TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION, IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000173 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2030 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KNNP IZ IR TU SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION, IRAN NUCLEAR FILE Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kahl on January 11, Turkish Ambassador Murat Ozcelik said Turkey does not want PM Maliki to win another term and will actively support other coalitions. Driven in part by their desire to preserve recently improved Turkey-KRG relations (KRG President Barzani does not want to see Maliki repeat, either),Turkey likes former PM Iyad Allawi and VP Adel abd al-Mehdi for the prime minister's job. Concerned about how long government formation could take, Ozcelik said the U.S., Turkey and others should begin discussions now with potential government coalition partners to help them reach preliminary decisions on partnerships. He argued for collaboration between the U.S. and Turkey in deciding which potential government coalitions appeared to be most viable and palatable. On Iran's nuclear ambitions, Turkey's foreign policy establishment and President Gul agreed that greater pressure might be needed; however, PM Erdogan and FM Davutoglu believe Iran can be contained through means other than sanctions and increased pressure. Details on disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas and Kirkuk are reported septel. End summary. TURKS OPPOSE MALIKI ... -------------- ¶2. (C) On elections and forming a coalition government, Ozcelik flatly said the Government of Turkey (GOT) "does not wish to see PM Maliki come to power again", and would actively work to prevent that possibility. Turkey supported Maliki during the past several years; however, the PM's retinue was uncomfortably close to Iran (he alleged some received instructions from Tehran) and Turkey does not judge that Maliki would work productively with the GOT if he wins a second term. Turkey also judged that if re-elected, Maliki would focus on further centralizing power and would be unable to advance exigent post-election issues such as Kirkuk/disputed internal boundary (DIBs),hydrocarbon legislation, revenue sharing and national reconciliation. In addition, KRG President Barzani believes Maliki failed to honor commitments on issues of interest to the Kurds and would prefer another government coalition partner. The Turks are keen to keep recently improved Turkey-KRG relations on an even keel; supporting Maliki could complicate that effort. �A; ... BUT ARE AMENABLE TO ALLAWI OR ABD AL-MEHDI -------------- - ¶3. (C) Ozcelik said Barzani and Turkey "would not object" if Iyad Allawi (Iraqia Alliance) or VP Adel Abd al-Mehdi (ISCI) were to become PM. Describing both as "wonderful and pragmatic", he cautioned that Allawi may not win enough seats to be seriously considered as a PM candidate. Ozcelik judged that there is a "strong likelihood" that Maliki's State of Law Alliance (SLA) will win the most seats, but that other coalitions will maneuver to prevent another Maliki term as PM, a potentially dangerous scenario that could cast doubt on the elections' legitimacy. Asked to approximate how many seats each of the major blocs might win, Ozcelik offered the following: Iraq National Alliance (INA) - 80 seats; SLA - 90 seats; al-Iraqia Alliance - 60-70 seats, and; the Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) - 60 seats. (Note: We assess that Ozcelik QAlliance List (KAL) - 60 seats. (Note: We assess that Ozcelik over-estimated the number of seats the Kurds, al-Iraqia and SLA are likely to win. End note.) WILLING TO PICK WINNERS AND LOSERS -------------- ¶4. (C) Ozcelik said Turkey would provide training and "other campaign assistance" to some coalitions, including Allawi's al-Iraqia Alliance, and urged the U.S. to provide direct assistance to coalitions it favors as well. (Comment: We are troubled by Ozcelik's apparent penchant for actively intervening to achieve specific election outcomes. End comment.) Expressing concern about how long government formation could take, Ozcelik said the U.S., Turkey and others should begin discussions now with potential government coalition partners to help them reach preliminary decisions on partnerships. Turkey wants to see a government formed within three months of the elections and believes initiating such discussions now could help speed that process. He suggested that the U.S. and Turkey speak with various Iraqi actors in the coming month and collaborate in deciding which potential government coalitions appeared to be most viable and palatable. Ozcelik cautioned that the dynamics within the Shi'a camp were unclear, particularly with respect to the Sadrists. MALIKI MAY NOT GO QUIETLY -------------- ¶5. (C) Asked by DASD Kahl what might happen if the SLA won the largest number of seats, but failed to secure Maliki another term as PM, Ozcelik expressed concern that recent security upgrades in the International Zone (IZ) could help Maliki physically resist relinquishing his office. Citing concerns about malign Iranian influence, Ozcelik argued that the U.S., Turkey and others should support Iraqi leaders who pushed back against Maliki's "centrist tendencies", which left Iraq more expose to control by Iran. IRAN NUCLEAR FILE -------------- ¶6. (C) DASD Kahl noted that suppression of internal political opposition and the al-Fakkah oilfield incursion had helped turn international opinion against the Iranian regime, which had failed to articulate a coherent position on its nuclear aspirations. The ability to reach a diplomatic solution on Iran's nuclear program depended on receptivity, which had not been forthcoming. Despite the fact that a majority of Turks do not support increased pressure on Iran, DASD Kahl urged Turkey to consider less desirable "alternative futures" if Iran did not choose to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the current impasse. DASD Kahl stressed to Ozcelik that the international community must be united when it comes to dealing with Iran in order to avoid further destabilization in the region. TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT NOT OPPOSED TO SANCTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ozcelik said Turkey shared concerns about Iran's intentions, but cautioned that there were different schools of thought on Iran within Turkey's leadership. The foreign policy establishment, with the notable exception of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, generally agreed that greater pressure might be needed, and had helped deter PM Erdogan from speaking out more directly against possible action by Israel. Turkey did not assess that Iran would relinquish its nuclear weapon aspirations, but believed it would stop just short of actually developing weapons and maintain "breakout capability". Turkey's political class was concerned that enhanced international sanctions against Iran would rest disproportionately on the shoulders of Iran's neighbors. PM AND FONMIN BELIEVE IRAN CAN BE PERSUADED -------------- ¶8. (C) Ozcelik said that while President Gul agreed with the foreign policy establishment's assessment, PM Erdogan and FM Davutoglu believe Iran "can be persuaded to be contained" and that a "path other than sanctions is still possible". DASD Kahl stressed that the U.S. is aware that developments in Iran have changed the political landscape. He added that we do not want measures we or the international community might take to help the Iranian regime rally the population with anti-foreigner rhetoric. ¶9. (U) DASD Kahl cleared on this message. HILL