Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BAGHDAD226
2010-01-29 18:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
ALLAWI WALKS BACK HIS BOYCOTT THREAT; ISSAWI STILL
VZCZCXYZ0014 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGB #0226/01 0291813 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291813Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6343 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000226
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ALLAWI WALKS BACK HIS BOYCOTT THREAT; ISSAWI STILL
WORKING POLITICAL OPTION FOR MUTLAQ
Classified By: Acting Pol M/C Yuri Kim, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000226
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ALLAWI WALKS BACK HIS BOYCOTT THREAT; ISSAWI STILL
WORKING POLITICAL OPTION FOR MUTLAQ
Classified By: Acting Pol M/C Yuri Kim, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Iyad Allawi walked back his threat of an
election boycott in public and private comments January
28.While he attempted to create the perception that the
boycott threat remained a live option, he noted in other
remarks that the real purpose of the remarks had been to let
the Saudis and Emiratis and others in the region know about
his coalition's problems and to highlight the level of
Iranian involvement in the controversy. Prominent Sunni
politician and DPM Rafi'e al-Issawi told Pol/C January 29
that he was also concerned by Allawi's talk of a boycott but
expressed his belief that this was just a bone he tossed to
Mutlaq to calm him. At Issawi's request, President Talabani
sent a letter to the Accountability and Justice Commission
(AJC) saying he (Talabani) saw no credible Ba'athism-related
charges against Mutlaq and Dafer al-Ani and noting that he
would like to see them reinstated. Issawi said he hoped the
AJC would present the letter January 30 to the special
three-person Council of Representatives (COR) committee
overseeing the AJC's efforts. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Iyad Allawi walked back his threat of an election
boycott in public and private comments January 28. In his
private comments to poloff, Allawi insisted that he stood by
his earlier threat of a boycott, but described it, in his key
point, as "one option we're considering," and adding, "I'm
not saying we're going to boycott or to ask people to
boycott." Nonetheless, in other remarks to poloff, he seemed
to strive to create the perception that the boycott threat
remained a live option:
-- He made the comments in Egypt to let the Saudis and
Emiratis and others in the region know about his coalition's
problems.
-- He noted that he was having second thoughts about
participating in a process that "benefits Iran and not the
Iraqi people."
-- He noted that he and others had a responsibility to try to
rectify the situation and create conditions that made the
Iraqi people proud. He also questioned why agents for
Iranian influence should be allowed to control the political
process.
-- He said he was exhausting all options in Iraq and the
region to find a way to move things forward and expressed
hope that the U.S. would play what he termed a more
constructive role to resolve the controversy.
3. (U) Nonetheless, publicly, Allawi had already walked by
the boycott threat much further. He was quoted on
al-Sharqiyah TV January 28 saying that he will strongly
participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Switching from a de-Ba'athification rationale, he was quoted
as cautioning, that he might revise that position and revert
to a boycott position if the current arrest operations
against national, liberal, secular, and Sadrist forces
continue, saying that such arrests harm the political process
and obstruct chances for creating a healthy environment to
run the elections.
4. (C) Prominent Sunni politician and DPM Rafi'e al-Issawi
told Pol/C January 29 that he was also concerned by Allawi's
talk of a boycott but expressed his belief that this was just
a bone he tossed to Mutlaq to calm him and persuade him not
to escalate. Issawi said that if Mutlaq is taken off the
list, Iraqiyya and the other parties would consider this
enough of a fix to turn the page on the de-Ba'ath issue.
5. (C) Issawi said there were three lines of action being
pursued to try to get Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dafer al-Ani off
the list of the disqualified:
-- At Issawi's request, President Talabani sent a letter to
Q-- At Issawi's request, President Talabani sent a letter to
the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) saying he
(Talabani) saw no credible Ba'athism-related charges against
Mutlaq and Ani and noting that he would like to see them
reinstated. Noting that Chalabi is out of town, Issawi said
that it was his understanding that the AJC deputy Faisale Ali
al-Lami would present this letter January 30 to the special
three-person Council of Representatives (COR) committee
overseeing the AJC's efforts. Issawi reported that Talabani
and Allawi had agreed to encourage the respective Sunni and
Kurd reps to show up for the meeting.
-- Mutlaq has sent a letter to Speaker Samarrai'e asking him
about two issues: the impact of a previous Presidency
Council decree stating that the de-Ba'athification committee
(the AJC's predecessor) was defunct; and the legal
implications of Article 7 of the Constitution, which requires
a new law to govern the work of the de-Ba'athification
committee.
-- Mutlaq continues to pursue a legal appeal.
HILL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ALLAWI WALKS BACK HIS BOYCOTT THREAT; ISSAWI STILL
WORKING POLITICAL OPTION FOR MUTLAQ
Classified By: Acting Pol M/C Yuri Kim, for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Iyad Allawi walked back his threat of an
election boycott in public and private comments January
28.While he attempted to create the perception that the
boycott threat remained a live option, he noted in other
remarks that the real purpose of the remarks had been to let
the Saudis and Emiratis and others in the region know about
his coalition's problems and to highlight the level of
Iranian involvement in the controversy. Prominent Sunni
politician and DPM Rafi'e al-Issawi told Pol/C January 29
that he was also concerned by Allawi's talk of a boycott but
expressed his belief that this was just a bone he tossed to
Mutlaq to calm him. At Issawi's request, President Talabani
sent a letter to the Accountability and Justice Commission
(AJC) saying he (Talabani) saw no credible Ba'athism-related
charges against Mutlaq and Dafer al-Ani and noting that he
would like to see them reinstated. Issawi said he hoped the
AJC would present the letter January 30 to the special
three-person Council of Representatives (COR) committee
overseeing the AJC's efforts. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Iyad Allawi walked back his threat of an election
boycott in public and private comments January 28. In his
private comments to poloff, Allawi insisted that he stood by
his earlier threat of a boycott, but described it, in his key
point, as "one option we're considering," and adding, "I'm
not saying we're going to boycott or to ask people to
boycott." Nonetheless, in other remarks to poloff, he seemed
to strive to create the perception that the boycott threat
remained a live option:
-- He made the comments in Egypt to let the Saudis and
Emiratis and others in the region know about his coalition's
problems.
-- He noted that he was having second thoughts about
participating in a process that "benefits Iran and not the
Iraqi people."
-- He noted that he and others had a responsibility to try to
rectify the situation and create conditions that made the
Iraqi people proud. He also questioned why agents for
Iranian influence should be allowed to control the political
process.
-- He said he was exhausting all options in Iraq and the
region to find a way to move things forward and expressed
hope that the U.S. would play what he termed a more
constructive role to resolve the controversy.
3. (U) Nonetheless, publicly, Allawi had already walked by
the boycott threat much further. He was quoted on
al-Sharqiyah TV January 28 saying that he will strongly
participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Switching from a de-Ba'athification rationale, he was quoted
as cautioning, that he might revise that position and revert
to a boycott position if the current arrest operations
against national, liberal, secular, and Sadrist forces
continue, saying that such arrests harm the political process
and obstruct chances for creating a healthy environment to
run the elections.
4. (C) Prominent Sunni politician and DPM Rafi'e al-Issawi
told Pol/C January 29 that he was also concerned by Allawi's
talk of a boycott but expressed his belief that this was just
a bone he tossed to Mutlaq to calm him and persuade him not
to escalate. Issawi said that if Mutlaq is taken off the
list, Iraqiyya and the other parties would consider this
enough of a fix to turn the page on the de-Ba'ath issue.
5. (C) Issawi said there were three lines of action being
pursued to try to get Saleh al-Mutlaq and Dafer al-Ani off
the list of the disqualified:
-- At Issawi's request, President Talabani sent a letter to
Q-- At Issawi's request, President Talabani sent a letter to
the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) saying he
(Talabani) saw no credible Ba'athism-related charges against
Mutlaq and Ani and noting that he would like to see them
reinstated. Noting that Chalabi is out of town, Issawi said
that it was his understanding that the AJC deputy Faisale Ali
al-Lami would present this letter January 30 to the special
three-person Council of Representatives (COR) committee
overseeing the AJC's efforts. Issawi reported that Talabani
and Allawi had agreed to encourage the respective Sunni and
Kurd reps to show up for the meeting.
-- Mutlaq has sent a letter to Speaker Samarrai'e asking him
about two issues: the impact of a previous Presidency
Council decree stating that the de-Ba'athification committee
(the AJC's predecessor) was defunct; and the legal
implications of Article 7 of the Constitution, which requires
a new law to govern the work of the de-Ba'athification
committee.
-- Mutlaq continues to pursue a legal appeal.
HILL