MADAGASCAR: AU/PING MISSION FAILS TO PERSUADE RAJOELINA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000044

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: AU/PING MISSION FAILS TO PERSUADE RAJOELINA


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: AU Chairman Jean Ping, accompanied by a
delegation from SADC, the UN, COI, and the OIF, met with
Madagascar's political leaders January 21-22 to propose
a compromise solution for implementing the Maputo and Addis
Ababa accords. De facto president Rajoelina immediately
rejected Ping's approach, although Ping encouraged him to
reconsider over the next 15 days and hopes he has not heard
the HATQs last word. In a reversal of prior statements, both
Ping and the French Ambassador said that they supported the
return of SADC mediator Chissano if Rajoelina was willing
to re-engage in negotiations. If Rajoelina definitively
rejects the olive branch offered by Ping by February 5, the AU
is likely to move to targeted sanctions against the HAT.
African heads of state might take this up during the upcoming
AU Summit, or it will wait until the next AU Peace and Security
Council meeting, to take place by February 15. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) African Union Chairman Jean Ping, accompanied by Peace
and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra, visited Madagascar
January 21-22 in an effort to encourage Madagascar's leaders
to apply the agreements that they had signed in Maputo and
Addis Ababa in 2009. During his stay, he met with de facto
president Rajoelina (tete-a-tete lunch),co-presidents
Andrianirina and Rakotovahiny, consensus PM Mangalaza, TGV's
PM Vital, other members of the Ravalomanana/Zafy/Ratisiraka
movements, military and civil society leaders, and the local
representatives of the International Contact Group.


3. (SBU) Ping presented a "compromise solution" to the four
movements which demanded the application of the signed Maputo
I and Addis accords, while clarifying a few points of contention
regarding the roles of the president and co-presidents. The
proposal followed a principled approach, in line with the
positions of the USG and SADC, rather than following the tack
of HAT appeasement recommended in the French proposal before
the visit. The compromise solution would maintain the two
co-presidents; assigned Ravalomanana's appointed co- president
to carry out transition goals and Zafy's appointed co-
president to focus on development issues; allowed acts taken
by the president in cabinet meetings that were not co-signed
by the two co-presidents as required by the Addis accord to
be reviewed a second time by the cabinet for approval; granted
the president precedence on protocol issues; and empowered the
cabinet to determine the role of the two co-presidents on
protocol matters. It reaffirmed Eugene Mangalaza, dismissed by
TGV in December, as the consensus prime minister and stated that
the fair manner of dividing ministerial portfolios among the
four movements agreed to in Addis should be maintained.
The compromise solution also recommended that a constitutional
referendum should be held first, followed by legislative and
presidential elections at the same time no later than October.
Finally, the amnesty agreements reached in Maputo should be
respected, and the amnesty law should be passed by the transition
senate and congress.


4. (SBU) Although the Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy
movements appeared pleased by the AU proposal, Rajoelina
rejected it immediately. In a likely pre-cooked written
statement, Rajoelina avowed that "cohabitation" was impossible
and requested support for rapid elections.


5. (SBU) In a briefing of the ICG members following the
first day's events, Ping explained that the purpose of his
mission was to unblock implementation of the Maputo I and
Addis accords. Most diplomats were in agreement that the
compromise solution would fail due to the HAT's rejection.
Ping did not disagree, but said that if the Malagasy would
like to re-launch negotiations, President Chissano
would take the lead as mediation was outside the scope of
Ping's mandate for this visit. Ping suggested that, given the
likelihood of a failure of the Maputo process, targeted
sanctions against the HAT might be discussed at the AU summit
in late January, or delayed for Peace and Security Council
consideration between February 5 and 15. The French Ambassador
was visibly upset by the suggestion of sanctions and engaged
in an undiplomatic exchange with Ping on the issue. Ping
asserted that the AU must stick to its principles
against coups and also respect the SADC's views. In the
end, the French Ambassador assured Ping that France would
continue to support the AU's lead here.


6. (SBU) Following further meetings the next day, Ping again
briefed the ICG late on Jan 22. He said that despite the
letter from TGV rejecting the compromise proposal, which
he asserted was mainly for domestic consumption, some HAT
representatives - even TGV's hard-line adviser Norbert Lala
Ratsirahonana -- appeared open to discussions. All four

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movements, even the HAT, discussed the establishment of the
AU-SADC-OIF-UN follow-up mechanism for implementation of the
Maputo accords in Madagascar. However, as there is nothing
currently in place to monitor,the follow-up mechanism will
not be implemented, Ping said. Ping was not overly optimistic,
but thought that the HAT might be willing to make concessions
when faced with the now-serious threat of sanctions. He added
that the AU did not consider TGV's letter as the HAT's final
response, but would give them the full 15- day period, through
Feb 5, to reflect and respond.


7. (SBU) The French Ambassador noted that he had received
frantic calls from HAT representatives all Friday morning,
indicating their concern about the possible ramifications
(read sanctions) of their actions [Comment: from which they
now realize the French will be unable to protect them.
End comment.] In a surprising reversal of prior statements
and/or apparent positions, both the French Ambassador and Jean
Ping said that they supported the return of SADC
mediator Chissano if the HAT was willing to re-engage in
negotiations. Ping suggested several times that the HAT
may be willing to re-engage if they can save face by maintaining
their Prime Minister Camille Vital as the
"Consensus Prime Minister" called for under Maputo I. As Vital
is known as a "Ratsirakiste" and according to prior agreement
it was Ratsiraka who provided the PM names for approval by the
four movements, Ping thought there was a possibility
of Vital being retained as the new "consensus PM". The
French clearly also support retention of Vital, their ambassador
having argued that his presence was key to maintaining
stability within the military.


8. (SBU) Five representatives of the Zafy movement told the
ambassador Jan 22 that unilateral elections can not resolve the
political crisis and asserted that the risk for the country would
be extremely serious if the three opposition movements were
excluded from the transition government. They expressed concern
about the ambiguous position of France and the actions of certain
French nationals, suggesting clearly that reprisals against French
nationals and interests may become frequent if the French do
not alter their "meddling" approach. They said the military
is the key to Rajoelina's power and noted that the opposition
movements are reaching out to sympathetic military leaders to
urge them to not support Rajoelina but to "remain neutral".
They argued that the Malagasy people and the army reactQowly
after events, but assured us that after some time, they
would react "correctly". Due to the lack of rule of law,
increase in corruption, rising number of armed attacks, and
the encouragement of the three opposition movements, the
people, they argued, would eventually rise up and attack
those that are benefitting from this crisis.


9. (SBU) Consensus Prime Minister Mangalaza met with the
ambassador on Saturday to reaffirm his willingness "to be of
service" if needed. He is returning to his home outside
Tamatave, for both security and financial reasons; he no
longer receives any support from the government and presumably
is having to pay for his hotel room and all
other expenses himself. He reported that Vital had given Ping a
formal letter requesting his designation as "Consensus Prime
Minister" instead of Mangalaza. The conversation with
Mangalaza raised the strong possibility that Mangalaza had
become unacceptable not so much to Rajoelina (with whom he
never had any particular confrontation) as to the French:
Mangalaza recounted several instances of attempted French
strong-arming, which he resisted, much to their chagrin.
At the same time, there is indeed a major issue of face-saving
involved in the identity of the consensus prime minister
following RajoelinaQs firing of Mangalaza, and no individual
should be deemed irreplaceable. A Saturday call to the
ambassador by a HAT insider also suggested that the HAT may
be looking at finding a more acceptable substitute for
co-President Fetison Andrianirina, whose strong public words
against Rajoelina and the HAT also raise issues of face and
compatibility in any cohabitation. That the HAT is examining
such potential personnel changes gives some small hope
that the HAT will opt to resurrect Maputo and Addis after all,
but such "insider" glimmers generally have proven false in
the past.


10. (SBU) A former presidential candidate, not affiliated
with the four movements, reiterated to Emboff separately
that the Malagasy are slow to react. They build up
grievances one by one and then explode, she explained.
It is unclear when that point may come, but she predicted
that it might occur once the results of a unilaterally-
organized presidential election were known. She would like to

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mobilize people to stop TGV from moving unilaterally forward
to what she believes will be rigged legislative and presidential
elections, but complained that she lacks financial resources
and feels powerless to stop this high speed train.


11. (SBU) Other Malagasy citizens that are paying attention to
politics - even Ravalomanana supporters -- have told us
alternatively that they support rapid elections. Some argue
that once the elections are held, it will be obvious that
TGV lacks a support base, while others argue that the crisis
will continue until elections are held so it would be best to
have them as soon as possible. As long as the international
community is divided and perceived to be supporting both sides
(HAT and opposition),each side will feel buoyed and will
continue to perpetuate the crisis, others argue. Some contacts
argue that there will be a civil war if elections go forward,
while others see civil war as a stronger possibility if the
crisis drags on without elections. Ping said that certain
colonels and generals with whom his delegation met implied that
they might be pushed into committing a coup d'etat if the
politicians continued to take the country down a dead-end road.
He of course advised them to stay in their barracks, but
recognized that they might not.


12. (SBU) Comment and Action Recommendation: Our view is that
the unilateral election plan envisioned by the HAT would in fact
perpetuate and aggravate the crisis by further postponing national
reconciliation and forcing a confrontation; reconciliation and
renewed consensus are the prerequisites to elections, not vice
versa (as some French may still believe). However, the
international community's resistance to early, unilateral
elections and its call for "inclusiveness and consensus" are
not well understood by the majority of the population here who
just want the crisis over. We think it unlikely that the HAT
will change its tune substantially or sufficiently in the next
two weeks to avoid AU sanctions.


13. (SBU) Comment Continued: While remaining open to the
possibility of a new negotiated solution under Chissano, we
recommend that the USG begin preparing for the imposition of
targeted travel bans and freezing of assets against Rajoelina,
members of the HAT, and selected others, in coordination with
the AU, SADC, and hopefully - the EU. (Note: the EU must
decide on its own "appropriate measures" - sanctions -- before
the end of February). For our part, we have started on a draft
list of target names. If the HAT responds positively to the
AU's compromise proposal before Feb 5, negotiations could
resume and the AU-UN-SADC-OIF follow-up mechanism would be
established in Madagascar. However, in the more likely event
that the HAT's response remains negative, sanctions
will be the next step. End comment.

MARQUARDT