IRAQ VISA AND REFUGEE VETTING: INTERAGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000191 SIPDIS VISAS DEPT FOR PRM, CA/VO/L/C AND INR/TIPOFF NSC FOR SAMANTHA POWER AND SCOTT BUSBY CIA FOR NCTC E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2222 TAGS: CMGT CVIS PREF PTER PINR PINS KVPR IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ VISA AND REFUGEE VETTING: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION REAPS GREAT REWARDS REF: A. BEIRNE/FAGAN EMAIL 01/06/10 ¶B. SELTZER/GREWE EMAIL 01/04/10 ¶C. 09 STATE 2602 ¶D. 09 STATE 13497 ¶E. WHITE HOUSE MEMO 01/07/10 SUBJ: ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK ON DECEMBER 25 ¶F. 2009 Classified By: A/DCM Gary Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Using Embassy Baghdad's VISAS VIPER Committee as a focal point, the Consular Section (CONS) and the Office of Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Affairs (REF) have coordinated efforts to significantly increase the sources and flow of derogatory information on persons that may include visa and refugee applicants. This improved information sharing has resulted in a marked increase in visa and refugee refusals and case investigations since August 2009. Mission Baghdad is working to further develop the integrity of its visa and refugee screening processes while continuing to facilitate legitimate travel, and to protect bona fide participants in consular and refugee programs. Our experience demonstrates that, in a country like Iraq where the U.S. has a large and diverse military presence, it is necessary to develop new systems for information sharing that can feed into the Visas Viper process and enhance our ability to protect national security. End summary. -------------- A Collaborative Model -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Derogatory information received about Iraqis intending to immigrate to the U.S. can generally be categorized into: (1) national security threats; (2) criminal behavior; (3) fraudulent representations of identity, nationality or qualifying employment; and (4) information relating to an individual's Saddam-era ties, actions or position. Embassy Baghdad has taken several steps to manage this type of information relating to visa and refugee applicants. The most significant improvement has been the increased coordination and information sharing between USG elements operating in Iraq. Both REF and CONS manage programs that allow Iraqi nationals to apply for admission to the United States, either temporarily or permanently. Consequently, beginning in early-to-mid 2009, they have worked with Iraq-based, regionally-located and Washington-based US Government (USG) interlocutors who possess potentially adverse information on the applicant pool, but which experience has shown has not otherwise made it into the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). ¶3. (C) In May 2009, Consular officers and Refugee coordinators began a series of meetings with U.S. military representatives to establish more formal lines of communication and systems for sharing derogatory information on foreign nationals. In September, the Consular FPU convened a Derogatory Information Working Group to develop mechanisms for sharing information broadly among interested USG entities. This group and effort directly involves Embassy Baghdad's Department of Homeland Security Attache (DHS),the Regional Security Office (RSO),FBI Legal Attache Q(DHS),the Regional Security Office (RSO),FBI Legal Attache (LEGATT),USF-I's J-9 Political Division, field agents from USF-I Human Intelligence Support Teams (HST) and Counter Intelligence, REF and CONS. Information developed through this network feeds into the VISAS VIPER Committee. ¶4. (C) In November 2009, CONS and RSO staff began attending the monthly Iraq-wide Counter-Intelligence Working Group meetings at U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) Headquarters. Representatives from USF-I HSTs now attend the monthly VISAS VIPER meetings and regularly share results of field investigations. In partnership with RSO and DHS, the FPU has provided document recognition training and other advice on visa-linked derogatory cases to the HST, Army Counter-Intelligence agents and Global Linguist Solutions managers so that they may intercept potential applicants before they apply for immigration or refugee benefits. -------------- Effective Systems and Procedures -------------- ¶5. (C) The Derogatory Information Working Group developed several proposals which were presented to the VISAS VIPER Committee. These include: the creation of classified and unclassified derogatory information email distribution lists, and the design and implementation of classified and unclassified tracking databases to better manage the flow of derogatory information and enhance joint management of cases. The unclassified version of the database is now operational. The classified version, still in development, will store the many reports and documents that can be referenced, but not attached to, Security Advisory Opinions and CLASS entries. Users in Washington and elsewhere will be able to access the database via a classified Sharepoint site, also being developed. ¶6. (C) The Mission team has established a systematic protocol that ensures information critical to protecting American borders is received and evaluated prior to visa and refugee adjudication, and after issuance when necessary. Once derogatory information is received, CONS and REF check to see if the individual in question holds a visa or has a pending visa, SIV Chief of Mission (COM) approval or refugee application. Those applications or cases are immediately put on hold pending further investigation. When there is sufficient information regarding a case, FPU enters a CLASS lookout so that the derogatory information is visible throughout the world by officers adjudicating visa or refugee cases. If the individual has a refugee case, REF adds the information to the Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) and flags it for an adjudicating DHS officer. Prior to this engagement, derogatory information was - and often was not - sent to CONS and REF on an ad hoc basis via a variety of formal and informal sources and channels, with no mechanism for comprehensive tracking or coordination. -------------- Concrete Actions, Direct Results -------------- ¶7. (SBU) As the two primary consumers of derogatory information, with complementary interests and programs, REF and CONS enjoy a close and collaborative relationship. Officers in both units regularly meet to discuss derogatory information on current and prospective applicants. The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program for Iraqis created under the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act provides a particularly good example of the interplay between the two. SIV applicants must obtain COM approval letters prior to applying for a visa. This approval authority has been delegated to REF. ¶8. (C) REF has wider discretion to withdraw COM approval than CONS has to revoke visas under the Immigration and Qthan CONS has to revoke visas under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The two sections have established procedures to enable REF to withdraw prior COM approvals based upon newly obtained derogatory information at almost any stage of the process. In several recent cases, the FPU referred significant derogatory information developed in the course of visa interviews and consular pre-adjudication vetting to REF. REF withdrew COM approval in these cases based on the information developed. Once COM approval was withdrawn, CONS returned the petitions to USCIS since the basis for the initial approval was no longer valid. REF and CONS partnership is essential to post's ongoing efforts to prevent mala fide applicants from traveling to the United States. ¶9. (C) In December and January alone, REF and CONS applicants were refused visas or denied access to the SIV program for, among other reasons, passing intelligence related to USF-I movements to terrorist organizations, selling U.S. military installation access badges that allow holders to carry weapons, distributing narcotics to U.S. military personnel, raping a U.S. service member, presenting false Iraqi nationality documents, and for making veiled threats against Mission personnel while expressing agreement and solidarity with the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq. ¶10. (C) In the first 17 months of the SIV program there were 45 COM denials, an average of 2.6 denials per month. In December, the COM designee denied or withdrew approval in 12 cases, denied access to another 6 individuals in the first 2 weeks of January and is currently reviewing an additional 14 cases for possible denial or withdrawal of COM approval. ¶11. (C) In a similar period, CONS returned six petitions to USCIS, revoked one issued immigrant visa and two non-immigrant visas, and has approximately 30 cases on hold pending investigation as a result of recently obtained derogatory information. In another December case, information passed through USF-I/CONS/REF channels led to visa revocation after it was discovered the applicant is under investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division for bribery, graft and misuse of USG resources. ¶12. (SBU) In addition to the improved information sharing amongst USG elements, CONS and REF have developed relationships with the primary companies that employ Iraqis who apply to the SIV and Priority 2 refugee programs. Approximately 70 per cent of all SIV applicants and 30 per cent of all P2 in-country US Refugee Assistance Program applicants qualify because of employment with Global Linguist Services (GLS) which provides interpreters to the U.S. military. REF, CONS, and USF-I continue to improve open communications with management at GLS who verify employment and pass names of interpreters who are terminated because of security threats or lack of faithful and valuable service. Program managers also maintain strong contacts at other large USG contractors such as KBR, Titan and Parsons. -------------- Additional Improvements -------------- ¶13. (C) In order to filter potential threats earlier in the SIV process, REF worked to enact new standard operating procedures to run all SIV applicants through the Department's CLASS name check database at the COM approval stage instead of waiting to have the checks run during the later-stage visa adjudication. The results were sobering when the first batch of 10 names resulted in an SIV COM denial because of direct terrorist ties and flagged that another had previously had a refugee case denied by DHS. Capturing information early in the process enables Embassy Baghdad to make swifter more efficient decisions and better utilize program resources for deserving applicants. REF and Qutilize program resources for deserving applicants. REF and CONS continue to run certain applicants through the ILiAD database maintained by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Qatar. In January 2010, REF began screening all applicants through ILiAD as part or the early alert program. ILiAD provides information from confiscated Saddam-era government, intelligence, military and criminal records, in addition to information gathered since 2003 contained in the DINAR Joint Intelligence Operations Center - Iraq (JOIC-I) database maintained in Iraq. ¶14. (SBU) The usual visa security steps taken include a CLASS name check, biometric fingerprint and facial recognition checks, and mandatory Security Advisory Opinions (SAO). However, there have been numerous cases in which applicants who have undergone the SAO process were subsequently found to have significant derogatory information not captured in the SAO vetting. CONS checks SIV applicants against more recently received derogatory information and often reconfirms that SIV applicants are either still employed or left employment in good standing if a significant length of time has passed since REF's initial vetting. ¶15. (C) CONS also works closely with the U.S. military's Human Intelligence Support Teams and the Embassy's Regional Security Office, which have access to the Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS). This system contains interview, intelligence and biometric data on thousands of Iraqis, including current and past employees, detainees, terrorists, insurgents and others. Using information gleaned from these newly developed sources, including REF COM denials or withdrawals, FPU increased the number of CLASS lookouts entered during the last two months of 2009 to 45, as compared to 9 in a similar period in 2008. There was a similar marked increase in VISA VIPER submissions. -------------- Case Studies -------------- ¶16. (SBU) This increased information flow has proven a boon for non-immigrant as well as immigrant visa processing. For example, in early January, an applicant was denied a non-immigrant visa as a result of adverse information developed 10 days earlier, marking him as the subject of a U.S. military investigation. ¶17. (C) In December 2009, the FPU obtained significant security-related reports from military sources and immediately disseminated the information via the classified email distribution list. CONS determined that one individual had been issued a Special Immigrant Visa in June 2009. By checking WRAPS, REF confirmed that the individual traveled to the United States in late 2009. Post's DHS Attache found the individual's arrival date and port of entry into the United States, and informed the National Targeting Center and the Terrorist Screening Center. CONS informed Post's Legal Attach Office. ¶18. (C) In another instance, FPU discovered a fraudulent Iraq passport submitted by a Sudanese national and asked DHS and RSO to interview the individual. FPU then contacted his employer, who picked him up outside the Consular entrance and delivered him to the HST for further interviewing and screening. FPU then passed the HST's assessment that the individual was a Sudanese national and not Iraqi to REF, which withdrew COM approval. CONS then returned the petition to USCIS. ¶19. (C) This improved coordination also facilitates travel for deserving Iraqis. In October 2009, FPU developed information from military and contractor sources that an individual with an already issued visa had failed his periodic polygraph exam. Rather than return for a more in depth follow-up, he was allowed to resign because he said he was traveling to the United States on his SIV. CONS was unable to contact the applicant directly but learned that his Qunable to contact the applicant directly but learned that his travel was imminent. In coordination with VO/L/A, DHS, the Terrorist Screening Center and the National Counterterrorism Center, CONS revoked his visa and called him back for a re-interview. After the re-interview, consultation with the administrator of the polygraph test, and a discussion with the HST, it was determined that the subject was not a threat and that no ineligibility applied. He was promptly issued a new visa. -------------- -------------- Visa and Refugee Programs Continue to Function with Integrity as Embassy Baghdad Looks to do More -------------- -------------- ¶20. (SBU) While Embassy Baghdad has made tremendous strides in accessing and managing derogatory information there is still more that needs to be done. The relevant agencies will continue to improve communication and ensure that information is entered into the necessary databases. The next step in the strategy is to require SIV applicants to hold valid Iraqi passports at the COM approval stage of the process. Iraqi passports contain more fraud protection mechanisms than the national identification cards, which are vulnerable to forgery. It will also ensure that an applicant's name, spelling, and date of birth are referenced consistently throughout the process. CA/VO/L recently agreed that post has the authority to make possession of an Iraqi passport a requirement at the COM stage (Refs A and B). REF will continue to work with CA/EX/CST to improve the SQ SIV database to enable it to better track and combat fraud. REF is preparing recommendations for the next release of the program to include the ability to cross-reference cases, conduct advanced searches, better categorize and track revocations of COM approval and other improvement that will save time and resources so SIV caseworkers can spend more time focusing on fraud and derogatory information. ¶21. (SBU) With the assistance of post's DHS Attache CONS will shortly begin a test project to filter all immigrant visa applicants through the Terrorist Screening Center database approximately three weeks before interview. This will help validate information in CLASS and highlight information gaps that require attention. Results, which will arrive before interview dates, will provide specific lines of questioning for adjudicating officers to consider and will capture derogatory information generated after REF's earlier thorough vetting. The immigrant visa pool in Baghdad provides an appropriately sized control group for this initiative. If successful, the project will expand on trial basis to non-immigrant visa applicants using the new DS-160 Electronic Visa Application Form. ¶22. (SBU) Baghdad is also piloting the Department's Iris capture program with immigrant visa applicants. Although scanning only began on January 11, the program is showing early promise. On January 20, an applicant with an arrest record was identified using his iris scan, but not his fingerprints. ¶23. (SBU) Comment: Aided in part by the rapid increase in derogatory information regarding Iraqis intending to immigrate or visit the U.S., the integrity of the USRAP and visa programs has improved. The programs continue to provide protection to thousands of vulnerable Iraqis who face threat as a result of service they provided on behalf of the USG, and to facilitate legitimate travel while protecting our borders. While 64 applicants have been denied access to the SIV program at the COM stage, 2,386 Iraqis have been approved. Over 1500 SIVs have been issued since the start of the program. Ninety-three per cent of applicants to the Qthe program. Ninety-three per cent of applicants to the Priority-2 in-country refugee program are approved by DHS. Embassy Baghdad continues to improve the processes for bona fide applicants, and the collaborative vetting and information sharing process has led to the addition of valid, as well as the removal of erroneous derogatory information, thereby ensuring that bona fide applicants are not prevented from traveling to the United States. Embassy Baghdad will continue to manage the need to keep the visa and refugee programs functioning with integrity while maintaining national security as the ultimate priority. End Comment. HILL