Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10BAGHDAD169
2010-01-23 15:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
MOMENTARY STALL IN CRAFTING SOLUTION TO
VZCZCXYZ0005 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGB #0169/01 0231522 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 231522Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6247 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000169
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: MOMENTARY STALL IN CRAFTING SOLUTION TO
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION CONTROVERSY, IN WAKE OF TALABANI'S
REMARKS
Classified By: Acting POL M/C Yuri Kim, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000169
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: MOMENTARY STALL IN CRAFTING SOLUTION TO
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION CONTROVERSY, IN WAKE OF TALABANI'S
REMARKS
Classified By: Acting POL M/C Yuri Kim, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Political negotiations to resolve the
de-Ba'athification controversy appear to have stalled in the
wake President Talabani's January 21 actions questioning the
legitimacy of the Accountability and Justice Commission
(AJC). Talabani's move -- including a statement in support
of non-Saddamist Ba'athists -- is reverberating through
Iraq's political class and, to a moderate extent for now, in
the streets. Political leaders are reassessing where they
are in keeping key players on board for the joint political
track/legal track solution they had artfully cobbled
together. Saleh al-Mutlaq, responding to the opening he
thought Talabani perhaps inadvertently created, insisted
publicly that the Presidency Council "freeze" the actions of
the AJC and is reportedly insisting privately that his
Iraqiyya Alliance call for the entire process be postponed
until after elections. This is a maximalist postponement
that Shi'a negotiator Hadi al-Amiri has made clear to us
privately would be a no-go for the Shi'a street and for Shi'a
politicians. We will be working January 23 to assess fallout
from Talabani's remarks and pressing the parties to pursue a
workable solution. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Friday prayers January 22 have created the appearance
of a momentary lull in the rush of reassessments to President
Talabani's January 21 statements questioning the legitimacy
of the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) and in the
behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy mounted by Shi'a power
broker Hadi al-Amiri and Sunni heavyweight DPM Rafi'e
al-Issawi. Amiri, who was to have briefed PM Maliki January
21 on the plan, has been unable to gain access to the PM, as
of late January 22, according to Issawi. Issawi told Acting
POL M/C that Amiri had managed to meet with Talabani. SRSG
Melkert was scheduled to meet with VP Adel Abd al-Mahdi.
TALABANI QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF AJC
--------------
3. (C) Talabani stated at a press conference yesterday that
he plans to ask Chief Judge of the Iraqi Supreme Court Medhat
Mahmoud if the AJC had statutory authority to act, given that
Parliament refused in 2009 to endorse the slate of
commissioners nominated to serve on the AJC. Judge Medhat's
staff have told us, however, that the judge has left the
country; they said they did not know where he had gone, or
when he would be back. (COMMENT: We have met with the
cautious Medhat earlier in this crisis and gauged that he
will likely be reluctant to render a clear-cut opinion on
whether the AJC decisions were legal. What he would be more
likely willing to do is send signals to the seven-judge
appeals panel for AJC decisions, the Cassation Chamber, that
it is clearly within their purview to weigh doubts about the
AJC's statutory authority in deciding appeals. END COMMENT.)
AND DEFENDS MUTLAQ AND OTHER "BA'ATHISTS"
--------------
4. (C) In his comments, Talabani also raised more profound
questions about the de-Ba'athification process, noting that
many former Ba'athists had changed sides and became prominent
elements of opposition to Saddam, a messy reality that the
AJC's black-and-white, unchecked decision-making had failed
to capture. Talabani stressed the importance instead of
national reconciliation and adherence to the broad spirit of
the Iraqi Constitution. He distinguished between "Ba'athist
Ba'athists" and "Saddamist Ba'athists." Putting prominent
Sunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq in the latter category,
QSunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq in the latter category,
Talabani insisted that Mutlaq and other "Ba'athist
Ba'athists" should be allowed to "participate in all fields
in Iraq," including, presumably, to run as candidates in the
upcoming national elections.
SHI'A POLITICIANS AND STREET CRY FOUL
--------------
5. (C) Talabani's statements have sent a shock wave through
Iraq's political class and well as the public. Shi'a
politicians are downplaying Talabani's actions, with
maintained PM Maliki demurring ("My intervention would be
unconstitutional.") and indicating that there were oversight
structures in place to determine if the AJC acted properly.
That said, his allies and ISCI politicians have been more
outspoken. Hassan al-Sunnayad, spokesman for the Maliki's
State of Law Coalition was quoted saying that Talabani's
views represented "his personal opinion only," and insisting
that "we are not interested in comments by any politicians or
bloc, except for decisions voted on by the Accountability and
Justice (AJC). Those who object have only the Iraqi judicial
system." MP Hummam Hamoudi, ISCI bloc leader and Chairman of
the Iraqi National Alliance List, offered a similar, but more
tempered assessment of Talabani's intervention, saying
"President Talabani's comments are respected. However, the
Constitution and the law are the go-to in this issue." The
Shi'a street made clear its views on the President's
statements January 21 and 22. There were reports of
"hundreds" gathered in Najaf and Karbala to protest
Talabani's remarks as well as (in the case of Karbala)
foreign interference in the work of the elections and the
de-Ba'athification process.
MUTLAQ LUNGES AT OPENING HE SEES
--------------
6. (C) Mutlaq spotted the opening Talabani perhaps
inadvertently created and with his usual inelegant brio
lunged forward, expressing appreciation for the President's
statements and insisting that the Presidency Council meet as
soon as possible to "freeze" the actions of the AJC and
instruct the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)
that it should disregard the list of 500-odd disqualified
candidates it had received. Issawi told Acting POL M/C that
with the possibility of nullification of the AJC in toto that
Talabani had introduced in public debate, Mutlaq and Iraqiyya
List allies VP Hashimi and Osama al-Nujaifi were pushing hard
for Iraqiyya to insist that the entire process be postponed
into a post-election vet-the-winners procedures, a maximalist
postponement that Amiri has made clear to us privately would
be a no-go for the Shi'a street and for Shi'a politicians.
IHEC HAPPY TO HAVE TOSSED THE HOT POTATO
--------------
7. (C) IHEC Commissioner Judge Qasim al-Aboudi, head of
IHEC's Legal Committee, told poloff January 22 that IHEC will
wait for the decision of the Federal Supreme Court regarding
the constitutionality of the AJC. In the meantime, he noted
that IHEC is already aware of many appeals of the list of
excluded candidates, but said he was unable to give a
specific number at this point. He predicted that the Supreme
Court would rule quickly on this issue and proved the needed
guidance for the Electoral Judicial Panel (to appeal IHEC
decisions) and the Cassation Chamber (for appeals of AJC
decisions) on how to handle the appeals. He expressed
confidence that IHEC would get the guidance it needed to
proceed with election preparations in a timely manner.
UNAMI, however, was less optimistic, assessing that Judge
Medhat would be reticent to render an opinion that would
place him in the center of the political firestorm.
HILL
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: MOMENTARY STALL IN CRAFTING SOLUTION TO
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION CONTROVERSY, IN WAKE OF TALABANI'S
REMARKS
Classified By: Acting POL M/C Yuri Kim, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Political negotiations to resolve the
de-Ba'athification controversy appear to have stalled in the
wake President Talabani's January 21 actions questioning the
legitimacy of the Accountability and Justice Commission
(AJC). Talabani's move -- including a statement in support
of non-Saddamist Ba'athists -- is reverberating through
Iraq's political class and, to a moderate extent for now, in
the streets. Political leaders are reassessing where they
are in keeping key players on board for the joint political
track/legal track solution they had artfully cobbled
together. Saleh al-Mutlaq, responding to the opening he
thought Talabani perhaps inadvertently created, insisted
publicly that the Presidency Council "freeze" the actions of
the AJC and is reportedly insisting privately that his
Iraqiyya Alliance call for the entire process be postponed
until after elections. This is a maximalist postponement
that Shi'a negotiator Hadi al-Amiri has made clear to us
privately would be a no-go for the Shi'a street and for Shi'a
politicians. We will be working January 23 to assess fallout
from Talabani's remarks and pressing the parties to pursue a
workable solution. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Friday prayers January 22 have created the appearance
of a momentary lull in the rush of reassessments to President
Talabani's January 21 statements questioning the legitimacy
of the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) and in the
behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy mounted by Shi'a power
broker Hadi al-Amiri and Sunni heavyweight DPM Rafi'e
al-Issawi. Amiri, who was to have briefed PM Maliki January
21 on the plan, has been unable to gain access to the PM, as
of late January 22, according to Issawi. Issawi told Acting
POL M/C that Amiri had managed to meet with Talabani. SRSG
Melkert was scheduled to meet with VP Adel Abd al-Mahdi.
TALABANI QUESTIONS LEGALITY OF AJC
--------------
3. (C) Talabani stated at a press conference yesterday that
he plans to ask Chief Judge of the Iraqi Supreme Court Medhat
Mahmoud if the AJC had statutory authority to act, given that
Parliament refused in 2009 to endorse the slate of
commissioners nominated to serve on the AJC. Judge Medhat's
staff have told us, however, that the judge has left the
country; they said they did not know where he had gone, or
when he would be back. (COMMENT: We have met with the
cautious Medhat earlier in this crisis and gauged that he
will likely be reluctant to render a clear-cut opinion on
whether the AJC decisions were legal. What he would be more
likely willing to do is send signals to the seven-judge
appeals panel for AJC decisions, the Cassation Chamber, that
it is clearly within their purview to weigh doubts about the
AJC's statutory authority in deciding appeals. END COMMENT.)
AND DEFENDS MUTLAQ AND OTHER "BA'ATHISTS"
--------------
4. (C) In his comments, Talabani also raised more profound
questions about the de-Ba'athification process, noting that
many former Ba'athists had changed sides and became prominent
elements of opposition to Saddam, a messy reality that the
AJC's black-and-white, unchecked decision-making had failed
to capture. Talabani stressed the importance instead of
national reconciliation and adherence to the broad spirit of
the Iraqi Constitution. He distinguished between "Ba'athist
Ba'athists" and "Saddamist Ba'athists." Putting prominent
Sunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq in the latter category,
QSunni politician Saleh al-Mutlaq in the latter category,
Talabani insisted that Mutlaq and other "Ba'athist
Ba'athists" should be allowed to "participate in all fields
in Iraq," including, presumably, to run as candidates in the
upcoming national elections.
SHI'A POLITICIANS AND STREET CRY FOUL
--------------
5. (C) Talabani's statements have sent a shock wave through
Iraq's political class and well as the public. Shi'a
politicians are downplaying Talabani's actions, with
maintained PM Maliki demurring ("My intervention would be
unconstitutional.") and indicating that there were oversight
structures in place to determine if the AJC acted properly.
That said, his allies and ISCI politicians have been more
outspoken. Hassan al-Sunnayad, spokesman for the Maliki's
State of Law Coalition was quoted saying that Talabani's
views represented "his personal opinion only," and insisting
that "we are not interested in comments by any politicians or
bloc, except for decisions voted on by the Accountability and
Justice (AJC). Those who object have only the Iraqi judicial
system." MP Hummam Hamoudi, ISCI bloc leader and Chairman of
the Iraqi National Alliance List, offered a similar, but more
tempered assessment of Talabani's intervention, saying
"President Talabani's comments are respected. However, the
Constitution and the law are the go-to in this issue." The
Shi'a street made clear its views on the President's
statements January 21 and 22. There were reports of
"hundreds" gathered in Najaf and Karbala to protest
Talabani's remarks as well as (in the case of Karbala)
foreign interference in the work of the elections and the
de-Ba'athification process.
MUTLAQ LUNGES AT OPENING HE SEES
--------------
6. (C) Mutlaq spotted the opening Talabani perhaps
inadvertently created and with his usual inelegant brio
lunged forward, expressing appreciation for the President's
statements and insisting that the Presidency Council meet as
soon as possible to "freeze" the actions of the AJC and
instruct the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)
that it should disregard the list of 500-odd disqualified
candidates it had received. Issawi told Acting POL M/C that
with the possibility of nullification of the AJC in toto that
Talabani had introduced in public debate, Mutlaq and Iraqiyya
List allies VP Hashimi and Osama al-Nujaifi were pushing hard
for Iraqiyya to insist that the entire process be postponed
into a post-election vet-the-winners procedures, a maximalist
postponement that Amiri has made clear to us privately would
be a no-go for the Shi'a street and for Shi'a politicians.
IHEC HAPPY TO HAVE TOSSED THE HOT POTATO
--------------
7. (C) IHEC Commissioner Judge Qasim al-Aboudi, head of
IHEC's Legal Committee, told poloff January 22 that IHEC will
wait for the decision of the Federal Supreme Court regarding
the constitutionality of the AJC. In the meantime, he noted
that IHEC is already aware of many appeals of the list of
excluded candidates, but said he was unable to give a
specific number at this point. He predicted that the Supreme
Court would rule quickly on this issue and proved the needed
guidance for the Electoral Judicial Panel (to appeal IHEC
decisions) and the Cassation Chamber (for appeals of AJC
decisions) on how to handle the appeals. He expressed
confidence that IHEC would get the guidance it needed to
proceed with election preparations in a timely manner.
UNAMI, however, was less optimistic, assessing that Judge
Medhat would be reticent to render an opinion that would
place him in the center of the political firestorm.
HILL