THE DE-BA'ATHIFICATION CONTROVERSY: SECTARIANISM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000266 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: THE DE-BA'ATHIFICATION CONTROVERSY: SECTARIANISM, CONSENSUS POLITICS, AND IRAQI DEMOCRACY Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The de-Ba'athification controversy that erupted in early January and has yet to subside is complicated, with the intentions of the political players involved often clouded in ambiguity. At its simplest, it can be viewed as an Iranian plot, directed by Tehran allies Ahmed Chalabi and Ali Faisal al-Lami. The de-Ba'athification controversy can also be viewed as an indicator of the stubbornly sectarian character of Iraqi politics and the unfinished business of national reconciliation. A related way to view the de-Ba'athification controversy is as a meter for gauging the overwhelming political appeal -- both on the street and at elite levels -- of anti-Ba'athist politics among Iraq's non-Sunni population. The controversy also points to the Shia parties' fear of the rapidly increasing political strength of Iyad Allawi's Iraqi National Movement and the broader Iraqiyya coalition. Answers to key questions remain only partially answered at best: To what extent were the actions of the Accountability and Justice Commission anti-Sunni? How will this controversy affect the performance of the parties? Will this de-Ba'athification process tarnish the election results? Overall, Iraqi political figures and institutions have not distinguished themselves in this controversy. The judges in the Cassation Chamber, supervised by Chief Judge Medhat, may yet turn out to be the heroes in this tale if they are able to withstand the intense political pressures and render unbiased, legally sound decisions in the days ahead. In the end, as in the resolution of most political crises in Iraq, a sort of "wisdom of the political consensus" may be evident even in that cluster of legal opinions and ultimately help resolve this mess. END SUMMARY. JUST AN IRANIAN PLOT? OR MORE TO THE STORY? -------------- ¶2. (C) This controversy, at its simplest, can be viewed as an Iranian plot, directed by Tehran allies Ahmed Chalabi and Ali Faisal al-Lami, as many Sunni interlocutors have averred. There is some evidence to support this view. Chalabi and Lami have been heavily involved in directing the efforts of the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) staff to identify Ba'athist-affiliated candidates and pressure the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to disqualify them. It seems reasonable that staunch anti-Iranian Saleh al-Mutlaq, a key target of the AJC early on, would cause heartburn for Tehran, particularly given his increased prominence when he joined Iyad Allawi's coalition. Tehran may also have been motivated to shore up the electoral prospects of ISCI and its Iraqi National Alliance (INA) by discouraging Sunni voters and limiting the appeal of Allawi's coalition among Iraq's Shi'a community. Nevertheless, we have seen no smoking gun to support the contention that Tehran ordered or directed either Chalabi or al-Lami to take this action. ¶3. (C) The de-Ba'athification controversy can also be viewed as an indicator of the stubbornly sectarian character of Iraqi politics (and the unfinished business of national reconciliation). De-Ba'athification is meant to be a tool for preventing certain Ba'athists from participating in the political process (which it was feared could be used as a crucial means over time to re-legitimize them). But it was perceived in this controversy to be a weapon that targeted Sunnis and certain political coalitions, especially with cross-sectarian appeal, whom Sunnis favored. The distinctly Qcross-sectarian appeal, whom Sunnis favored. The distinctly Shi'a identity of the key instigators, Chalabi and Lami, with their pro-Tehran reputations, reinforced suspicions that sectarian fault-lines in Iraqi society were being manipulated for political advantage. The process of national reconciliation, still in its early stages, was not nearly strong enough to counter this tendency. ¶4. (C) A related way to view the de-Ba'athification controversy is as a meter for gauging the overwhelming political appeal -- both on the street and at elite levels -- of anti-Ba'athist politics (and hence its efficacy as a tool for settling political scores) among Iraq's non-Sunni population. It proved to be such a powerful force that no Iraqi politician or institution attempted to resist the AJC's actions, although many in private bemoaned the selective, arbitrary and divisive character of the AJC effort. SHI'A PARTIES' FEAR OF ALLAWI ALSO A FACTOR? -------------- ¶5. (C) The controversy also points to the Shi'a parties' fear of the increasing political strength of Allawi's Iraqi National Movement and the broader Iraqiyya coalition, with its suspected support from neighboring Sunni states opposed to the dominance in Iraq of sectarian Shi'a politics. More broadly, the AJC's efforts seem to point to fear of secular nationalists like Allawi and Minister of Interior Bolani. Their coalitions were disproportionately hit by AJC disqualifications, with 72 of Iraqiyya's 510 candidates and 65 of the Iraq Unity Alliance's 514 members disqualified). KEY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONTROVERSY -------------- ¶6. (C) There is a related set of questions that can be posed about the de-Ba'athification controversy that also help shed light on some of its broader implications. First, were the AJC's actions anti-Sunni in intent or impact? The evidence is mixed. Interlocutors, including IHEC, have told us at least half the total names on the list were Shi'a, a key data point that early on took some of the steam out of accusations that the AJC was on an anti-Sunni witchhunt. In addition, Sunnis in general have remained relatively subdued about the controversy, with limited public support for Mutlaq or other Sunni candidates affected. ¶7. (C) Tawafuk, the other largely Sunni coalition that includes IIP has been largely silent on this matter, in the hope, many suspect, of picking up defecting backers of Allawi's Iraqi National Movement, displeased with the INM. There are other political reasons perhaps that explain why so few Sunni political figures have so far come to Mutlaq's assistance: they fear his political strength and -- especially his Islamists competitors in the Iraqi Islamist Party -- quietly welcomed his political demise. Some on the secular side probably feared being labeled pro-Ba'athist themselves and were also cowed by the threat of further action by the AJC. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the AJC disproportionately targeted cross-sectarian coalitions with strong appeal to Sunnis. The only major political figures on the list are Sunnis (Mutlaq, Sa'ad al-Janabi, and to an extent, Dafer al-Ani, a member of the Council of Representatives.) (See septel for a broader analysis of the Sunni political aspects of this controversy.) ¶8. (C) A second key question is whether the legal appeals process that was hastily cobbled together, with the formation of the seven-judge Cassation Chamber, can provide the overall process with sufficient legitimacy. While the judges are apparently respected and professionally competent, it is not clear that they have sufficient time to consider the appeals or access to the details of the evidence used by the AJC. For now, the consensus among politicians in Baghdad is that the controversy should be resolved in the legal process, rather than through a political fix. However, there is the reality that 500-odd candidates were disqualified with little due process or transparency, and given time constraints, it is possible that some may not be reinstated and allowed to run, regardless of how the judges rule on their appeals. IHEC will have to proceed with printing the official candidate list on January 31 (and can possibly print an addendum in mid-February). After that, it will be too late for decisions on appeals to facilitate the re-entry of disqualified candidates into the race. WILL THE CONTROVERSY TARNISH THE ELECTION RESULTS? -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Will this de-Ba'thification process tarnish the results? That answer depends to an extent on the resolution of the controversy. The narrative is still being written. If Mutlaq is allowed back in the race, there is a sense that the controversy could dissipate and any tarnishing of results significantly diminished. Iraqis seem to have already made Qsignificantly diminished. Iraqis seem to have already made their peace with most the 500-odd candidates being disqualified. ¶10. (C) How will this controversy affect the performance of various coalitions? Some observers argue that the whole controversy was engineered to undercut the appeal of cross-sectarian coalitions, which were generally dominated by secular nationalists like Allawi and Bolani, whose coalition allies were the most vulnerable to charges of past Ba'athist affiliation. The tactic seemed to be to tar these coalitions as pro-Ba'athist (whether substantiated or not) and diminish their appeal, while simultaneously creating a polarizing political atmosphere that would drive Shi'a voters back to their sectarian base. This tactic was seen by some observers as particularly promising for Chalabi's own ISCI-led Iraqi National Alliance. ISCI performed relatively weakly in the 2009 provincial elections when voters seemed to focus more on cross-sectarian government performance rather than religious or sectarian identity politics. While larger cross-sectarian alliances would still be a major factor post-election, the objective seems to be to ensure that no cross-sectarian coalitions built up a head of steam at the pre-election stage. One could argue, however, that the controversy has had the opposite effect. INA early on sought to come to the aid of Iraqiyya to seek a political solution, of which it ultimately failed. And it would seem that Maliki and his Da'wa party's phlegmatic response may have had the unintended consequence of aiding Tawafuq. ¶11. (C) Shi'a and Sunni alike saw the de-Ba'athification issue as an opportunity to attack and eliminate rivals, galvanize their political bases, and, for the Chalabi and his allies, curry favor with Tehran. But there have been side effects and unintended consequences as well. The de-Ba'athification drive has turned out to be something of a runaway firehose which, once turned on, nobody was able to aim or control with any predictability. It has wounded some people, no doubt and perhaps has destroyed or seriously damaged Mutlaq's career. Whether it reversed or at least stalled the increasing political support of coalitions like Allawi's remains an open question. ¶12. (C) An interesting sub-plot in this controversy is focused on the people who have tried to intervene at various stages. Overall, Iraqi political figures and institutions have not distinguished themselves in this controversy. But that is not unusual during a political witchhunt: courage and wisdom are often in short supply and usually evident only at strategic moments of least risk and maximum political advantage. PM Maliki has generally been AWOL, seeking to capitalize politically behind the scenes, and maneuvering fiercely against his ISCI rivals and probably against Iranian would-be puppet masters whose strings often turned out in this saga to be knotted up or cut. President Talabani intervened a few times, after a slow start, lurching from one position to another with little effect. ¶13. (c) IHEC has shown itself to be technically proficient in handling various administrative issues and timelines but demonstrated no political courage, as it caved almost immediately to pressure and browbeating from the AJC. Faulting IHEC in this story is probably a bit misplaced, however. It's moniker aside, it was never created to have that level of independence. Iraqi political culture -- so dependent on consensus -- would never agree to an institution, especially one focused on organizing elections, having that much power, unmoored from the oversight of the large political parties. The recently appointed judges of the Cassation Chamber, supervised by Chief Judge Medhat al-Mahmoud, have thus far demonstrated professionalism and tried to establish their independence. They may yet turn out to be the heroes in this tale if they are able to issue timely, legally sound decisions on the 350-odd appeals. RESOLUTION BY CONSENSUS -------------- ¶14. (C) In the end, as in most political crises in Iraq that get resolved, a sort of "wisdom of the political consensus" may be evident even in that cluster of legal opinions and ultimately help resolve this mess. No one -- except perhaps the judges, if they perform the unexpected and deliver an expedited Solomonic collective decision on all the appeals -- will get much credit (or deserve it). If they do, the political landscape will be re-set and the players will clamber back to approximately where they left off, seeking again to gain advantage and do in rivals, all the while keeping an eye on the big prize with the upcoming elections. ¶15. (C) We are nearing the point where we will know how this little crisis resolves itself. What we have learned thus far is that while Iraq's legal and political institutions hold Qis that while Iraq's legal and political institutions hold great promise, they are yet young, unsure of themselves, and will continue to require strong U.S. support to fend off those who would kill or pervert Iraq's democratic aspirations. HILL