MALIKI READY TO SUPPORT SOLUTION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000144 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: MALIKI READY TO SUPPORT SOLUTION TO DE-BA'ATHIFICATION CONTROVERSY REF: BAGHDAD 0092 Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Maliki told the Ambassador and CG USF-I January 19 that he supported a political fix to the de-Ba'athification controversy. Maliki said he supported the plan proposed by ISCI/Badr bloc leader Hadi al-Ameri, which he said would lead to the establishment by January 20 of a new de-Ba'athification committee -- one with clear statutory authority -- that will review the list of some 500 names, eliminate some names, confirm determinations before the elections for clear-cut Ba'athists, and postpone some "hard" cases for post-election vetting. In Maliki's view, "the Iraqi people would not accept" postponing all the vetting until after the elections. The PM said he was less enthusiastic about a proposal for intervention put forward by Vice President Hashimi and supported by President Talabani, although he would not oppose this effort. A haggard-looking Maliki said he was upset by the entire de-Ba'athification crisis, saying that a wide range of political players had claimed to be acting in a constitutional and democratic manner, but had in fact acted irresponsibly in ways that undermined the constitution and Iraq's democracy. END SUMMARY. PM EMBRACES AL-AMERI PROPOSAL -------------- ¶2. (C) PM Maliki told the Ambassador and CG USF-I January 19 that he supported a political fix to the de-Ba'athification controversy that erupted since the first week of January. Showing no signs of the combative demeanor on display at his previous meeting with Ambassador on this issue (reftel), Maliki said he was throwing his behind-the-scenes support to the plan proposed by ISCI/Badr bloc leader Hadi al-Amiri, which he said would lead to the establishment by January 20 of a new de-Ba'athification committee -- one with clear statutory authority -- that will review the list of some 500 names, eliminate some names, confirm determinations before the elections for clear-cut Ba'athists, and postpone some "hard" cases for post-election vetting. Maliki claimed that leaders of the major party blocs had expressed support for this approach and described the approach as "the safest and the easiest way forward." He hinted that the committee would be a body created by the Council of Representatives and made up of a group of its members. (COMMENT: The elements of the al-Amiri proposal are not completely clear. At one point, the proposal included the obligation for the 514 candidates on the de-Ba'athification list to sign an oath upholding the Constitution -- including the strictures against Ba'athism -- and condemning atrocities and crimes of the Saddam regime. Wording of any such pledge will likely be an item requiring political consensus, like every other aspect of this approach. Based on hints from Maliki and al-Amiri, we suspect that the initial vetting by this new committee could significantly reduce the number of candidates subject to disqualification. END COMMENT.) REJECTS VETTING ALL THE WINNERS -------------- ¶3. (C) Maliki acknowledged the January 17 phone call from VPOTUS, noting that he had understood that VPOTUS supported post-election vetting for all candidates. In Maliki's view, "the Iraqi people would not accept" postponing all the vetting until after the election. Some clear-cut Ba'athists needed to be vetted and eliminated before they were allowed to run for public office. CONCERNS ABOUT THIS POLITICAL FIX -------------- ¶4. (C) Maliki expressed two key concerns about implementing Q4. (C) Maliki expressed two key concerns about implementing the al-Amiri proposal. First, everyone was up against the electoral clock; time was very short for getting a solution implemented and clearing the way so that IHEC could finalize elections preparations (including printing ballots and candidate lists) and candidates could begin campaigning. Second, the Ba'athist issue remained a highly charged political issue. Party leaders were likely to find dealing with it so close to the elections to be fraught with difficulties. "Everyone has their own calculations and no one wants to lose the election because of mishandling this issue," observed Maliki. PM BACKS AWAY FROM SUPPORT FOR MORE PUBLIC APPROACH -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The PM said he was less enthusiastic about a proposal for intervention put forward by Vice President Hashimi and supported by President Talabani. (NOTE: Hashimi described for the Ambassador earlier in the afternoon January 19 a different approach, in which the Presidency Council meeting January 20 would declare that the Ahmed Chalabi-led Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) does not have the statutory authority required for the actions it has taken in the past two weeks. Details of the Hashimi meeting reported septel. END NOTE.) He acknowledged that the Presidency Council is charged with oversight of constitutional implementation (de-Ba'athification is constitutionally mandated in Article 135),and hence the Presidency Council would be clearly acting on an issue within its purview. He added, however, in response to a question from the Ambassador, that he would not associate himself with this approach, underscoring that such an intervention would be for the Presidency Council alone, exercising its constitutional oversight function. Maliki also expressed concern that Hashimi's approach would be too time-consuming. Any Presidency Council decision on the AJC would likely need to receive Federal Supreme Court endorsement to be binding, which would take too much time. (COMMENT: Although left unsaid, it is clear that the Presidency Council approach is a much more public approach, and one that might cost Maliki politically more than behind-the-scenes support for the Hadi al-Amiri proposal. END COMMENT.) PM CITES CONFEDERACY OF IRRESPONSIBLE PLAYERS -------------- ¶6. (C) The PM said he was upset by the entire de-Ba'athification crisis. In his view a wide range of political players had claimed to be acting in a constitutional and democratic manner, but were in fact acted irresponsibly in ways that undermined the constitution and Iraq's democracy. In response to the Ambassador's observation that the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) had not performed with much independence, the PM characterized the actions of all the players in the de-Ba'athification drama as "haphazard -- everybody was confused or hesitant," including IHEC, the Parliament, and the commissions and other bodies involved. CRITICIZED POLITICIZATION OF THE PROCESS -------------- ¶7. C) The PM even criticized the judiciary for not making clear "from day one" that the individuals (Ahmed Chalabi and Faisal al-Lami) who were working in the name of the new Accountability and Justice Commission had no legal authority to be taking such action. He also criticized the intense politicization of the process, underscoring the unfairness of the AJC disqualifying former Ba'athists like Defense Minister Abd al-Qadir al-Mufriji, a member of his State of Law coalition, who had left the Ba'ath Party years before the fall of Saddam and in fact had been imprisoned or otherwise demonstrated opposition to the Saddam regime. Others he put in this category included prominent Shi'a politicians Qasim Daoud and VP Adil Abd al-Mahdi. At the same time, "people with criminal records and wanted by the police and Interpol" (Chalabi, he hinted) were still eligible as candidates. ¶8. (C) In response to Ambassador's comment that he looked as if the de-Ba'athification had worn him down a bit, Maliki said he was "more upset than tired." Expressing a bit of discouragement, the PM voiced concern that the messiness of Iraq's democracy might frustrate Iraqis and lead some to "march in the streets, shouting slogans calling for the return of a dictator." He noted that it was very hard for people who have lived a long time under a dictatorship to Qpeople who have lived a long time under a dictatorship to accept democracy. Maliki recounted that he had taken a nap that afternoon, and like many people who slept when they were upset, he had had a bad dream. He had dreamed he was walking on a bridge and witnessed a boat sink with 30 people aboard. He said he had only been able to save three people. "Were they the members of the Presidency Council?" asked the Ambassador. Maliki laughed for the first time in the meeting. HILL