GREECE: VIEWS ON EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000137 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/ERA, EAP/CM, PM/RSAT, AND ISN/RA AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25 TAGS: PREL PARM CH EUN GR SUBJECT: GREECE: VIEWS ON EU CHINA ARMS EMBARGO REF: STATE 13969 CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah A. McCarthy, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Greek interlocutors conveyed that a review or a possible lifting of the European Union's China arms embargo is not on the agenda in Brussels, to the best of their knowledge. They stated that since the replacement of the EU's political "Code of Conduct on Arms Exports" in December 2008 by the legally binding Council Common Position 944, the issue had been dormant. They were unaware of recent Spanish comments, and puzzled to learn of them. While they stated that Greece is less skeptical of lifting the embargo now as compared to 2004, they stated that Greece does not have strong views either way. They pointed out then-President Chirac's leading role in the 2004 effort to lift the embargo, and noted that cooler French-Chinese relations under President Sarkozy would likely temper the French position and make things tougher should Spain make any overtures in Brussels. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Pol-Mil Chief delivered reftel points February 23 to the MFA's Common Security and Defense Policy European Correspondent Alexandros Ioannidis (who coordinates Foreign Affairs Council preparation and accompanies the Minister to Brussels monthly) and MFA Disarmament Sub-Section Head Loukas Tsokos, who has primary responsibility for developing Greek weapons export policy. They had been unaware of recent Spanish comments, and puzzled to learn of them. The last they had heard of the issue had been in December 2008 at the end of the French EU Presidency, when the EU Council had adopted the legally binding Council Common Position 944, replacing the political "Code of Conduct on Arms Exports." At that time, France and other nations had wanted to formally link the adoption of CCP 944 to the prospect of re-starting discussion on lifting the embargo. The consensus position was not to make a formal linkage, but to agree that at a "certain point," the EU would re-examine the embargo in light of this new legally binding common position. ¶3. (C) In response to a question, Tsokos replied that although Greece has no strong views on the issue, it would likely view a lifting of the arms embargo with less skepticism today as compared to its 2004 position. He noted that the EU's "one China" policy, which does not recognize Taiwan, means that Greece cannot sell equipment to Taiwan; while Taiwan has never requested weaponry, Greece has refused in a few instances to export equipment under these rules. Ioannidis questioned the significance of this issue to U.S. policymakers. PolMil Chief stressed the importance to our strategic interests in the Pacific, reminded him of the rancor this issue brought to U.S.-European relations in 2004, and highlighted the U.S.-EU strategic dialogue on Asia as the place to continue discussions on security and stability in East Asia. ¶4. (C) Discussing the role of personalities in the 2004 debate of lifting the Embargo, Ioannidis and Tsokos expressed the sense that China was not as high a priority for Europe now as it was then. They also pointed to the activist role played by then French President Chirac, and contrasted his views with those of President Sarkozy. Our interlocutors believed that France-China relations were not at their best, and that this could make things more difficult for Spain in Brussels should Spain ultimately seek to make any moves on the embargo issue. SPECKHARD