, and that they are already talking about government formation. The Vice President told Melkert that he wanted to emphasize two main messages - that the government had a serious responsibility to continue service delivery during the transition, and that it was critical not to waste time during the period of government formation. General Odierno noted the importance of security after the election, and the need to reinforce that message to parties that might challenge the Prime Minister. ¶9. (C) Melkert anticipated the government formation period "may get complicated" after election results are announced. He cautioned the Vice President about recent efforts to introduce an Electoral Code of Conduct in the COR, and explained that the draft law sought to limit the authority of IHEC while also curtailing the Prime Minister's powers in the caretaker government. (Comment: As of January 26, the Code of Conduct bill faced bleak prospects in the COR and seemed unlikely to garner sufficient support to pass. End Comment) Melkert pointed to the content of the Electoral Code of Conduct as an illustration of the political challenges to come. The Vice President agreed with the problems presented by such a proposal, and noted that he would try to refute it if the matter came up during discussions of Iraq's post-election caretaker government. ¶10. (U) The Office of the Vice President has cleared this message. HILL