Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BAGHDAD238
2010-01-30 11:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
DPM AL-ISSAWI ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, THE IRAQIYA
VZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGB #0238/01 0301122 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 301122Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6364 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000238
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DPM AL-ISSAWI ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, THE IRAQIYA
COALITION AND A "NATIONAL FRONT"
Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000238
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DPM AL-ISSAWI ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, THE IRAQIYA
COALITION AND A "NATIONAL FRONT"
Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: DPM Rafi al-Issawi said the growing
realization among some Shi'a politicians of the Iraqiya
Coalition's appeal and the threat it posed to sectarian-based
politics spurred the de-Ba'athification effort, which was
intended to divide Sunni voters and perhaps prompt them to
boycott. Issawi did not/not believe Sunnis would boycott,
and assessed that the de'-Ba'athification controversy could
encourage them to turn out in greater numbers and perhaps
improve Iraqiya's showing at the polls. Saying Iraqis had
seen the limits of sectarian politics and were tired of
ineffectual incumbents - many of whom are running on
sectarian coalitions' lists - he
expressed optimism that Iraqiya could gain more than 70 seats
in upcoming national elections. (Note: NDI polls do not show
that Iraqiya will do that well. End note.) Issawi said
Iraqiya leader and former PM Iyad Allawi had been in contact
with Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) leader Ammar
al-Hakim and KRG President Masoud Barzani to discuss the
possibility of a "national front" government that would
comprise Iraqiya, ISCI, the Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) bloc
and possibly PM Maliki's State of Law Alliance (SLA). Part
of the impetus for a national front was to agree on
candidates for president, prime minister and speaker of the
parliament before the election and shorten the government
formation period. The idea of a national front governing
coalition has quietly been gaining currency as the election
approaches and the prospect of a lengthy government formation
process looms. END SUMMARY.
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION COULD BACKFIRE, HELP SUNNI TURNOUT
-------------- --------------
2. (C) On the margins of a dinner hosted by Kurdistan
Regional Government PM Barham Salih in honor of Ambassador's
visit to Suleymaniyah, DPM Rafi al-Issawi told Deputy
PolCouns that the Iraqiya Coalition's non-sectarian,
nationalist message was "well-timed" and resonated with Iraqi
voters. Issawi said Shi'a politicians' growing realization
of Iraqiya's appeal and the threat it posed to
sectarian-based politics had spurred the effort to disqualify
some candidates on the grounds of alleged Ba'athist ties.
The goal was to divide the Sunni vote and perhaps prompt
Sunnis to boycott the election. Issawi did not/not believe
Sunnis would boycott, in part because their decision to do so
in 2005 had hurt them politically. He offered that the
de-Ba'athification effort could actually have the unintended
consequence of bolstering voter turnout among Sunnis and
increasing the appeal of Iraqiya, which he characterized as
the only non-sectarian coalition in the race.
3. (C) Issawi said PM Maliki's SLA coalition had "quiet but
deep" ties to Ahmed Chalabi, who has shepherded the
de-Ba'athification campaign. SLA had at least tacitly
endorsed - and more likely, in his view, actively encouraged
- Chalabi's de-Ba'athification effort. Despite encouragement
from Issawi, former PM Allawi and President Talabani, Maliki
and his office "repeatedly sidestepped" opportunities to tamp
down rhetoric and help find a political solution to the
de-Ba'athification embroglio. Issawi said he and KRG PM
Salih agreed that the proposed political solution of ISCI's
Ammar al-Hakim had died when Hakim realized that if he
succeeded in brokering a solution, Maliki and SLA would
attack ISCI as pro-Ba'athist in the election campaign.
IRAQIYA'S PROSPECTS
--------------
4. (C) Issawi expressed optimism that Iraqiya, of which his
Q4. (C) Issawi expressed optimism that Iraqiya, of which his
own Future Gathering party is a member, could gain more than
70 seats in upcoming national elections. (Note: Estimates of
the number of seats various coalitions might win vary, but
Issawi's estimate of Iraqiya's showing is higher than shown
in most polls, including that of NDI. End note.) He
attributed his optimism to the fact that Iraqiya is the only
coalition offering a non-sectarian, nationalist alternative
to traditional sectarian coalitions. Iraqis had seen the
limits of sectarian-based politics, were tired of ineffectual
incumbents (many of whom are running on sectarian coalitions'
lists),and wanted to see a different, more effective
political approach. He assessed that Iraqiya would do well
at the polls in Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Anbar, Baghdad,
Diwaniyah, Babil and Basra. He was cautiously optimistic
that Iraqiyya could win seats in Maysan and Muthanna,
traditional Shi'a strongholds, as well.
NATIONAL FRONT COALITION UNDER CONSIDERATION
--------------
5. (C) Issawi said Allawi had been in close contact with
Hakim and KRG President Barzani - he described Allawi as
being "very close" to Barzani - to discuss the possibility of
a "national front" government that would comprise Iraqiya,
ISCI, the Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) bloc and possibly SLA.
(Note: Allawi and Hakim have both traveled to Erbil several
times in the past month to discuss campaign strategy with
Barzani. End note.) Part of the impetus for reaching
agreement on a national front and its candidates for
president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament was
to shorten the period of government formation after the
election. Issawi assessed that ISCI had gained ground and
SLA had lost momentum in the past two months, largely because
high-profile attacks and the failure of the government to
deliver basic services had undermined Maliki's credibility.
He believed that after a rocky start, Hakim had gained more
respect in the "Shi'a heartland" of central/southern Iraq.
6. (C) Issawi flatly said he supported former PM Allawi for
prime minister in the new government. He said he had
broached with ISCI's Hakim the idea that even if ISCI won the
most parliamentary seats, ISCI should support Allawi for PM.
Describing Allawi as the only secular candidate of stature,
Issawi explained that "he has good relations with all of
Iraq's neighbors, both Shi'a and Sunnis can claim him, and no
one loses", which could facilitate quicker government
formation. Issawi said Hakim did not reject the idea. KRG
PM Salih told Issawi that Hakim had subsequently discussed
the concept with both Barzani and President Talabani (PUK).
(Note: Our understanding is that Barzani's latest assessment
is that Iraqiya may not win enough seats to make Allawi a
viable PM candidate, and that he is leaning towards VP Abd
al-Mahdi, of ISCI, as a consensus PM candidate. End note.)
7. (C) COMMENT: The idea of a national front governing
coalition has quietly been gaining currency as the election
approaches and the prospect of a lengthy government formation
process looms. Polling data are mixed - there are
suggestions that SLA could win the most seats, although polls
vary. However, PM Maliki has so alienated the political
class that it would be difficult for him to emerge as a
viable candidate for another term as PM. In that scenario,
VP Abd al-Mehdi or Allawi could emerge as consensus alternate
candidates. END COMMENT.
HILL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: DPM AL-ISSAWI ON DE-BA'ATHIFICATION, THE IRAQIYA
COALITION AND A "NATIONAL FRONT"
Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: DPM Rafi al-Issawi said the growing
realization among some Shi'a politicians of the Iraqiya
Coalition's appeal and the threat it posed to sectarian-based
politics spurred the de-Ba'athification effort, which was
intended to divide Sunni voters and perhaps prompt them to
boycott. Issawi did not/not believe Sunnis would boycott,
and assessed that the de'-Ba'athification controversy could
encourage them to turn out in greater numbers and perhaps
improve Iraqiya's showing at the polls. Saying Iraqis had
seen the limits of sectarian politics and were tired of
ineffectual incumbents - many of whom are running on
sectarian coalitions' lists - he
expressed optimism that Iraqiya could gain more than 70 seats
in upcoming national elections. (Note: NDI polls do not show
that Iraqiya will do that well. End note.) Issawi said
Iraqiya leader and former PM Iyad Allawi had been in contact
with Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) leader Ammar
al-Hakim and KRG President Masoud Barzani to discuss the
possibility of a "national front" government that would
comprise Iraqiya, ISCI, the Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) bloc
and possibly PM Maliki's State of Law Alliance (SLA). Part
of the impetus for a national front was to agree on
candidates for president, prime minister and speaker of the
parliament before the election and shorten the government
formation period. The idea of a national front governing
coalition has quietly been gaining currency as the election
approaches and the prospect of a lengthy government formation
process looms. END SUMMARY.
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION COULD BACKFIRE, HELP SUNNI TURNOUT
-------------- --------------
2. (C) On the margins of a dinner hosted by Kurdistan
Regional Government PM Barham Salih in honor of Ambassador's
visit to Suleymaniyah, DPM Rafi al-Issawi told Deputy
PolCouns that the Iraqiya Coalition's non-sectarian,
nationalist message was "well-timed" and resonated with Iraqi
voters. Issawi said Shi'a politicians' growing realization
of Iraqiya's appeal and the threat it posed to
sectarian-based politics had spurred the effort to disqualify
some candidates on the grounds of alleged Ba'athist ties.
The goal was to divide the Sunni vote and perhaps prompt
Sunnis to boycott the election. Issawi did not/not believe
Sunnis would boycott, in part because their decision to do so
in 2005 had hurt them politically. He offered that the
de-Ba'athification effort could actually have the unintended
consequence of bolstering voter turnout among Sunnis and
increasing the appeal of Iraqiya, which he characterized as
the only non-sectarian coalition in the race.
3. (C) Issawi said PM Maliki's SLA coalition had "quiet but
deep" ties to Ahmed Chalabi, who has shepherded the
de-Ba'athification campaign. SLA had at least tacitly
endorsed - and more likely, in his view, actively encouraged
- Chalabi's de-Ba'athification effort. Despite encouragement
from Issawi, former PM Allawi and President Talabani, Maliki
and his office "repeatedly sidestepped" opportunities to tamp
down rhetoric and help find a political solution to the
de-Ba'athification embroglio. Issawi said he and KRG PM
Salih agreed that the proposed political solution of ISCI's
Ammar al-Hakim had died when Hakim realized that if he
succeeded in brokering a solution, Maliki and SLA would
attack ISCI as pro-Ba'athist in the election campaign.
IRAQIYA'S PROSPECTS
--------------
4. (C) Issawi expressed optimism that Iraqiya, of which his
Q4. (C) Issawi expressed optimism that Iraqiya, of which his
own Future Gathering party is a member, could gain more than
70 seats in upcoming national elections. (Note: Estimates of
the number of seats various coalitions might win vary, but
Issawi's estimate of Iraqiya's showing is higher than shown
in most polls, including that of NDI. End note.) He
attributed his optimism to the fact that Iraqiya is the only
coalition offering a non-sectarian, nationalist alternative
to traditional sectarian coalitions. Iraqis had seen the
limits of sectarian-based politics, were tired of ineffectual
incumbents (many of whom are running on sectarian coalitions'
lists),and wanted to see a different, more effective
political approach. He assessed that Iraqiya would do well
at the polls in Ninewa, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Anbar, Baghdad,
Diwaniyah, Babil and Basra. He was cautiously optimistic
that Iraqiyya could win seats in Maysan and Muthanna,
traditional Shi'a strongholds, as well.
NATIONAL FRONT COALITION UNDER CONSIDERATION
--------------
5. (C) Issawi said Allawi had been in close contact with
Hakim and KRG President Barzani - he described Allawi as
being "very close" to Barzani - to discuss the possibility of
a "national front" government that would comprise Iraqiya,
ISCI, the Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) bloc and possibly SLA.
(Note: Allawi and Hakim have both traveled to Erbil several
times in the past month to discuss campaign strategy with
Barzani. End note.) Part of the impetus for reaching
agreement on a national front and its candidates for
president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament was
to shorten the period of government formation after the
election. Issawi assessed that ISCI had gained ground and
SLA had lost momentum in the past two months, largely because
high-profile attacks and the failure of the government to
deliver basic services had undermined Maliki's credibility.
He believed that after a rocky start, Hakim had gained more
respect in the "Shi'a heartland" of central/southern Iraq.
6. (C) Issawi flatly said he supported former PM Allawi for
prime minister in the new government. He said he had
broached with ISCI's Hakim the idea that even if ISCI won the
most parliamentary seats, ISCI should support Allawi for PM.
Describing Allawi as the only secular candidate of stature,
Issawi explained that "he has good relations with all of
Iraq's neighbors, both Shi'a and Sunnis can claim him, and no
one loses", which could facilitate quicker government
formation. Issawi said Hakim did not reject the idea. KRG
PM Salih told Issawi that Hakim had subsequently discussed
the concept with both Barzani and President Talabani (PUK).
(Note: Our understanding is that Barzani's latest assessment
is that Iraqiya may not win enough seats to make Allawi a
viable PM candidate, and that he is leaning towards VP Abd
al-Mahdi, of ISCI, as a consensus PM candidate. End note.)
7. (C) COMMENT: The idea of a national front governing
coalition has quietly been gaining currency as the election
approaches and the prospect of a lengthy government formation
process looms. Polling data are mixed - there are
suggestions that SLA could win the most seats, although polls
vary. However, PM Maliki has so alienated the political
class that it would be difficult for him to emerge as a
viable candidate for another term as PM. In that scenario,
VP Abd al-Mehdi or Allawi could emerge as consensus alternate
candidates. END COMMENT.
HILL