Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ASHGABAT175
2010-02-06 09:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ashgabat
Cable title:  

TURKMENISTAN'S TRAVEL BLACKLIST

Tags:  PHUM PREL SOCI TX 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8110
PP RUEHAG RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHAH #0175/01 0370903
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060903Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4194
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 6221
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3899
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3758
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 4465
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 4374
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000175 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020
TAGS: PHUM PREL SOCI TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN'S TRAVEL BLACKLIST

REF: A. ASHGABAT 117

B. 09 ASHGABAT 1429

Classified By: Charge Sylvia Reed Curran for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000175 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020 TAGS: PHUM PREL SOCI TX SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN'S TRAVEL BLACKLIST REF: A. ASHGABAT 117 ¶B. 09 ASHGABAT 1429 Classified By: Charge Sylvia Reed Curran for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOTX keeps an officially "nonexistent" blacklist of activists, journalists, students, and others that are not allowed to leave Turkmenistan for any reason. By enforcing the blacklist at all exit points, the GOTX can block exit to anyone that it believes represents a threat or is connected to someone who falls in that category. Any Ministry can add names, or "hits," to the blacklist, and some individuals can be blocked from exiting Turkmenistan for multiple reasons. Only the Deputy Chairman that added a name can have it removed from the blacklist. END SUMMARY. WHAT IS THE BLACKLIST? ¶2. (C) The blacklist, sometimes referred to as the "no-fly" list, is an electronic database of citizens of Turkmenistan that have been deemed unworthy of exit from Turkmenistan (dual citizens included). The GOTX officially denies the existence of this list, maintaining that other than criminals, all citizens are free to leave the country at any time. However, a variety of Embassy contacts including activists, religious groups, journalists, students, and others are, in fact, denied exit from Turkmenistan. The list is enforced by Migration Services at all of the official exit points from Turkmenistan. WHO IS ON THE LIST ¶3. (C) It is unclear exactly how many names are on the blacklist and for what reasons. In the case of the TASP students, Deputy Chairman for Education and Health Hydyr Saparliyew added the students names to the blacklist. Other confirmed listees include independent journalists, human rights activists, and even rap musicians. A citizen only learns that their name has been added to the blacklist if they attempt to leave Turkmenistan. Upon attempted departure, those who are on the blacklist are told by Migration Services that they cannot leave the country. If they ask further questions, they are told to "write a letter to the Director of Migration Services." During multiple attempts to have their names removed from the blacklist, Migration Services informed TASP students in writing that their "request had been denied for security reasons." HOW TO GET OFF THE BLACKLIST - A CASE STUDY ¶4. (C) On January 19, 2010, MinEd officials informed the &#
x000A;Embassy that the problems with the TASP program had been resolved. They asked the Embassy to fax a list of all of the students that the Embassy was planning to send to the American University in Bulgaria (AUBG) and promised to take that list to "the services" and that the students would be allowed to leave within a few days. During the following days, as the students' departure became imminent, MinEd officials were in near constant communication with the Embassy. The initial estimate of a few days stretched into five, due to a "complicated" process. Eventually MinEd officials demanded to know exactly which flights the students would be taking so that he "could ensure that everything went smoothly." MULTIPLE HITS ON THE BLACKLIST ¶5. (C) In the event, there were a few hiccups in the process that shed interesting light on the process. It appears that only the Deputy Chairman who puts a person's name on the blacklist can remove it. As such, despite MinEd officials having removed one student's name from the MinEd-generated list, he initially was not allowed to leave as another Ministry had added a second "hit" to the blacklist (Ref A). After a few hours (and most likely intense intra-governmental communications) MinEd called and apologized about the mix-up ASHGABAT 00000175 002 OF 002 and informed that the student could now depart. A ONE-TIME WAIVER ¶6. (C) It also appears that the GOTX can give one-time exit approval for blacklisted citizens. In the case of TASP, several indications hint that this particular release was a one-time waiver. For example, when one student arrived at the airport two hours early, he was initially denied exit by Migration Services. Only after he returned to the Migration Service exit checkpoint with the group of TASP students was he allowed exit. Also, MinEd officials were unwilling to accept Embassy assurances that all of the students would be leaving in short order, they demanded exact flight times for each of the groups. After all of the students had left Turkmenistan, MinEd officials called to make sure that the process was over. (COMMENT: It is clear to us that the TASP students received a "waiver" to travel at this time to Bulgaria, and their names are still in the blacklist data base. If the GOTX had simply removed the students' names from the blacklist, there would not have been the intense choreography of each departure, as the students would be free to leave at anytime. It may be that the process for a waiver is much easier than one for removal. In another case, an Embassy employee had been placed on the blacklist, because her father works for RFE/RL. We were able to get approval for her to fly to Moscow for medical treatment. However, she decided to delay her travel by several months. When she then tried to leave, she discovered that she could not depart. Evidently, her waiver had expired. This necessitated the Embassy renegotiating her departure, and evidently, the issuance of a new waiver. END COMMENT.) THE ZATOKA CASE - GIVE UP YOUR TURKMEN CITIZENSHIP AND CATCH THE NEXT FLIGHT ¶7. (C) The removal of Andrey Zatoka, a dual Russian/Turkmen citizen, from the blacklist provides another interesting case study. Mr. Zatoka, an environmental activist, was on the blacklist for several years, as part of the condition of amnesty from a prior offense. After his arrest in November 2009 (Ref B),the GOTX found it expedient to allow him to renounce his Turkmen citizenship and basically deport him to Russia. Mr. Zatoka was required to sign an affidavit requesting to renounce his citizenship and then was escorted to the airport by security service officials. He was escorted past Migration Services with nary a check of the blacklist. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: The GOTX views the blacklist as an important tool for maintaining control over society. Through it's strict visa regime, internet censoring, and the blacklist, the GOTX is able to control contact with the outside world. END COMMENT. CURRAN

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -