PRT SALAH AD DIN: FORMER GOVERNOR FINALLY REMOVED

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000184 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ KCOR SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: FORMER GOVERNOR FINALLY REMOVED FROM OFFICE REF: A. A) 09 BAGHDAD 2530 ¶B. B) 09 BAGHDAD 2847 ¶C. C) 09 BAGHDAD 3181 ¶D. D) 09 BAGHDAD 3387 Classified By: OPA Director Greta Holtz for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) This is a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Salah Ad Din (PRT) reporting cable. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY. In the early morning hours of January 21, following issuance of a Council of Ministers letter rescinding its prior support of former Salah al-Din (SaD) Governor Mutashar, the Iraqi army and police, together with high-level provincial officials, persuaded the former governor to leave the governor's official residence. The removal was successfully conducted without incident, despite Provincial Council (PC) complaints the week before that they had exhausted all options to resolve the impasse. Plans are being made by the PC to arrange for the governor-elect to be sworn in, though there are still questions how this can be done legally without a Presidential Decree. If the PC succeeds in their effort, it will mark a significant victory for rule of law in Salah ad Din (SaD) and for Iraq. END SUMMARY. RISING PROVINCIAL COUNCIL FRUSTRATION -------------- ¶3. (C) PRT Team Leader (TL) and Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Commander separately met with SaD PC Chair Ahmed Abdullah Abid Khalaf (Abu Mazin) on January 14 for another update on the PC's efforts to remove SaD Provincial Governor Mutashar Hussein Ilaiwee of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) officially from office, per the PC's decision on September 3, 2009. (Reftel A). The PC Chair, Provincial Governor-elect Khalid Hassan Mahdi Salih, and other key PC members were clearly anxious to resolve the governor impasse and swear in as the new governor as soon as possible. They reported that o/a January 12, Abu Mazin, the governor-elect, and several other PC members had traveled to Baghdad for two days of meetings, including a meeting with Supreme Court Chief Judge Medhat, to try to resolve issues related to the removal of Mutashar. ¶4. (C) The PC delegation wanted to vet a plan that would have the PC swear in Khalid as the new governor on January 20. However, the Chief Judge told them that absent the presidential decree from the President's Council, he could not permit any judge to participate in a swearing-in ceremony for the governor--elect. Without the presence of a judge, 
the PC could not proceed with the installation of a new governor. The PC Chair, governor-elect and two other influential PC members, expressed strong frustration to PRT Team Leader, saying they felt they had exhausted all political and legal means available to them, were being blocked by powerful IIP leaders, and were ready to take matters into their own hands. As Governor-elect Khalid observed, "if this had been Anbar, the problem would have already been solved". (COMMENT: The implication was that by "solved" they meant through force or assassination. END COMMENT.) ¶5. (C) PRTOffs held another meeting with the PC Chair and leading PC members on January 18 for an update on the PC's latest efforts on the governor case. During that meeting, Abu Mazin told PRTOffs he planned to travel again to Baghdad the next day to meet with Prime Minister Maliki, adding that they were expecting finally to get the long-awaited letter from the Prime Minister rescinding his October 28 memo. Abu Mazin repeated what he had told the PRT before, that at a meeting in Baghdad on December 30, Maliki acknowledged he had erred when he had signed the memo in support of Mutashar, that the PC had followed the correct steps, and that the Qthat the PC had followed the correct steps, and that the Federal Supreme Court decision confirming Mutashar's removal was correct and binding (Reftel D). Abu Mazin then said that the Prime Minister, on the spot, began to draft another letter in support of the Supreme Court decision to the President of the Council of Representatives (CoR),Ayad al-Sammarra'ie. That letter appears not to have gone forward at that time, allowing the stalemate to continue. (NOTE: The governor-elect subsequently explained that Maliki felt compelled to reverse himself once he realized his October letter was indeed illegal and that this episode could likely raise ethics questions for him in the run-up to the March elections. END NOTE.) MALIKI CLEARS PATH FOR GOVERNOR'S REMOVAL... -------------- ¶6. (C) On January 19, Abu Mazin again traveled to Baghdad to follow up on the promised memo from the Prime Minister. Though he returned empty-handed, he was told the memo was being drafted and would be ready on January 20. The next day another PC member, Radhi Muhammed Ali-Hadi of the State of Law Alliance, traveled to Baghdad on behalf of the PC Chair and procured the memo from the Executive Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. The memo, written with the full support of the Prime Minister, stated that "the decision made by the Federal Supreme Court on this case supersedes all other government authorities according to Article 94 of the Iraqi Constitution." Per Maliki's instructions through the Council of Ministers, "all entities are obligated to execute the following decisions: -- Execute the order as given by the Supreme Court regarding the removal of the Governor of Salah ad Din from his position; -- Authorizes the PC to nominate and elect a replacement Governor according to the Provincial Powers Law no. 21, 2008; -- Asks the Legal Affairs Department of the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers to coordinate with the Iraqi High Electoral Commission to separate the accusations made against the Chairman of the PC as it relates to this decision." ...AND EXIT GOVERNOR MUTASHAR -------------- ¶7. (C) Early on the evening of January 20, the BCT notified PRT that they had received an urgent message from the Provincial Chief of Police, General Hamid, and General Salahuddin, the Kurdish Commander of the 4th Iraqi Army Division. Both reported that they had the Executive Secretariat letter ordering the implementation of the Supreme Court ruling to remove Governor Mutashar. They also stated that they had received follow-up communications from the ministries of Interior and Defense to carry out the Prime Minister's recommendation and remove Mutashar from the official governor's residence, and that they intended to move at 0500 hrs on January 21 to escort the former governor from the premises. ¶8. (C) The acting provincial governor, Ahmed Abed-al-Jabar, told PRTOffs that a high-level PC delegation met with IIP leader and PC member Ammar Yousef Hammoud to try to negotiate the removal of Mutashar from office and the residence. Ammar, believed to be the main powerbroker behind the Mutashar, adamantly refused, adding there would be blood in the streets before the IIP would give up the position, since retention of the SaD governorship by the IIP was part of a political deal brokered in Baghdad. Meanwhile, small teams of Iraqi army and police, along with the acting governor, communicated to Mutashar the contents of the Prime Minister's memo and the need to follow the rule of law. ¶9. (C) At 0520 hrs on January 21, General Salahuddin, a Kurdish career soldier, successfully persuaded Mutashar to leave the official residence "for the good of the province." The general escorted Mutashar out of the building without incident and the Iraqi army secured the building. Mutashar's heavily-armed security detail melted away, taking their weapons (SaD government property) with them. Abu Mazin told PRTOffs the final hurdle - getting a judge to swear in Khalid as the new governor ) was being handled directly with the Supreme Court. The PC had written a letter January 20 to Chief Judge asking him to review his earlier decision (regarding the Presidential Decree) in light of the Prime Minister's support for the Supreme Court's October 12 decision and the removal of the governor. The PC Chair told PRTOffs he expected to have a judge available for the swearing in within days - even without a Presidential Decree Qswearing in within days - even without a Presidential Decree - though he and key PC members emphasized they wanted to follow the letter of the law exactly, whatever that entailed. COMMENT: HARD-WON VICTORY FOR RULE OF LAW -------------- ¶10. (C) This prolonged power struggle in Salah ad Din proved to be a serious test of the integrity of the Constitution, the Provincial Powers Law, and the authority of the Supreme Court. If it continues to unfold peacefully, this case will have significant benefits for the development of rule of law and separation of federal and provincial powers in Iraq. Another visible outcome from this affair was the increasing political maturity exhibited by the SaD PC, which demonstrated a determination to conduct itself within the context of the Constitution and the Provincial Powers Law. Though provincial officials lobbied hard for U.S. assistance at critical junctures, in the end, they accomplished the governor's removal peacefully and by their own efforts. ¶11. (C) That the key "diplomat" in this drama turned out to be a Kurdish general operating in Saddam's former hometown shows how far things have progressed in the province. It is also tribute to how successful the effort over the past six years has been to stand up an effective and professional Iraqi army. HILL