SCENESETTER FOR IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000211 SIPDIS WHITE HOUSE FOR THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT (H.MUSTAFA) NSC FOR M.PHEE AND P.VROOMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KDEM IZ SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT HASHIMI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON REF: BAGHDAD 146 Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Gary A. Grappo ¶1. (C) Vice President Tareq al-Hashimi hopes to use his trip to Washington to bolster his image domestically as a respected national figure and defender of Sunni interests. We understand from his advisors that he sees himself as a contender to succeed Jalal Talabani as President. Time and again, however, Hashimi's ambitions have been undermined by a prickly personal style that has alienated other Sunni leaders and limited his popular appeal. According to Hashimi's principal foreign policy advisor, Hashimi plans to discuss post-election government formation in his Washington meetings. As he has done with recent senior USG visitors, Hashimi is also likely to press for a robust and interventionist U.S. role in Iraq, arguing that the GOI is not yet ready to manage domestic political conflicts or ensure security without strong U.S. guidance. (Suggested talking points on these and other topics are provided in para 8.) Personal Background -------------- ¶2. (C) Hashimi's difficult personality hinders his political influence and ability to compromise in a polity where consensus-building is crucial. Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) members removed Hashimi as Secretary-General in early 2009 due to what they perceived as his imperious style. Hashimi's prickliness was most visibly on display when he vetoed the amended election law in November 2009. He subsequently waged a war of words in the press with PM Maliki and others, straining relations with Sunni and Shi'a leaders alike but also significantly raising his profile, especially with Sunni voters. Still, Hashimi's support base and influence within Iraq's fractured Sunni political arena is relatively weak as he is considered too moderate for Sunni hardliners, and too secular for Islamists. More than a few of our Iraqi interlocutors distrust Hashimi's motives and question his abrupt transition from leadership in an Islamist party to creation of an avowedly secular party. Hashimi's "Tajdeed" (Renewal) party is part of the secular nationalist (and Sunni-majority) "Iraqiyya" coalition of Ayad Allawi, DPM Rafi al-Issawi, and MP Saleh al-Mutlaq, but he tends to be treated as a junior partner. According to the latest NDI poll, 3% of potential voters would cast a ballot for Hashimi's party, versus 18% for Ayad Allawi's party and 7% for Mutlaq's party. (Additional biographic information at para 9.) Agenda for Washington Visit -------------- ¶3. (C) DE-BA,ATHIFICATION. Hashimi advocates a legal and transparent de-Ba'athification process that will reassure Sunnis of their legitimate place in the Iraqi polity. He has welcomed U.S. mediation in forging potential legal and political solutions to the crisis created by the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) in disqualifying more than 400 election candidates. Hashimi has highlighted the AJC episode as evidence of imbalance in Iraq's political system, contrasting his "constitutional" election law veto with the "illegal" activities of the AJC. Hashimi's ideal solution will be one that publicly embarrasses or disadvantages PM Maliki. Over the long-term, Hashimi will want to see a de-Ba'athification process that is careful to distinguish between "Saddamist Ba'athists" and those who were Qdistinguish between "Saddamist Ba'athists" and those who were merely party members. ¶4. (C) SONS OF IRAQ INTEGRATION. Hashimi's perception is that the GOI has not made sufficient progress integrating and paying personnel of the Sons of Iraq (Sahwa) program. Hashimi aides believe that failure to adequately integrate the Sahwa into the government might have facilitated the devastating bombings in Baghdad in the fall of 2009 because Sahwa members no longer man the security checkpoints that formed a "Baghdad belt" against insurgent penetration. Hashimi will insist that GOI efforts on Sahwa integration are inadequate. (NOTE: Yet in fact, the GOI is both paying the SOI and transitioning them to permanent government jobs. Moreover, in line with a Baghdad Operations Command request that no additional SOI personnel be transitioned to civilian jobs until after the national elections, the SOI continue to work their security posts. END NOTE.) ¶5. (C) BALANCE OF POWERS. Hashimi has repeatedly complained, both publicly and privately, that PM Maliki has overly concentrated government power in his office. He sees this imbalance as a direct challenge to the development of democracy and accountable governance in Iraq. He is also worried by what he sees as Maliki's sectarian and personal agenda in directing Iraq's security services. Hashimi has recently spoken of his "embarrassment" that the Iraqi government is unable to protect citizens and has accused Maliki of failing to institute professionalism in Iraq's security establishment that could have prevented the large-scale bombings in Baghdad. He may remind Washington officials that he agreed to vote for Iraq's constitution, and the division of powers it codifies, under USG pressure, and will likely claim that the United States broke its promise to him to use its influence to help enact amendments to the constitution. ¶6. (C) U.S.-IRAQ SECURITY AGREEMENT. Hashimi's views on the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement reflect the Sunnis' contradictory stance towards the U.S. military presence and his willingness to pander to the public ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections. In December 2009, Hashimi criticized the United States for "disrespecting" the articles of the agreement. An aide later explained to us that Hashimi was misquoted and that he meant that the United States should take a more active role in resolving the Iran-Iraq border dispute. In the same month, Hashimi supporters staged a demonstration in downtown Baghdad criticizing both the U.S. and Iranian "occupations" of Iraq. Hashimi's foreign policy aide confided to us that Hashimi would not mind if a referendum on the Security Agreement were included on the March 7 election ballot, though he has not made any public statements to that effect. ¶7. (C) REGIONAL RELATIONS. Hashimi has called on Arab states to engage Iraq more actively through trade ties and re-establishing embassies in Baghdad. Hashimi believes that settling the border with Kuwait is a vital step towards reintegrating Iraq in the region politically and attracting investment and trade from the Gulf States. Having lived in Kuwait for ten years, Hashimi has personally intervened with Kuwaiti authorities on issues like the release of Iraqis imprisoned since Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Talking Points -------------- ¶8. (C) Embassy recommends the following talking points for possible use during meetings with Hashimi in Washington: --Vice President Biden's visit to Iraq in January 2010 underscored the U.S. commitment to implementing the cultural, economic, and political provisions of the Strategic Framework Agreement. The United States is firmly committed to strong bilateral relations and Iraq remains a priority for the administration. --While we support implementation of the Iraqi constitution with regard to de-Ba'athification, we expect that it will be done in a manner that is transparent and affords the process to all Iraqi citizens. --It is in Iraq's direct interest to establish an inclusive, representative government as soon as possible following the March 7 elections. We hope that you and other Iraqi leaders will be prepared to make the compromises necessary to achieve this. --We applaud your calls for Arab states to return their ambassadors to Baghdad and to take an active role in Iraq's Qambassadors to Baghdad and to take an active role in Iraq's regional reintegration. --We understand there has been significant progress in integrating members of the Sahwa movement into security and civilian government jobs. We will continue to work with the government on this important program and urge you to do the same. Additional Biographic Information -------------- ¶9. (C) Hashimi served in the Iraqi military until 1975, when he left with the rank of Lt. Colonel. He completed an M.A. in economics from the University of Baghdad. Hashimi lived in Kuwait for nearly ten years, heading Iraq's branch of the United Arab Navigation Company. He fled Kuwait in 1990 and returned to Iraq, where he worked in the private sector until ¶2003. Three of Hashimi's four siblings were murdered in 2006 by unknown assailants, most likely due to Hashimi's involvement in politics. Hashimi claims ancestry from the Prophet Mohammed's family; his clan is related to the former Iraqi royal family and the present leadership of Jordan. HILL