AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON MOQTADA AL-SADR'S KINDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000206 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO FELTMAN, SCHLICHER, CORBIN, AND LIMBERT. NSC FOR TALWAR. OVP FOR MUSTAFA. E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL IR EG IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON MOQTADA AL-SADR'S KINDER GENTLER (PRO-AMERICAN) COUSIN AYATOLLAH HUSSEIN AL-SADR Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a three-hour introductory meeting with the Ambassador, Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ismail al-Sadr (strictly protect),cousin of Moqtada al-Sadr, made the following points: (1) Iraq owes a debt of gratitude to the U.S. for toppling Saddam and will require a lasting partnership with the U.S. to overcome its long-term internal and external challenges; (2) Iraqi politicians continue to inject religion into politics to advance self-serving interests; (3) Iraq's security ministries need to be de-politicized and professionalized; (4) the ongoing de-Ba'athification election saga is a political farce that must end; (5) the USG should continue to actively guide and influence the decisions of Iraqi leaders to ensure national unity; (6) Iraq needs help with protecting its borders and water resources; (7) the Kurds must avoid a political confrontation with Baghdad; (8) Iraq will be well-served if either Jalal Talabani or Barham Saleh is elected as the next president of Iraq. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) On January 24, the Ambassador met with Grand Ayatollah Hussein Ismail al-Sadr, cousin of Moqtada al-Sadr, one of Iraq's five grand ayatollahs and Baghdad's most senior Shi'a cleric, to solicit the cleric's views on Iraq's political situation. During the three-hour discussion (and hearty meal) held in Sadr's residence in Baghdad's historic Kadhimiya district, the 62-year old cleric and close confidant of Grand Ayatollah Sistani raised a variety of topics including Iraq's transition to democracy, sectarian politics, de-Ba'athification, Iraq's territorial integrity, Arab-Kurd relations, water rights, and Iraq's strategic partnership with the United States. Thank You for You, America -------------- ¶3. (C) The soft-spoken Ayatollah, visibly pleased, and accompanied by Mustafa Al-Kadhimy (Director of Iraq's Memory Foundation),warmly welcomed the Ambassador, A/DCM and poloff and expressed his deep appreciation for the liberation of Iraq and the continued USG effort to bring lasting peace and stability to the country. "You helped deliver us from dictatorship to democracy," he said. Sadr praised the 
Ambassador for taking the initiative to solicit a cleric's advice and commented that "Iraqi politicians will always tell you what is in their best interest." ¶4. (C) Sadr underscored the importance of ensuring an enduring U.S. commitment and partnership with Iraq after the military drawdown. "It is important for all to realize that America will be our partners," he said. Given Iraq's fragile state, a strategic partnership with the U.S. would serve as the much-needed "safety valve," Sadr noted. The U.S. military should operate bases in Iraq and sustain their ability to project power and force as needed against internal and external threats to Iraq's security, he said. Politicians Injecting Religion Into Politics -------------- ¶5. (C) Sadr observed that Iraq continued to face internal and external crises. He commented that most Iraqi politicians lack a strong political base and resort to religion and sectarianism to bolster their credentials. He criticized Iraq's politicians for "injecting religion into Qcriticized Iraq's politicians for "injecting religion into politics" and for their pursuit of self-serving agendas that supplant Iraq's national interests. Underscoring a common theme during the meeting, Sadr urged continued U.S. activism with Iraqi political leaders to shape their efforts and decisions in support of a national agenda. ¶6. (C) Sadr counseled that Iraqi leaders must be reminded of their duty to the people of Iraq and the role the U.S. played in ensuring their political resurrection after years of exile under Saddam. The Ambassador noted that it was important for Iraqi society to chart its own course and learn from its own mistakes, while heeding the lessons of other nations. He explained that despite the religiosity of most Americans, the separation of church and state remained a fundamental cornerstone of American governance, prompting Sadr to quip, "Then why did you support all the Islamist parties in Iraq?" The Ambassador commented that the U.S. had to strike a delicate balance when promoting its political agenda in a BAGHDAD 00000206 002 OF 003 fragile political environment like Iraq's with so many religious, ethnic, and political layers. "I only hope that you can educate the politicians; we (the clergy) will take care of the people," Sadr replied. De-Politicize the Security Ministries -------------- ¶7. (C) Sadr voiced deep concern about the "politicization" of Iraq's security ministries (Defense, Interior, National Security). These ministries had been infiltrated by "a new breed" of ministers and security officials loyal to a political group and/or sect rather than the nation, he noted. The USG should help ensure the de-politicization and professionlization of these ministries in the new Iraqi government, Sadr said, while cautioning, "You saved Iraq from its past dilemma under Saddam and we don't want history to repeat itself." ¶8. (C) He called for the vigorous implementation of the Security Agreement, "every word of it" in order to professionalize the Iraqi Security Force (ISF),and rebuild it from scratch if necessary in order to ensure the integrity of the force. Ambassador underscored the USG commitment and ongoing success in building a professional ISF. This effort would require patience and time, resulting ultimately in a long-term relationship with the U.S. military that would help redefine Iraq's military culture, to which the Grand Ayatollah nodded approvingly. De-Ba'athification A Political Farce -------------- ¶9. (C) Sadr criticized Ahmed Chalabi for brewing the latest de-Ba'athification crisis that has plagued the electoral process in recent days, describing the saga as a political farce intended to advance individual agendas at the risk of national unity and stability. ¶10. (C) Sadr asserted that despite the brutality (and successive jail time) he and other members of his family, notably his late uncle Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, had experienced at the hands of Saddam and the Ba'athists, he ardently opposed de-Ba'athification. Sadr claims to have warned former USG officials, including Jay Garner and Paul Bremer, and senior Iraqi leaders, including the late-Abdel Aziz al-Hakim and Ibrahim Ja'afari, about the potential for political vendettas and instability resulting from rampant de-Ba'athification. ¶11. (C) Sadr called on the USG to "be a partner and not just an adviser" in bringing an end to this crisis. Mustafa Al-Kadhimy, a well-respected liberal political commentator, noted that de-Ba'athification had become a convenient smoke-screen for the GOI and Iraqi politicians eager to cover-up their political failings in the run-up to the elections. "The same people who are championing de-Ba'athification now will embrace the former Ba'athists after the elections to form coalitions," Mustafa asserted. The Ambassador noted that the issue had become polarized, requiring less emotion and more reason that could lead all parties, including the USG, toward finding a viable solution. Help Protect Our Borders and Water Resources -------------- ¶12. (C) Sadr expressed concern about Iraq's border and water troubles, stating that the country would require the support and intervention of the USG with neighboring countries to protect its interests. "Water is a matter of life or death Qprotect its interests. "Water is a matter of life or death for Iraq," Sadr noted. The Ambassador acknowledged Sadr's concerns and underscored the importance of continued outreach with Iraq's neighbors, citing recent progress with Turkey on water rights. The Ambassador also pointed to ongoing USG efforts in Basrah to address water access from the Euphrates River and the utility of new technology and water conservation methods. ¶13. (C) Sadr called on the USG to encourage neighboring Arab states to strengthen their ties to Iraq in order to bolster the country's Arab identity. He recalled his own recent discussions on this issue with the Egyptian and UAE ambassadors and efforts underway to establish a formal dialogue and exchange between Iraq's Shi'a clergy and their BAGHDAD 00000206 003 OF 003 Sunni counterparts in Cairo's prestigious Al-Azhar. Sadr said he also called on the Egyptian ambassador to encourage closer ties with Saudi Arabia and to solicit the KSA's help in condemning and preventing personal attacks against Sistani and anti-Shi'a propaganda by Saudi clerics. Kurds Always Want More -------------- ¶13. (C) Turning to Arab-Kurdish relations, Sadr reiterated his call for USG attention to the matter. Describing his own relationship with Kurdish leaders as strong, Sadr cautioned that the Kurds are "always seeking more concessions" in their dealings with the central government in Baghdad and prone to inflammatory comments on Kirkuk and other sensitive issues. ¶14. (C) Sadr commented that Iraq could not afford a crisis between its Arab and Kurdish populations, particularly at a time when the country was facing lingering external and internal problems. The Ambassador reaffirmed the USG's strong interest and involvement on this issue, notably the fate of Kirkuk, while explaining that the potential economic windfall from recent GOI oil contracts, resulting in a generous 17 percent share for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG),could go a long way in convincing KRG leaders that their long-term economic interests were better served as part of a unified Iraq vs. independent Kurdistan. Talabani or Barham Saleh for President -------------- ¶15. (C) Sadr very frankly stated his desire to see Jalal Talabani re-elected as Iraq's president after the elections. Sadr praised Talabani as "an excellent leader" with an ability to "talk with all sides" as well as unrivaled ability to transcend political divisions in times of crisis. "If Talabani cannot remain president, then he should nominate Barham Saleh," Sadr suggested. "Saleh has a good mind and a big heart," he added. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) Sadr is the son of Ismail al-Sadr and nephew of the late Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, the spiritual founder of the Da'wa party. Calm, gracious, and diplomatic, Sadr articulated his thoughts clearly and did not hesitate to applaud or (politely) criticize USG efforts. Clearly distrustful of Iraqi politicians' intentions, Sadr prefers more active USG intervention in Iraq's internal political affairs. A critic and ideological opponent of his firebrand cousin Moqtada's extreme views, Hussein al-Sadr is an adherent of the "Quietest" school of Shi'a clergy in Iraq led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Marja'iyah of Najaf. Like Sistani, Sadr opposes mixing religion and politics and opposes the Khomeini-inspired notion of "velayat-e-faqih" or rule of the jurisprudent. With Moqtada as the black sheep of the family, Hussein al-Sadr can best be described as the kinder, gentler, and more tolerant voice of reason in the al-Sadr clan. Unfazed by allegations of being too pro-Western, Sadr does not shy from meeting senior USG officials to exchange views on political developments. Moqtada's name was noticeably absent during the discussion. ¶17. (C) The meeting took place in Sadr's book-lined residence/office near the Kadhimiya shrine in Baghdad north of the Green Zone. When not meeting with foreign and Iraqi officials, Sadr spends the bulk of his time advancing Qofficials, Sadr spends the bulk of his time advancing philanthropic projects in Iraq through his Humanitarian Dialogue Foundation (with offices in the UK) and Salaam (Peace) satellite channel, supporting Sunnis and Shi'a communities alike. He maintains close ties to many of the most prominent Shi'a and Sunni clerics in the Muslim world and has hosted a series of conferences and published works promoting religious dialogue, human rights, and women's issues. Although not an official member of the Marja'iyah led by Sistani in Najaf, Sadr is Baghdad's most senior Shi'a cleric and retains a sizable following and is considered by supporters to be a viable successor to Sistani. HILL