DE-BA'ATHIFICATION FALLOUT: INA ASKS AMBASSADOR TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000304 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IR IZ SUBJECT: DE-BA'ATHIFICATION FALLOUT: INA ASKS AMBASSADOR TO REASSERT U.S. OPPOSITION TO BA'ATH REF: A. BAGHDAD 285 ¶B. BAGHDAD 296 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) MP Qassim Daoud (Iraqi National Alliance/Solidarity bloc leader) invited the Ambassador to his residence on February 5 to deliver a message on behalf of the INA coalition's Executive Committee. Daoud first said he had his own views on the matter, then more formally explained that recent statements by the Ambassador and General Petraeus in regards to de-Ba'athification had prompted the INA to question whether the United States had changed its position of opposition to the Ba'ath party. He added that the Cassation Chamber's February 3 order to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to allow candidates appealing their disqualification on de-Ba'athification grounds to remain on the ballot (ref A) surprised the INA's leadership, and galvanized concerns that Ba'athists and Saddam sympathizers would be allowed to contest the election. The Ambassador pointed out that the United States steadfastly honors its commitment under the Security Agreement to combat Ba'athism and has continually expressed support for the Iraqi Constitution's provisions banning the symbols and ideology of the Saddamist Ba'ath Party. He asked Daoud to convey to all concerned that the United States would not backtrack in its opposition to the Ba'ath after making a major sacrifice to defeat Saddam. ¶2. (C) Commenting that it would be in the interest of the United States and the INA to lower tensions engendered by the judicial panel's decision and undercut the extremists in the INA and the PM's State of Law Alliance (SLA),Daoud recommended that the United States deliver a public message to the Iraqi public reiterating its strong position against Ba'athism. The Ambassador agreed to repeat our assertions on de-Ba'athification, and committed to do so on Iraqi television stations, ideally prior to the likely special parliamentary session on February 7 or 9. Daoud and the Ambassador concurred that some of the apprehension in the Iraqi body politic might stem from the perception that the United States would favor secular parties over the majority of Iraqi parties that have a strong religious affiliation. ¶3. (C) Daoud explained that the INA denounced the Cassation Chamber's ruling (ref B) because it thought the judicial panel did not have the authority to postpone de-Ba'athification vetting and appeals. He argued that if the judicial panel did not have time to conduct its appeals properly, perhaps the election could be postponed to make time. Ambassador and Political M/C countered, noting that the election had already been postponed once, and another delay would create a dangerous Constitutional and legal vacuum of authority, as well as doubts among the Iraqi public over the government's commitment to holding elections. Daoud withdrew the comment, concurring that a second delay would undermine the credibility of the election and agreed to convey this to his INA colleagues. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked Daoud about Iran's role in the AJC's decision to convene a de-Ba'athification review shortly before the election. Daoud shared that he had met with IRGC Commander General Qassem Soleimani in Tehran a week ago on January 30, at Soleimani's invitation. The IRGC chief was reportedly pleased at the AJC's action to combat "Ba'athist infiltration" of the GOI. Daoud observed to the Ambassador that Iran and Iraq share a common interest in preventing the Qthat Iran and Iraq share a common interest in preventing the return of Ba'athists and Saddamist ideology, and that Ahmed Chalabi took advantage of this to launch the AJC's campaign. Lamenting that there are "two kinds of misguided people in Iraq," Daould said that some wildly exaggerate Iran's role and negative influence in Iraq, while the rest are apologists for Tehran. Daoud also reported that Soleimani offered him money to support his campaign, which he said he declined in favor of taking a small rug. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: Daoud's comments on his coalition's position reflect continuing Shi'a paranoia with Ba'athism, which they conflate with secularism. Moreover, the INA is in a tight battle for Shi'a votes in the March elections and, like its competitor, State of Law Alliance, cannot afford to be labeled "soft on Ba'athism." Continued reassurance from us should help tamp the rhetoric on this emotional issue and recenter the election campaign on substantive issues facing the fledgling democracy. But it won't be easy. END COMMENT. HILL