Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BAGHDAD238
2010-01-30 11:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DPM AL-ISSAWI ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, THE IRAQIYA

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM IZ 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0238/01 0301122
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301122Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6364
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000238 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DPM AL-ISSAWI ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, THE IRAQIYA
COALITION AND A "NATIONAL FRONT"

Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000238 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: DPM AL-ISSAWI ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, THE IRAQIYA COALITION AND A "NATIONAL FRONT" Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DPM Rafi al-Issawi said the growing realization among some Shi'a politicians of the Iraqiya Coalition's appeal and the threat it posed to sectarian-based politics spurred the de-Ba'athification effort, which was intended to divide Sunni voters and perhaps prompt them to boycott. Issawi did not/not believe Sunnis would boycott, and assessed that the de'-Ba'athification controversy could encourage them to turn out in greater numbers and perhaps improve Iraqiya's showing at the polls. Saying Iraqis had seen the limits of sectarian politics and were tired of ineffectual incumbents - many of whom are running on sectarian coalitions' lists - he expressed optimism that Iraqiya could gain more than 70 seats in upcoming national elections. (Note: NDI polls do not show that Iraqiya will do that well. End note.) Issawi said Iraqiya leader and former PM Iyad Allawi had been in contact with Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) leader Ammar al-Hakim and KRG President Masoud Barzani to discuss the possibility of a "national front" government that would comprise Iraqiya, ISCI, the Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) bloc and possibly PM Maliki's State of Law Alliance (SLA). Part of the impetus for a national front was to agree on candidates for president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament before the election and shorten the government formation period. The idea of a national front governing coalition has quietly been gaining currency as the election approaches and the prospect of a lengthy government formation process looms. END SUMMARY. DE-BA'ATHIFICATION COULD BACKFIRE, HELP SUNNI TURNOUT -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On the margins of a dinner hosted by Kurdistan Regional Government PM Barham Salih in honor of Ambassador's visit to Suleymaniyah, DPM Rafi al-Issawi told Deputy PolCouns that the Iraqiya Coalition's non-sectarian, nationalist message was "well-timed" and resonated with Iraqi voters. Issawi said Shi'a politicians' growing realization of Iraqiya's appeal and the threat it posed to sectarian-based politics had spurred the effort to disqualify some candidates on the grounds of alleged Ba'athist ties. The goal was to divide the Sunni vote and perhaps prompt Sunnis to boycott the election. Issawi did not/not believe
;Sunnis would boycott, in part because their decision to do so in 2005 had hurt them politically. He offered that the de-Ba'athification effort could actually have the unintended consequence of bolstering voter turnout among Sunnis and increasing the appeal of Iraqiya, which he characterized as the only non-sectarian coalition in the race. ¶3. (C) Issawi said PM Maliki's SLA coalition had "quiet but deep" ties to Ahmed Chalabi, who has shepherded the de-Ba'athification campaign. SLA had at least tacitly endorsed - and more likely, in his view, actively encouraged - Chalabi's de-Ba'athification effort. Despite encouragement from Issawi, former PM Allawi and President Talabani, Maliki and his office "repeatedly sidestepped" opportunities to tamp down rhetoric and help find a political solution to the de-Ba'athification embroglio. Issawi said he and KRG PM Salih agreed that the proposed political solution of ISCI's Ammar al-Hakim had died when Hakim realized that if he succeeded in brokering a solution, Maliki and SLA would attack ISCI as pro-Ba'athist in the election campaign. IRAQIYA'S PROSPECTS -------------- ¶4. (C) Issawi expressed optimism that Iraqiya, of which his Q4. (C) Issawi expressed optimism that Iraqiya, of which his own Future Gathering party is a member, could gain more than 70 seats in upcoming national elections. (Note: Estimates of the number of seats various coalitions might win vary, but Issawi's estimate of Iraqiya's showing is higher than shown in most polls, including that of NDI. End note.) He attributed his optimism to the fact that Iraqiya is the only coalition offering a non-sectarian, nationalist alternative to traditional sectarian coalitions. Iraqis had seen the limits of sectarian-based politics, were tired of ineffectual incumbents (many of whom are running on sectarian coalitions' lists),and wanted to see a different, more effective political approach. He assessed that Iraqiya would do well at the polls in Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Anbar, Baghdad, Diwaniyah, Babil and Basra. He was cautiously optimistic that Iraqiyya could win seats in Maysan and Muthanna, traditional Shi'a strongholds, as well. NATIONAL FRONT COALITION UNDER CONSIDERATION -------------- ¶5. (C) Issawi said Allawi had been in close contact with Hakim and KRG President Barzani - he described Allawi as being "very close" to Barzani - to discuss the possibility of a "national front" government that would comprise Iraqiya, ISCI, the Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) bloc and possibly SLA. (Note: Allawi and Hakim have both traveled to Erbil several times in the past month to discuss campaign strategy with Barzani. End note.) Part of the impetus for reaching agreement on a national front and its candidates for president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament was to shorten the period of government formation after the election. Issawi assessed that ISCI had gained ground and SLA had lost momentum in the past two months, largely because high-profile attacks and the failure of the government to deliver basic services had undermined Maliki's credibility. He believed that after a rocky start, Hakim had gained more respect in the "Shi'a heartland" of central/southern Iraq. ¶6. (C) Issawi flatly said he supported former PM Allawi for prime minister in the new government. He said he had broached with ISCI's Hakim the idea that even if ISCI won the most parliamentary seats, ISCI should support Allawi for PM. Describing Allawi as the only secular candidate of stature, Issawi explained that "he has good relations with all of Iraq's neighbors, both Shi'a and Sunnis can claim him, and no one loses", which could facilitate quicker government formation. Issawi said Hakim did not reject the idea. KRG PM Salih told Issawi that Hakim had subsequently discussed the concept with both Barzani and President Talabani (PUK). (Note: Our understanding is that Barzani's latest assessment is that Iraqiya may not win enough seats to make Allawi a viable PM candidate, and that he is leaning towards VP Abd al-Mahdi, of ISCI, as a consensus PM candidate. End note.) ¶7. (C) COMMENT: The idea of a national front governing coalition has quietly been gaining currency as the election approaches and the prospect of a lengthy government formation process looms. Polling data are mixed - there are suggestions that SLA could win the most seats, although polls vary. However, PM Maliki has so alienated the political class that it would be difficult for him to emerge as a viable candidate for another term as PM. In that scenario, VP Abd al-Mehdi or Allawi could emerge as consensus alternate candidates. END COMMENT. HILL

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