Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ASTANA67
2010-01-25 06:35:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Astana
Cable title:
KAZAKSTAN: CHINA PRAISES ASTANA'S FOREIGN POLICY, WORRIES
VZCZCXRO6610 OO RUEHIK DE RUEHTA #0067/01 0250635 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 250635Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7258 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2390 RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2458 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1752 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1368 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1948 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 1798 RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2677 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2967
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000067
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EUR/RUS
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EPET ECON NATO CH RU UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKSTAN: CHINA PRAISES ASTANA'S FOREIGN POLICY, WORRIES
ABOUT RUSSIA
REF: A. 08 ASTANA 0812
B. 09 ASTANA 2168
ASTANA 00000067 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (A),(B),(D)
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000067
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EUR/RUS
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EPET ECON NATO CH RU UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKSTAN: CHINA PRAISES ASTANA'S FOREIGN POLICY, WORRIES
ABOUT RUSSIA
REF: A. 08 ASTANA 0812
B. 09 ASTANA 2168
ASTANA 00000067 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (A),(B),(D)
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In his farewell courtesy call with the
Ambassador on January 22, China's Ambassador to Kazakhstan Cheng
Guoping (please protect) highly praised Kazakhstan's skillful
balancing of the "great powers." Repeatedly emphasizing the personal
nature of the conversation, Cheng highlighted his view that China and
Russia must "coexist" in Central Asia. He expressed a positive view
of the U.S. role in the region, but cautioned against a permanent
military presence. Cheng recommended that the United States urge
Uzbekistan to invite NATO "as a guest" to attend the June summit in
Tashkent of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in order to
increase NATO-SCO cooperation. Cheng departs Astana February 2 to
return to Beijing to become Deputy Foreign Minister for Eurasia (the
CIS). We suspect Embassy Beijing will find him to be an interesting
but reserved interlocutor. END SUMMARY.
FUTURE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
2. (S) Arriving in the Ambassador's office with a large gift bag of
green tea "for the Ambassador's health," China's Ambassador to
Kazakhstan Cheng Guoping (please protect) stressed his interest in
maintaining close contact with the Ambassador after he returns to
China February 2 to become Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of
Eurasia (i.e., countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States).
Among the key issues that he will handle, he mentioned relations with
Russia, the SCO, and Kazakhstan. Cheng argued, "Kazakhstan's role
and importance is growing daily and is of great significance to China
for political, economic, and security reasons." He underlined the
need to develop mutual trust in order to enhance Chinese influence in
the region, especially because of the area's effect on China's
security.
SOPHISTICATED, SMART FOREIGN POLICY
3. (S) Cheng strongly agreed with the Kazakhstani Foreign Ministry's
portrayal of Kazakhstan as a bridge between East and West, the OSCE
and the SCO. He emphasized the sophistication of Kazakhstan's
foreign policy of balancing Russia, the United States, European
Union, and China. Highlighting Kazakhstan's membership in the
Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic
Community, and the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, Cheng
stated that Kazakhstan still "attaches great importance to relations
with the United States, China, and the European Union."
4. (S) Asserting that Kazakhstan is not a pro-Russian country, Cheng
called its foreign policy "smart and successful, because good
relations with China, the European Union, and the United States
increase his (i.e., President Nazarbayev's) influence when he engages
with Russia. All countries in the region want to maintain their
independence, but Russia wants to regain its regional influence. CIS
countries need Russian cooperation and good relations, but they all
suspect Russia's intentions. No CIS country wants to return to the
Soviet period." Comparing the current situations in Ukraine,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan, Cheng again called Kazakhstan "smart" for
cooperating with Russia as well as the United States, European Union,
and China. Cheng further argued that Kazakhstan's growing economy
and influence allow it to resist Russian control.
"CHINA MUST COOPERATE HERE"
5. (S) Elaborating on China's role in Central Asia, Cheng said, "The
new oil and gas pipelines are breaking Russia's monopoly in energy
exports and are decreasing the countries' dependence on Russia.
Because Russia wants to maintain a monopoly on oil and gas exports in
Central Asia, it dislikes the China-Kazakhstan pipeline (refs A-B)."
According to Cheng, as China increases its regional "cooperation,"
the Russian Foreign Ministry wants to maintain close contact to
ensure that it does not "harm Russia's core interests." Cheng
ASTANA 00000067 002.2 OF 003
emphatically declared, "China must cooperate here. The growth of
Chinese influence will break the Russian monopoly in the region."
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION WITH RUSSIA
6. (S) Reflecting on his upcoming responsibilities, Cheng stated, "I
will have to balance carefully increasing our cooperation with
Central Asia with Russian interests. However, we cannot harm our own
interests because of Russia. Competition and collaboration coexist
in Chinese-Russian relations in Central Asia. Our policy is to
coexist here. We must maintain a dialogue and consultations." Cheng
asserted that Russia and China can work together on security issues,
such as terrorism and narcotics, to the benefit of all. On the
economic front, though, Cheng underlined their rivalry, and again
asserted that Russia's reaction will not force it to limit its
regional cooperation. "In the future, great power relations in
Central Asia will be complicated, delicate. Kazakhstan is very
smart, aware of the opportunities and that it must maintain a
balance," he concluded.
SUPPORT FOR U.S. REGIONAL ROLE
7. (S) In contrast to his unease with Russian influence, Cheng
argued that the U.S. presence in the region promotes a "balance of
the great powers." Cheng emphasized China's support for U.S. efforts
to fight the Taliban and terrorists, calling them a common challenge.
Nonetheless, he cautioned, "We have concerns if the United States
uses the opportunity of fighting terrorists to enhance its military
presence in the region." The Ambassador reassured Cheng that the
United States does not want a permanent military presence or bases in
Central Asia. Given President Obama's focus on Afghanistan and troop
increases, he explained, Manas Transit Center -- and potentially
other commercial transit centers for goods -- is very important.
"KARIMOV NEEDS POLITICAL SUPPORT"
8. (S/NF) Cheng confided that he had "information" about the
possibility of a new U.S. military transit center in Uzbekistan and
called it a "delicate point." Cheng expressed his belief that
Karimov will agree to the proposal because "he needs political
support and assistance from other countries due to Uzbekistan's
difficulties, poor relations with Russia. He is using the flag of
anti-terrorism efforts to decrease criticism of his regime."
NATO-SCO COOPERATION POSSIBLE
9. (S/NF) Replying to Cheng's assertion that "stabilization and
reconstruction in Afghanistan will take a long time," the Ambassador
asked if NATO-SCO consultations might be helpful. Cheng highlighted
the absence of an established NATO-SCO dialogue before expressing his
personal viewpoint. "If NATO wants to establish contact with the
SCO, the host of the June 23 SCO Summit [Uzbekistan] can invite NATO
to attend as a guest, which would increase understanding and
cooperation." He further suggested, as a first step, the United
States recommend that NATO attend the meeting because of the event's
anti-terrorism "content." He argued, "The United States can attend
the June 23 summit being hosted by Tashkent as Uzbekistan's guest in
order to increase contact."
10. (S/NF) Again emphasizing the personal nature of this
not-for-attribution advice, Cheng stated, "Russia supports it as far
as I know. China has not researched the issue, but Russia has ideas
because of Afghanistan. If the United States advances the
suggestion, the Chinese government will actively consider it. The
United States must apply to Uzbekistan as the summit's host country.
The Chinese government will be cautious, but agreement from Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan would be good for the proposal. The
United States could attend as a guest of the host country."
NO DIRECT CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
11. (S) Cheng argued that the United States should attend the summit
ASTANA 00000067 003.2 OF 003
to "maintain stability and fight the Taliban and terrorists in
Central Asia." Cheng underlined the importance China attaches to
Afghanistan and the defeat of the Taliban. He also emphasized
Chinese fear of the Taliban and Al-Qaida due to their "support of
terrorists in Xinjiang." Nonetheless, he asserted that China does
not want "direct involvement in the fight because China's capacity to
fight terrorists is less than the United States."
CHINESE MEASURES TO SECURE THE PIPELINE
12. (S) Emphasizing China's large population, Cheng called
preservation of security a big task, for which the Chinese capacity
does not match that of the United States. He especially underlined
China's vulnerability to attacks on shipping and pipelines, which
would strike at the heart of the Chinese economy. According to
Cheng, Chinese "measures" to secure the pipeline have included
consultations between the "security departments" of China,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. He told the Ambassador
that China has helped to train security personnel and provide
equipment and weapons. He said that China annually supplies
materials to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Interior and National Security
Committee (KNB).
PERSONAL, NOT OFFICIAL, CONVERSATION
13. (S) Concluding this meeting that took place in the Ambassador's
officer, Cheng again requested that the Ambassador not quote him. He
underlined his concern about dissemination of his personal
reflections, which he said he conveyed due to his strong personal
relationship with the Ambassador.
BIOGRAPHIC NOTES
14. (S) Cheng Guoping departs Astana on February 2 for his new
assignment as Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of CIS
countries. He said he might travel to the United States on
consultations. In addition, he plans to visit the United States upon
retirement. His daughter currently studies at the University of
Iowa.
15. (S) This was the fourth time the Ambassador received Cheng in
his office, where Cheng preferred to meet because, he has told the
Ambassador, he does not feel comfortable speaking freely in his own
office. Even so, Chen exhibits maximum caution, whispering his
comments in Mandarin (he does not speak English or Russian) to his
interpreter. We suspect that Embassy Beijing will find him to be an
interesting but reserved interlocutor.
16. (S) COMMENT: Fear about China regularly appears in
conversations and the press in Kazakhstan. Some Kazakhstanis worry
about Chinese control of natural resources and proposals to lease
agricultural land. Because Kazakhstanis are attuned to their
geography as a resource-rich country with vast swaths of uninhabited
land bordering the world's most populous nation, they convey anxiety
that the Chinese will arrive "like ants to colonize." Cheng's
portrayal of Chinese concerns about Kazakhstan's other large neighbor
gives another perspective to the power game, which Kazakhstan so
adeptly plays. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EUR/RUS
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR EPET ECON NATO CH RU UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKSTAN: CHINA PRAISES ASTANA'S FOREIGN POLICY, WORRIES
ABOUT RUSSIA
REF: A. 08 ASTANA 0812
B. 09 ASTANA 2168
ASTANA 00000067 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (A),(B),(D)
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In his farewell courtesy call with the
Ambassador on January 22, China's Ambassador to Kazakhstan Cheng
Guoping (please protect) highly praised Kazakhstan's skillful
balancing of the "great powers." Repeatedly emphasizing the personal
nature of the conversation, Cheng highlighted his view that China and
Russia must "coexist" in Central Asia. He expressed a positive view
of the U.S. role in the region, but cautioned against a permanent
military presence. Cheng recommended that the United States urge
Uzbekistan to invite NATO "as a guest" to attend the June summit in
Tashkent of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in order to
increase NATO-SCO cooperation. Cheng departs Astana February 2 to
return to Beijing to become Deputy Foreign Minister for Eurasia (the
CIS). We suspect Embassy Beijing will find him to be an interesting
but reserved interlocutor. END SUMMARY.
FUTURE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
2. (S) Arriving in the Ambassador's office with a large gift bag of
green tea "for the Ambassador's health," China's Ambassador to
Kazakhstan Cheng Guoping (please protect) stressed his interest in
maintaining close contact with the Ambassador after he returns to
China February 2 to become Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of
Eurasia (i.e., countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States).
Among the key issues that he will handle, he mentioned relations with
Russia, the SCO, and Kazakhstan. Cheng argued, "Kazakhstan's role
and importance is growing daily and is of great significance to China
for political, economic, and security reasons." He underlined the
need to develop mutual trust in order to enhance Chinese influence in
the region, especially because of the area's effect on China's
security.
SOPHISTICATED, SMART FOREIGN POLICY
3. (S) Cheng strongly agreed with the Kazakhstani Foreign Ministry's
portrayal of Kazakhstan as a bridge between East and West, the OSCE
and the SCO. He emphasized the sophistication of Kazakhstan's
foreign policy of balancing Russia, the United States, European
Union, and China. Highlighting Kazakhstan's membership in the
Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic
Community, and the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, Cheng
stated that Kazakhstan still "attaches great importance to relations
with the United States, China, and the European Union."
4. (S) Asserting that Kazakhstan is not a pro-Russian country, Cheng
called its foreign policy "smart and successful, because good
relations with China, the European Union, and the United States
increase his (i.e., President Nazarbayev's) influence when he engages
with Russia. All countries in the region want to maintain their
independence, but Russia wants to regain its regional influence. CIS
countries need Russian cooperation and good relations, but they all
suspect Russia's intentions. No CIS country wants to return to the
Soviet period." Comparing the current situations in Ukraine,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan, Cheng again called Kazakhstan "smart" for
cooperating with Russia as well as the United States, European Union,
and China. Cheng further argued that Kazakhstan's growing economy
and influence allow it to resist Russian control.
"CHINA MUST COOPERATE HERE"
5. (S) Elaborating on China's role in Central Asia, Cheng said, "The
new oil and gas pipelines are breaking Russia's monopoly in energy
exports and are decreasing the countries' dependence on Russia.
Because Russia wants to maintain a monopoly on oil and gas exports in
Central Asia, it dislikes the China-Kazakhstan pipeline (refs A-B)."
According to Cheng, as China increases its regional "cooperation,"
the Russian Foreign Ministry wants to maintain close contact to
ensure that it does not "harm Russia's core interests." Cheng
ASTANA 00000067 002.2 OF 003
emphatically declared, "China must cooperate here. The growth of
Chinese influence will break the Russian monopoly in the region."
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION WITH RUSSIA
6. (S) Reflecting on his upcoming responsibilities, Cheng stated, "I
will have to balance carefully increasing our cooperation with
Central Asia with Russian interests. However, we cannot harm our own
interests because of Russia. Competition and collaboration coexist
in Chinese-Russian relations in Central Asia. Our policy is to
coexist here. We must maintain a dialogue and consultations." Cheng
asserted that Russia and China can work together on security issues,
such as terrorism and narcotics, to the benefit of all. On the
economic front, though, Cheng underlined their rivalry, and again
asserted that Russia's reaction will not force it to limit its
regional cooperation. "In the future, great power relations in
Central Asia will be complicated, delicate. Kazakhstan is very
smart, aware of the opportunities and that it must maintain a
balance," he concluded.
SUPPORT FOR U.S. REGIONAL ROLE
7. (S) In contrast to his unease with Russian influence, Cheng
argued that the U.S. presence in the region promotes a "balance of
the great powers." Cheng emphasized China's support for U.S. efforts
to fight the Taliban and terrorists, calling them a common challenge.
Nonetheless, he cautioned, "We have concerns if the United States
uses the opportunity of fighting terrorists to enhance its military
presence in the region." The Ambassador reassured Cheng that the
United States does not want a permanent military presence or bases in
Central Asia. Given President Obama's focus on Afghanistan and troop
increases, he explained, Manas Transit Center -- and potentially
other commercial transit centers for goods -- is very important.
"KARIMOV NEEDS POLITICAL SUPPORT"
8. (S/NF) Cheng confided that he had "information" about the
possibility of a new U.S. military transit center in Uzbekistan and
called it a "delicate point." Cheng expressed his belief that
Karimov will agree to the proposal because "he needs political
support and assistance from other countries due to Uzbekistan's
difficulties, poor relations with Russia. He is using the flag of
anti-terrorism efforts to decrease criticism of his regime."
NATO-SCO COOPERATION POSSIBLE
9. (S/NF) Replying to Cheng's assertion that "stabilization and
reconstruction in Afghanistan will take a long time," the Ambassador
asked if NATO-SCO consultations might be helpful. Cheng highlighted
the absence of an established NATO-SCO dialogue before expressing his
personal viewpoint. "If NATO wants to establish contact with the
SCO, the host of the June 23 SCO Summit [Uzbekistan] can invite NATO
to attend as a guest, which would increase understanding and
cooperation." He further suggested, as a first step, the United
States recommend that NATO attend the meeting because of the event's
anti-terrorism "content." He argued, "The United States can attend
the June 23 summit being hosted by Tashkent as Uzbekistan's guest in
order to increase contact."
10. (S/NF) Again emphasizing the personal nature of this
not-for-attribution advice, Cheng stated, "Russia supports it as far
as I know. China has not researched the issue, but Russia has ideas
because of Afghanistan. If the United States advances the
suggestion, the Chinese government will actively consider it. The
United States must apply to Uzbekistan as the summit's host country.
The Chinese government will be cautious, but agreement from Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan would be good for the proposal. The
United States could attend as a guest of the host country."
NO DIRECT CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
11. (S) Cheng argued that the United States should attend the summit
ASTANA 00000067 003.2 OF 003
to "maintain stability and fight the Taliban and terrorists in
Central Asia." Cheng underlined the importance China attaches to
Afghanistan and the defeat of the Taliban. He also emphasized
Chinese fear of the Taliban and Al-Qaida due to their "support of
terrorists in Xinjiang." Nonetheless, he asserted that China does
not want "direct involvement in the fight because China's capacity to
fight terrorists is less than the United States."
CHINESE MEASURES TO SECURE THE PIPELINE
12. (S) Emphasizing China's large population, Cheng called
preservation of security a big task, for which the Chinese capacity
does not match that of the United States. He especially underlined
China's vulnerability to attacks on shipping and pipelines, which
would strike at the heart of the Chinese economy. According to
Cheng, Chinese "measures" to secure the pipeline have included
consultations between the "security departments" of China,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. He told the Ambassador
that China has helped to train security personnel and provide
equipment and weapons. He said that China annually supplies
materials to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Interior and National Security
Committee (KNB).
PERSONAL, NOT OFFICIAL, CONVERSATION
13. (S) Concluding this meeting that took place in the Ambassador's
officer, Cheng again requested that the Ambassador not quote him. He
underlined his concern about dissemination of his personal
reflections, which he said he conveyed due to his strong personal
relationship with the Ambassador.
BIOGRAPHIC NOTES
14. (S) Cheng Guoping departs Astana on February 2 for his new
assignment as Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of CIS
countries. He said he might travel to the United States on
consultations. In addition, he plans to visit the United States upon
retirement. His daughter currently studies at the University of
Iowa.
15. (S) This was the fourth time the Ambassador received Cheng in
his office, where Cheng preferred to meet because, he has told the
Ambassador, he does not feel comfortable speaking freely in his own
office. Even so, Chen exhibits maximum caution, whispering his
comments in Mandarin (he does not speak English or Russian) to his
interpreter. We suspect that Embassy Beijing will find him to be an
interesting but reserved interlocutor.
16. (S) COMMENT: Fear about China regularly appears in
conversations and the press in Kazakhstan. Some Kazakhstanis worry
about Chinese control of natural resources and proposals to lease
agricultural land. Because Kazakhstanis are attuned to their
geography as a resource-rich country with vast swaths of uninhabited
land bordering the world's most populous nation, they convey anxiety
that the Chinese will arrive "like ants to colonize." Cheng's
portrayal of Chinese concerns about Kazakhstan's other large neighbor
gives another perspective to the power game, which Kazakhstan so
adeptly plays. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND