(MORE) CONFUSION IN MADAGASCAR AS ICG APPROACHES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANTANANARIVO 000077 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E JAMES LIDDLE PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN LONDON FOR PETER LORD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV MA SUBJECT: (MORE) CONFUSION IN MADAGASCAR AS ICG APPROACHES REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 44 ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 68 Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M) prepares to discuss Madagascar's ongoing crisis on February 18 in Addis Ababa, Antananarivo is buzzing with political intrigue, although facts remain scarce. All four political movements have submitted their replies to AU Chairperson Jean Ping's January request concerning a return to the accords signed in Maputo and Addis Ababa in 2009. Zafy and Ratsiraka are generally amenable to the plan, and Ravalomanana has added a few caveats, while Rajoelina's fractious team produced their own "compromise" that reportedly was rejected immediately by Ping. Rajoelina sent envoys to Addis on Thursday to negotiate with AU on possible firther comppppromises. Vice Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Ny Hasina Andriamanjato resigned on Feb 10, in protest over Rajoelina's intransigence, precipitating rumors of an impending cabinet reshuffle, or further principled resignations. In the background, a diverse group of church leaders are growing more vocal in their opposition to the political stalemate, Ravalomanana's in-country representation is growing impatient and frustrated, rumors are circulating that former PM Roindefo Monja may be plotting a new coup, and the EU parliament has joined the fray with a firm denunciation of the de facto GOM and the current impasse. The only constant appears to be that all eyes are, once again, on Addis Ababa and the ICG, although there is little consensus on what they hope is achieved there. END SUMMARY. RAJOELINA LOSES FOREIGN MINISTER, FALLOUT UNCLEAR -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The departure of Ny Hasina Andriamanjato is significant; in a political culture generally unfamiliar with the concept of a principled resignation, his decision sends a message to the government and its recalcitrant supporters, although it is not clear that they will hear it. Andriamanjato has been one of Rajpoelina's closest and most mature allies since 2008, serving him first at the mayor's office in Antananarivo, and then following him through his rise to power in early 2009 to become Minister of Foreign Affairs after the March 17 coup. He also remained a privileged embassy contact afterwards, regularly calling ont he ambassador at the CMR. There were other factors at play: in a January 2009 discussion with Emboff, he cited "divine inspiration" in his decision to join Rajoelina, and never wavered in his belief that Ravalomanana would eventually fall. Several months after the coup, however, he was among the first to understand the consequences of continued isolation, and came to represent the small "moderate" faction of the administration. When attempts at engagement (through the ICG, the mediation team, and the various summits in Maputo and Addis Ababa) failed to produce international legitimacy or recognition, he slowly lost ground to hard-liners in the High Transition Authority. Earlier this week, he staked his position on Rajoelina's choice to accept the Maputo/Addis accords. The only surprise is that he actually followed through, when he handed his resignation to both Rajoelina and de facto PM Camille Vital on February 10. He called the ambassador on February 11 to explain his decision before it became public: he said that he still wants to help Rajoelina, but hopes his resignation will help bring him around to supporting Maputo. In the interim, hard-liner Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana has taken temporary responsibility for foreign affairs; this is unlikely to calm the opposition, and may presage a more assertive, and more ideological, voice from the MFA. Rumors of an imminent cabinet shuffle are now circulating as well, although it is unclear how that would fit into the current schema as everyone waits for the ICG response next week. Futher resignations are also a possibility. BELEAGUERED CO-PRESIDENT WANTS OUT -------------- ¶3. (C) Fetison Andrianirina, appointed co-president by Ravalomanana under the November 2009 Addis accord, told the Ambassador on February 10 that he is tired of living without his family, frustrated with his inability to make change, and wants out of his position. He has been constantly blocked by Rajoelina, who issued a warrant for his arrest, forcing him to live in hiding. He is also growing weary of mistreatment by his own boss, Ravalomanana, who is trying to keep him on too short of a leash, fails to listen to Fetison's advice, and is unwilling to set aside his personal ambitions to find a solution to the crisis. Special Intervention Force (FIS, ANTANANARI 00000077 002 OF 004 military unit reporting to Rajoelina) leaders COL Charles Andrianasoavina and COL Rene Lylison told Fetison that they were willing to back the Maputo and Addis accords as long as they could be assured that Ravalomanana, from whom they fear retribution, would not run in the next presidential election, which they allpresume he would win. As this sentiment is shared by many, particularly in the military, Fetison attempted to encourage Ravalomanana to remain out of politics for a few years, but to no avail. ¶4. (C) Fetison appears sincere in his concern for Madagascar and attempted to bring all sides together in an open discussion February 4. Although around 280 participants attended, mainly from the "silent majority" but also from the Zafy and Ratsiraka movements, the HAT boycotted and Ravalomanana told his own movement not to support the effort. He also said that the French Ambassador had approached Ravalomanana supporter Mamy Rakotoarivelo (who was appointed head of the still unformed transition congress) to encourage his camp to compromise by accepting TGV's Prime Minister Camille Vital staying on as the "consensus" PM, and replacing Fetison with a new co-president, preferably a woman. Fetison noted that Vital was on good terms with the military leaders "of the day", but would likely not be accepted by Ravalomanana. PASTORS SPURRED INTO ACTION -------------- ¶5. (C) Six Protestant pastors involved in a budding "Ecclesiastical Movement" explained to the Ambassador on February 10 that they had been spurred into political action by the lack of democracy and rule of law, growing insecurity, human rights abuses, poverty, and attacks against churches. Another contact reported separately to Emboff that churches that were known to have received financial or other support from Ravalomanana, an ardent Protestant, were being targeted by the de facto GOM. At least three of the pastors in the movement are subject to arrest warrants, and the leaders of the movement are spied on and followed. ¶6. (C) They have already held two services in Antsahamanitra (FJKM property in Tana) to call for a return to democracy, and claim that most Malagasy just want a return to rule of law, so they have a high level of support. Although not all Protestants are in agreement with politicization of the church, they claim that hundreds of Protestant and some Anglican and Lutheran pastors support their movement (although the Catholics are notably absent). The new Anglican head of the FFKM, a local association of the Protestant, Anglican, Lutheran, and Catholic churches, is taking a cautious approach in order to avoid deeper divisions within the association. The Anglicans have, however, planned a prayer service for the nation on February 12 and plan to call for everyone to return to reason, according to the pastors. ¶7. (C) The Ecclesiastical Movement is planning to hold a large prayer service, followed by a procession through town, and will request permission from the authorities to use the main stadium in the capital (Mahamasina). They have provisionally scheduled the event for February 20, but will base their action on the result of the February 18 ICG meeting in Addis Ababa, so may postpone if the AU/international community response is not yet clear. They expressed concern that Rajoelina was inflexible and confident due to French backing, and urged the U.S. to act as a diplomatic counterweight. The Ambassador explained that the entire international community, including the French, was now pressuring Rajoelina to compromise. FOUR MOVEMENTS RESPOND TO PING -------------- ¶8. (C) In January, AU Chairperson Jean Ping travelled to Antananarivo to propose a compromise solution to the current political impasses (ref A); he gave the four movements 15 days to respond, in writing, at which time the ICG would reconvene to discuss their options. The movements have responded, and a meeting of the ICG has been scheduled for February 18 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Fortunately, no party has completely rejected a renewed effort to implement the structures outlined in the Maputo and Addis accords, but particularly Rajoelina's position stops short of a clear endorsement to pick up where they left off in November. Rajoelina's proposal reflects the facts that the French support the maintenance of PM Vital and dismissal of Mangalaza, and that he is limited in his maneuvering by hardliners in his increasingly fractured movement. ANTANANARI 00000077 003 OF 004 - ZAFY and RATSIRAKA have generally endorsed Ping's proposal. Athough Zafy expressed hesitation at the idea that Rajoelina would remain head of state (ref B),he has not rejected the possibility, and has imposed no new conditions. Ratsiraka requested that the presidential election be held prior to the legislative elections, rather than simultaneously as Ping suggested, and also expressed hesitation to Rajoelina keeping his current position. - RAVALOMANANA stated that he accepts the compromise proposal, but introduced several "observations" for consideration. These include a change in the wording concerning the co-presidents to increase their authority, empowerment of the cabinet to decide who replaces the president in case of absence, the granting to his movement of the ministerial posts submitted to Prime Minister Mangalaza in November (foreign affairs, agriculture, commerce, transport, higher education, and decentralization),and the holding of presidential and legislative elections separately. Tellingly, he also suggested a change in how a vacancy in the presidency would be filled, proposing consensus among the four movements in the place of allowing the Rajoelina movement to do it unilaterally. - RAJOELINA's proposal keeps some elements of Maputo, but rejects others, diminishing the power of the other three movements. He proposed that the unity government would be formed by his unilaterally-appointed PM Vital, based on names provided by the other three movements. Vital, who would become the "consensus" PM, would decide which names would be matched with which portfolios. Elections for a legislature/constituent assembly would occur in May; a new cabinet would then be formed based on party rankings in those elections. The legislature would organize a national conference to rewrite the constitution and then the new government would organize presidential elections in November. The other three movements will likely reject the proposal because it weakens their power under the Maputo and Addis accords; it fails to mention Zafy's national reconciliation council, excludes Ravalomanana's congress, unilaterally replaces consensus PM Mangalaza, and indicates a strong preference to eliminate the co-presidents. But it concludes by inviting the AU and/or ICG to arbitrate a solution. Ping reportedly rejected the Rajoelina proposal upon receipt, so Rajoelina dispatched his Chief of Staff Zazah to Addis on Thursday to negotiate a possible revised version. EU PARLIAMENT DENOUNCES COUP, HR VIOLATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The EU parliament passed an extremely critical resolution on February 11 against the HAT, denouncing the coup d'etat, Rajoelina's unilateral actions, his failure to implement the Maputo and Addis accords, human rights violations (harassment, arbitrary arrests and torture, press intimidation, and pillage of churches),the HAT's monopolization of power, the authorization of unprocessed wood exports endangering the country's biodiversity, systematic repression of the opposition, and detention of opponents without charges. The resolution further condemned Rajoelina's decision to boycott the Maputo III negotiations, called for a return to talks and the immediate implementation of the Maputo and Addis agreements, mandated targeted sanctions against members of the HAT if they failed to implement those agreements, and demanded an account by the European Commission on the status of the Article 96 consultations regarding the future of 600 million Euros of aid under the Cotonou Agreement. The main pro-HAT newspaper vehemently protested some of the characterizations of Madagascar and the HAT, particularly the European parliament's "concern about the disappearance of several hundred people" and its call for the establishment of a disarmament process and the disbanding of militia. Post is unaware of "disappearances" conducted by the HAT and agrees that the language may be somewhat exaggerated, but overall, the resolution is a welcome contribution that is helping place additional pressure on the HAT to reconsider its intransigent ways. COUP PLOTS, ASSASSINATIONS, AND SUNDRY RUMORS ABOUND -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) On February 11, Emboff met with two individuals, both well-connected to the current government, who claimed to have direct knowledge of an imminent plan for Roindefo Monja to launch a coup against Rajoelina's government, allegedly within the following 48 hours. Such plans are not beyond the imagination of the disgruntled former PM, and he has been ANTANANARI 00000077 004 OF 004 incrementally raising his profile over the past two months (including in a recent meeting with Ambassador Marquardt, which he publicized within minutes of leaving the Chancery). However, Post cannot corroborate the claim, and the sources' attempts to link it with current unrest within an Antananarivo gendarme unit were spurious, at best. They also echoed months-old rumors of a plot to assassinate Rajoelina, although they added former consensus PM Eugene Mangalaza to the list of possible targets, stating that combined attempts on their lives would spur a coastal/highland conflict that would allow hard-line members of the HAT to seize power, and provide the military with an excuse for direct intervention. These individuals were unable to provide any evidence, or other sources, to back up their claims, but they reflect widespread (if overstated) sentiment that the current impasse may come to violence, after almost a year of political infighting. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: Rumors such as those in para 10 are not new, and their source has no more credibility than any of the disaffected activists that exist on all sides of the conflict. With the ICG meeting around the corner, however, and Rajoelina's government looking weaker than ever in the wake of Andriamanjato's resignation, there is increasing concern among our contacts that something has to give - although we've been here before. The only constant among them all is their current attention on the international community, with each side convinced that the ICG's meeting next week will be decisive, one way or another. Despite increasing consensus among members of the ICG, however, there is no middle ground that will please all of these voices. END COMMENT. MARQUARDT