FM ZEBARI PREVIEWS JCC, REVIEWS CHAPTER VII

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000149 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019 TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ KU IR SUBJECT: FM ZEBARI PREVIEWS JCC, REVIEWS CHAPTER VII ISSUES, BORDER DISPUTE WITH IRAN, REF: A. BAGHDAD 0118 ¶B. 09 STATE 130342 ¶C. 09 BAGHDAD 2924 Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zebari told A/DCM January 18 that he welcomed arrival of NEA A/S Feltman for the holding of the first Diplomatic Joint Coordinating Committee, set for January 24. Zebari also informed A/DCM that he had written to the President of the Security Council and the DG of the IAEA on the WMD issue, following up on a commitment made by his senior advisors to DCM earlier this month to seek a UNSC Presidential Statement as the first step towards a resolution lifting UNSCRs 687 and 707. Regarding relations with Kuwait, Zebari complained about comments attributed to Kuwaiti FM Dr. Mohammed which had annoyed the Iraqi leadership. Zebari acknowledged the lack of progress on UNSCR 833 and laid blame on both sides for the stalemate. As for Iraq's relations with Jordan, Egypt, and the Emirates, he said formal relations were good but there was little real enthusiasm to engage. "They all still believe that Iraq is under Iranian influence." Regarding the border dispute with Iran, Zebari reported that one of the Iraqi technical teams had met for the first time January 18 with Iranian counterparts at the border town of Qasr Shireen, although Zebari had instructed his team to inform the Iranians there would be no need for further meetings until the Iranians pulled their forces back completely from Faka. END SUMMARY. WELCOMING FIRST DIPLOMATIC JCC -------------- ¶2. (C) Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zebari told A/DCM January 18 that he welcomed the arrival of NEA A/S Feltman and his team for the first Diplomatic Joint Coordinating Committee, set for the morning of January 24 in Baghdad. A/DCM previewed the agenda and Zebari noted that he had been briefed on it by his policy advisor Fareed Yasseen. According to Zebari, the agenda "covers all our issues and concerns." Zebari said he looked forward to the meeting, focusing on Chapter VII issues, "because we are way behind." A/DCM acknowledged the slow pace but pointed to recent progress on DFI and Oil-for-Food. WMD --- ¶3. (C) Following up on Chapter VII, A/DCM asked where things stood on WMD. Zebari shared that he had met with Speaker Samarrai'e January 17 at the Council of Representatives (COR) and pressed hard for passage of the Additional Protocol during this session of the COR. The FM said he had been told the COR leadership now understood the importance of ratification, and he received promises that it would be put to a vote soon. A/DCM acknowledged the challenges the COR faced as it came to the end of session (likely as soon as the budget is passed),but underscored that ratification would help tremendously with lifting the WMD-related Chapter VII resolutions. (NOTE: A COR Foreign Relations Committee source reported to the A/DCM January 20, however, that the one WMD-related treaty had only had one reading and that the second had not yet been scheduled. Under COR rules of procedure, there must be two calendar days between the first and second reading and four (sometimes cut to three) days for the final reading/vote. If the COR passes the budget in the next few days, the COR will go out of session and any remaining readings would need to be done when the new COR is formed after the elections.) Zebari told A/DCM he had written to the President of the Security Council and the DG of the IAEA on the WMD issue. (COMMENT: This was to follow up on the options presented in refs A and B. Embassy Qup on the options presented in refs A and B. Embassy received a copy of the letter January 20. In the January 13 meeting with DCM, senior MFA officials committed to sending the letter and seeking a UNSC Presidential Statement as the first steps towards a resolution lifting UNSCRs 687 and 707. END COMMENT.) RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT -------------- ¶4. (C) Regarding relations with Kuwait, Zebari complained about comments attributed to Kuwaiti FM Dr. Mohammed which had annoyed the Iraqi leadership. According to Zebari, the Kuwaiti FM was quoted January 17 in a journal called al-Kubs saying that Kuwait is afraid of the new Iraq, for its sectarianism and tribal issues that affect Kuwait. The statement went on to say that it was not money that Kuwait needed from Iraq, but security, Zebari reported. Zebari said he had been trying to contact Dr. Mohammed to ask him about the remarks but had not been able to reach him yet. He described the timing of the remarks as unfortunate and said BAGHDAD 00000149 002 OF 002 that he feared the remarks might gain traction and outrage COR members who would not hesitate to respond publicly with equally ill-advised remarks. THE ONGOING SAGA OF UNSCR 833 -------------- ¶5. (C) The FM said he knew that the Kuwaitis were annoyed about UNSCR 833 and the GOI failure to re-affirm it, as part of the broader effort to extricate Iraq from Chapter VII status. Zebari expressed frustration that the GOI had not made more progress on the issue and repeated remarks he has made previously (ref C, for example) that the USG and the MFA needed to stay in synch and ensure that the PM's office did not get the sense that it could somehow avoid the obligations of the UNSCR 833 demarcations of the land and sea border. While the MFA had prepared comprehensive files on the issue, he said PM's office was finding every excuse possible to postpone the issue; the situation had gotten so bad that the Kuwaitis have given up until after the Iraqi elections. The FM added that it would be helpful if the Kuwaitis would "make a gesture, but we know they won't." Part of the problem, in addition to the fact that it was "not their mentality" was that "the Saudis are influencing them, especially anytime there is a breakthrough." THE OTHER NEIGHBORS: NO REAL ENTHUSIASM TO ENGAGE -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Addressing briefly other neighbors, Zebari said he had good relations with Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal, but an improvement in relations with the Saudis "is not in his hands." The FM noted with satisfaction that the Egyptians had returned their ambassador and that the Emiratis and the Jordanians are present, facilitating proper relations. However, "there is no real enthusiasm to engage. They all still believe that Iraq is under Iranian influence." Zebari acknowledged U.S. help on the issue and pointed out that part of the problem was self-inflicted. The GOI speaks with different voices and lashes out sometimes in public "at the slightest problem." The GOI needed to prove that it really was a government of national unity that could speak with one voice and deliver on its commitments, said Zebari. THE BORDER DISPUTE WITH IRAN: ONE STEP FORWARD. . . -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Regarding the border dispute with Iran, Zebari told A/DCM that one of the Iraqi technical teams had met for the first time January 18 with Iranian counterparts at the border town of Qasr Shireen. This move followed a decision at the National Security Council to activate the three technical working groups on the land and water borders and "commissaire issues" (NFI). The team was led by head of the Iraqi Border Police. Zebari complained that the Iranians had not followed through completely on the commitment that FM Mottaki had made "to normalize the situation," which the Iraqis took to mean a complete withdrawal from Iraqi territory. So far, the Iranians had not made good on that commitment; so Zebari instructed his team to attend the first day but inform the Iranians there would be no need "to sign the minutes for that meeting" or hold further meetings until they pulled their forces back completely from Faka. He added that the GOI was sending a team down the same day to see if the Iranians had completed the withdrawal. AGREEING TO DISAGREE ON THE ALGIERS AGREEMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) Regarding the backdrop to the recent slight movement on border demarcation between the two sides, Zebari said the Qon border demarcation between the two sides, Zebari said the Iranians had been "very tough" on the issue for years, insisting that the GOI fully accept the 1975 Algiers Agreement. The GOI had agreed to the protocols on water, security, and some other issues in the agreement, said Zebari, but insisted that "legally the agreement is problematic," given Saddam's public renunciation of the agreement and the state of war in which relations were formally left after the war in the 1980's. However, the Iraqi side had eventually convinced the Iranians that "we had accepted it enough." HILL