RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE U.S. CIVILIAN PRESENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000225 NEA FOR CORBIN, NSC FOR PHEE, OSD FOR FLOURNOY E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL APER AMGT IZ SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE U.S. CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN IRAQ REF: A. 09 STATE 122448 B. 09 STATE 34650 C. WHITEHOUSE 312206Z MAR 09 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER HILL, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). (U) This cable contains an action request. This is a joint U.S. Embassy - USF-I message. ¶1. (C) Summary and Action Request: This message responds to ref A request for a drawdown plan for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq. The plan below has been jointly agreed by Ambassador Hill and GEN Odierno. Embassy and USF-I request interagency concurrence on this plan, which envisions maintaining all 16 PRTs in their current location until June 2011, and closing all but the five enduring presence posts by September 30, 2011. End Summary and Action Request. ¶2. (C) The strategic guidance approved by Deputies on October 15 (Ref A) on the State Department's provincial footprint in Iraq calls for a reduction of the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) from 16 at the end of August 2010, to 7 (Basrah, Irbil, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala, Anbar and Najaf) by September 30, 2011. Anbar and Najaf will close on September 30, 2011 unless a compelling strategic reason for extension is identified by mid-2010 and approved by Deputies. Thus, we anticipate five enduring posts (Basrah, Irbil, Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala) as of Oct 1, 2011. Two of those posts -- Basrah and another location -- will ultimately become US consulates. ¶3. (C) Embassy and USF-I components have started planning in earnest. All agree on the need for robust, prudent and focused U.S. engagement in the provinces during the military's responsible drawdown. The teams will advance the President's objective stated in his February 27, 2009 speech at Camp Lejeune to sustain a strong political, diplomatic, and civilian effort to "help Iraqi institutions strengthen their capacity to protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic services." The teams will also forecast, prevent, mitigate or contain instability outside Baghdad, as well as seize strategic opportunities for influence and investment. We also agree, therefore, to maintain a full complement of PRTs as long as military support is available. ¶4. (C) The timing, coordination, pace and sequence of PRT closures have been the subject of much discussion and planning both in the Embassy and USF-I. The following plan is the product of this effort and has been approved by Ambassador Hill and GEN Odierno. The plan is based on the assumption of a 50,000-strong force. A smaller military presence likely would necessitate a review that could change the outcome. ¶5. (C) Timing. In order to meet the President's objectives to maintain a robust, flexible presence in Iraq during the first year of the new national government and our military drawdown, each non-enduring PRT will remain in operation until 30 days prior to the date on which the military is able to maintain the current level of support. The military currently it will be required to begin withdrawing support from one or more of the non-enduring PRTs on June 30, 2011. The military also forecasts it will withdraw support from the last of the non-enduring PRTs by September 30, 2011. Thus, the nine non-enduring PRTs will close between June and September 2011. The State Department will not pay any operational costs beyond those already agreed for any of the non-enduring PRTs. By September 30, 2011 we will have seven provincial presences. Najaf and Anbar will close on September 30 unless a compelling strategic reason arises to cause a course change. On October 1, 2011, the Department of State will have five provincial presences -- Basrah, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Irbil. ¶6. (U) Coordination. The drawdown of the non-enduring presence posts is overseen by the Embassy/USF-I Transition Steering Group, made up of senior Embassy and USF-I officials. In addition, OPA and USF-I maintain a joint PRT Forward Operating Base (FOB) Closing List which provides estimates of the dates on which the military will begin to withdraw support for each of the non-enduring PRTs. That list is updated twice a month as information becomes available. The updated list is distributed to all interagency participants in the PRT program. These oversight groups have links back to Main State and the Iraq Interagency Transition Working Group. ¶7. (C) Pace and Sequence. Current military estimates are for most of the nine non-enduring PRT-hosting bases to close between June 30 and September 30, 2011 (some bases may remain open longer). Because of the tight PRT drawdown schedule, the exact sequence and pace of closure of the non-enduring PRTs, excluding PRTs Anbar and Najaf, will be determined based on military withdrawal plans and a joint assessment of the mission in each province. These plans will continue to evolve in response to the military mission, resources, and other relevant factors. As the Deputies agreed on October 15, 2009, PRTs Anbar and Najaf will remain open until September 30, 2011 due to their strategic relevance. The military will provide adequate movement resources to fully support the sequence and pace of PRT closures. ¶8. (C) State Department resources will staff the nine non-enduring PRTs plus PRTs Anbar and Najaf until the summer 2011 transfer cycle, and at levels appropriate to the mission. The Embassy's Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) is constantly analyzing staffing requirements to ensure PRTs have the right mix of people, performing the right tasks. With the closure of the ePRTs by August 2010 and natural attrition in program areas where various PRTs see minimal need, staffing levels may continue to decline somewhat over the next 18 months. Closure of ePRTs alone will reduce total PRT staffing by approximately 70 employees (about 14 percent). However, we will continue to staff PRTs to meet the mission -- including hiring new staff as appropriate under various authorities available. ¶9. (C) In the time remaining, PRTs must focus on achieving key USG objectives in each province, influencing provincial leaders and civil society, and providing analysis and reporting to policy-makers. PRTs must be adequately staffed to achieve their priority tasks, and PRT personnel whose skill sets are not relevant to achieving priority tasks will not be backfilled. PRT leaders have been instructed to build a cadre of Iraqis to carry on essential tasks under the direction of the enduring presence posts after PRTs close. ¶10. (C) This plan will be reviewed periodically, along with the military draw down plan, and is subject to change. However, it currently provides the maximum flexibility to achieve the strategic objectives identified in refs A-C. The plan offers appropriate civilian coverage of Iraq for the longest possible time, provides the capability to mitigate the risk of instability on the ground as the military withdraws, and maintains maximum flexibility to adapt to shifting and unpredictable circumstances. It also provides critical support to provincial governments in the year following the seating of the new national government in 2010, when political coalitions will be shifting and coalescing, the ministries will fall under new leadership, and leaders in the center and the provinces will be renegotiating governance and patronage relationships. A robust PRT presence during this formative period will provide ballast and a hedge against the significant risks of instability or diminished governance. ¶11. (C) A related planning exercise is underway for the enduring presence posts, under the leadership of the Embassy Management Counselor working with M Bureaus and NEA/SCA/EX/I as well as with DoD organizations. This effort is planning the staffing, logistics, support, and security for the 5 locations that will remain after October 1, 2011. Several joint DOS-Embassy working groups have been established to work the various aspects of this extremely complex exercise. These groups include participation by a range of personnel at Main State. As we proceed, it has become clear that security issues (and related costs) are going to be among the most difficult. If, in 2012 and beyond, we assess that diplomats require a security footprint as heavy as is required in 2009 (but without military support),we will need to annually reassess the viability of some of the enduring presence posts. Embassy will make any and all recommendations on enduring presence posts by mid-2010, so as to inform the FY2012 budget cycle. HILL