AMBASSADOR MEETS KURDISH OPPOSITION LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000254 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS KURDISH OPPOSITION LEADER NAWSHIRWAN MUSTAFA Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In his first meeting with a U.S. Ambassador, the leader of the Kurdish opposition Goran ("Change") Movement, Nawshirwan Mustafa, made the following points: 1) U.S. observers will be critical in ensuring the legitimacy of upcoming national parliamentary elections; 2) Goran expects to take 15 or more seats and President Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) will win only eight to 10; 3) which Iraqi leaders are chosen as president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament is less important than good policies; 4) PUK harassment of Goran supporters continues, and the USG can help by conveying to the PUK that it must stop or Goran will not cooperate with the PUK on Kurdish issues in a new government; 5) Goran's appeal stems from its platform of anti-corruption and changing the hidebound Kurdish political system; 6) Goran (unlike the PUK and Kurdish Democratic Party) favors a strong central government in Baghdad; 7) the election law compromise threatens the consensus-based approach and potentially allows for majoritarian rule; and 8) Goran believes special status for Kirkuk for a period of some years may be the best available solution (NOTE: This is a position unpopular with Kurds that Mustafa has not articulated publicly. END NOTE.). The Ambassador reiterated U.S. desire for a strong relationship with the Kurds in the context of a united Iraq, encouraged stronger ties between Erbil and Baghdad, made clear U.S. support for a consensus-based resolution to the final status of Kirkuk, and underscored the importance of the full integration and professionalization of the peshmerga. Mustafa impressed us with his grasp of detail, clear-eyed assessment of Kurdish internal politics, and national perspective. How Goran would perform as a governing, vice opposition, party remains to be seen, but its message is resonating with the many Kurdish voters dissatisfied with the status quo. END SUMMARY. U.S. EFFORTS CRITICAL TO ELECTIONS' LEGITIMACY -------------- - ¶2. (C) In his first meeting with a U.S. ambassador, the leader of the Kurdish opposition Goran ("Change") Movement, Nawshirwan Mustafa, said January 26 that U.S. assistance and monitoring will be critical in ensuring that upcoming national elections are fair, transparent and democratic. Mustafa was joined by Mohammed Tawfiq, deputy leader of Goran. The Ambassador was joined by RRT Erbil Team Leader, PolCouns, Deputy PolCouns and Poloff. The Ambassador said the USG would provide observers, and noted that a good bellwether of a democracy is not the behavior of the winners, but of the losers, who typically complain they were ill-served by the system. Mustafa said Goran had prepared its candidate to compete in Suleymaniyah, Erbil, Dohuk, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Diyala and Baghdad, and that, unlike the current government, most of its candidates were educated technocrats who would help govern effectively. GORAN EXPECTS TO BEST PUK -------------- ¶3. (C) On elections, Mustafa predicted that Goran would take about 15 of the Kurdish seats, and that the PUK would get eight to 10. He predicted that the KRG President Barzani,s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) would win fewer than 35, but would likely get most of the seats in Erbil, Dohuk and Qwould likely get most of the seats in Erbil, Dohuk and Kurdish areas of Ninewa. Mohammed Tawfiq said Goran could take as many as 18-20 seats, depending on results in Erbil and Dahuk, traditional KDP strongholds. Tawfiq complained that the allocation of seats per the December election law would mean that the Kurds would win only 60 (18.5%) out of a total 325 seats, compared to the current 58 (21.1%) out of ¶275. He predicted winning six or seven seats from Kirkuk province, two from Diyala, eight to 10 from Ninewa and one or two from Baghdad, totaling 60-64 seats. Mustafa noted that over half a million Kurds lived in Baghdad, but claimed most are Shi'a and would vote for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). (Note: During the election law debate, UNAMI projected that the Kurds could win as many as 70 seats. End note.) Previously, it was virtually impossible to achieve a two-thirds majority without the Kurdish bloc. In the new parliament, Shi'a and Sunnis could more easily do so, Mustafa said, threatening consensus and potentially allowing majoritarian rule, an approach Iraq was not politically mature enough to adopt. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that more important than the number of seats is the fact that unless a constitutional BAGHDAD 00000254 002 OF 004 amendment is adopted, the Presidency Council (PC) will expire, potentially leaving the president and vice president without veto authority. The Ambassador added that the PC arrangement had helped guarantee that major ethno-sectarian groups' interests were not overlooked. Mustafa agreed that the PC was an important balancing mechanism, but was skeptical that a constitutional amendment and referendum ratifying it could be adopted before the current parliament's term expires. (Note: There is debate about whether a constitutional amendment adopted before the current parliament's term ends would have to be put to a referendum. End note.) ¶5. (C) In an aside with Deputy PolCouns, Mustafa predicted the following rank-order finish for the major blocs: 1) ISCI; 2) State of Law (SLA); 3) al-Iraqiya; and 4) the KAL. He said the stock of ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim - whom he described as "a reasonable person" - was rising, and that PM Maliki had so alienated Iraq's political class that another term as PM was "highly unlikely." Mustafa said he foresaw a proliferation of smaller parties in the next parliament, creating greater opportunity for cooperation across party and ethno-sectarian lines, but also a more fractious process. GOVERNMENT FORMATION -------------- ¶6. (C) Mustafa told the Ambassador Goran would wait until after the elections to talk with potential government coalition partners, and would focus on policy formulation in the interim. By contrast with most Iraqi political leaders, Mustafa downplayed the importance of who is chosen as president, prime minister, or speaker of the parliament. He observed that it was more important that Kurds be "real partners" in formulating policy in Iraq through the rights they enjoy as citizens than to achieve short-term gains through ephemeral political deals. Mustafa stressed that it was more important to have effective ministers in "service ministries" (education, health, agriculture, industry and oil) than in "power ministries" (foreign affairs, defense and interior) in the next government. PUK-GORAN CONTRETEMPS -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite KRG President Barzani's recent public statement calling for calm, Mustafa said the PUK continued to threaten and intimidate Goran candidates, supporters and their relatives, particularly in the traditional PUK strongholds of Suleymaniyah and Kirkuk. Tawfiq said the PUK recently escalated its efforts, pressuring homeowners not to rent space to Goran to use as campaign headquarters during the election. Mustafa claimed that Goran, unlike the PUK, had avoided personal political attacks and had not mentioned KRG President Barzani or President Talabani by name. He argued that for Goran to soften its political message, as Barzani had urged, would mean remaining silent about corruption and the lack of basic services in the KRG, which would be "dishonest." Mustafa underscored that with a single television and radio channel and one weekly newspaper, Goran was already at a significant disadvantage with respect to the PUK and KDP, which collectively own some 400 media outlets. ¶8. (C) Mustafa claimed that Talabani -- embarrassed by the results of the PUK's failed campaign in the July 2009 KRG parliamentary election, which he (Talabani) had personally overseen -- was the force behind the harassment of Goran. There were signs that some PUK leaders, including KRG PM QThere were signs that some PUK leaders, including KRG PM Barham Salih and KRG VP Kosrat Rasoul, had moderated their position on Goran; however, die-hard Talabani loyalists refused to do so. Mustafa asked the USG to urge the PUK to cease its use of threats and intimidation; otherwise, Goran would not cooperate with the PUK on Kurdish issues in Baghdad. (Comment: This is a significant shift - Goran leaders previously told us they would campaign separately from the KAL, but support it after elections on core Kurdish issues. End comment.) PUK AND KDP NOT SUITED TO GOVERN -------------- ¶9. (C) While tension between Goran and the PUK was more acute, Mustafa underscored, the PUK and KDP were part of the same system. Both were well-suited as guerrilla movements, but poorly equipped to govern. Referring to the warlord mentality of the PUK/KDP leadership, Mustafa said that senior party leaders' salaries were 100 times greater than those of BAGHDAD 00000254 003.2 OF 004 the KRG's civil servants, and that KRG PM Barham Salih's discretionary spending fund totaled some USD 250,000 per month. Mustafa claimed the KDP and PUK received USD 35 million each month from the KRG central budget for operational expenses. Faced with a lack of basic services, people were angered by over-compensated and under-performing KRG leaders, Mustafa said. GORAN'S PLATFORM AND APPEAL -------------- ¶10. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question on why voters supported Goran, Tawfiq stressed the appeal of the party's platform of anti-corruption, transparency, rule of law, and a desire to change the hidebound Kurdish political system. Nepotism, cronyism and dissatisfaction with basic services were common complaints, he said. Goran's leaders had co-founded the PUK in the 1970s to help topple the Ba'ath Party and did not want to live under a dictatorial PUK/KDP political order. Describing the extent of PUK/KDP dominance, Mustafa claimed it was impossible to obtain a civil service job in the KRG without membership in the PUK or KDP, a serious constraint since most jobs in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) were in the public sector. Even in the IKR's private sector, many companies were linked to the PUK or KDP and party membership was essential to secure jobs in them, he said. In another recent example, Tawfiq said Erbil businessmen had built a mosque, only to have KDP and PUK leaders quarrel over who would appoint the imam. ¶11. (C) Lack of drinking water, regular electricity, and education were persistent problems, Mustafa said. Some primary and secondary schools were forced to run four shifts of two and half hours each a day (far less than was needed) to accommodate the number of students they serve. (Comment: This has as much to do with Kurdistan's explosive population growth as with poor KRG governance. End comment.) Tawfiq characterized graduates of public Kurdish universities, who were educated largely in Kurdish and taught by Soviet-bloc trained professors, as "useless" and anachronistic. CENTRALIZED VS. REGIONAL POWER -------------- ¶12. (C) Mustafa said Goran's support for a strong, democratic central government also differed from the PUK and KDP, which remained suspicious of centralized power and favored stronger provincial/regional governments. Mustafa believed a mature multi-party system, a more independent judiciary, and greater press freedom in the rest of Iraq would serve the Kurds' long-term interests. Most Kurds, he said,understood that as long as the Iraqi parliament and central government remained viable, there was no longer an existential threat against Kurds. (Comment: This is perhaps an over-generalization of Kurdish sentiment. End comment.) The Ambassador underscored that politics, like war, could become total, and that it was important to have political structures resistant to that tendency. PESHMERGA MERGER -------------- ¶13. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about peshmerga funding, Mustafa flatly said he was not confident that a real merger of PUK- and KDP-led peshmerga militia elements would occur as long as the PUK and KDP remained in power. The forces might come to wear the same uniform, be funded from common sources and notionally respond to the same chain of command, but peshmerga elements ultimately remained Qchain of command, but peshmerga elements ultimately remained personal militias loyal to their political masters. Mustafa said a priority for Goran in the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament's next session would be adopting measures - including paying the salaries of retired and injured peshmerga out of the KRG's budget, not party funds - to promote peshmerga loyalty to the KRG. The Ambassador noted that the new KRG budget would reflect integration of KRG and PUK peshmerga and stressed the importance of full integration and unity of command. ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK -------------- ¶14. (C) On Article 140 implementation, Mustafa commented that the issue of Kirkuk had been exploited by all parties - including the Kurds - for selfish political reasons. He characterized Kirkuk as the "least developed city in Iraq" and complained that municipal and provincial governance were held hostage by national Arab-Kurd tensions. Mustafa BAGHDAD 00000254 004 OF 004 emphasized that Goran viewed Turkomans, Christians, and Arabs as groups with valid national identities who should not be pressured to determine Kirkuk's final status. It was important that a process move forward after elections to determine whether Kirkuk would be linked to Erbil or Baghdad, or enjoyed special status. Tawfiq cautioned against expecting that the status of Kirkuk and other disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas would be solved in the near-term, saying he expected them to remain "frozen conflicts" for some time. Mustafa added that DIBs-related issues could create problems, but need not constitute an existential threat for Kurds and others. Responding to the Ambassador's comments on possible ways ahead on Kirkuk, Mustafa said it may be that special status for a period of some years would the best available solution. The Ambassador made clear that the USG would only support a referendum to adopt a politically negotiated consensus-based resolution. 15.(C) COMMENT: Mustafa impressed us with his grasp of detail, clear-eyed assessment of Kurdish internal politics, and national perspective. His emphasis on Kurdish participation in a viable, democratic central government is consistent with our argument that the Kurds' interests are best-served by remaining closely engaged with Baghdad. His identification of special status as the best available option for Kirkuk is also consistent with our view; however, outside observers assess that for him to publicly say that would be political suicide. Goran's private moderation on DIBs issues has not been consistent with the intermittent cheap shots Mustafa and others have taken at Barzani and Talabani for having compromised on the election law. How Goran would govern - as opposed to serving as an opposition party - remains to be seen, but it is clear that the party's message strikes a chord with the significant number of Kurdish voters dissatisfied with the current PUK/KDP system. HILL