LOCAL FRENCH VIEWS ON MALAGASY CRISIS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000111 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E-JLIDDLE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL FR MA SUBJECT: LOCAL FRENCH VIEWS ON MALAGASY CRISIS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Although the French government may be outwardly in synch with the rest of the international community, discussions with local French representatives indicate that do not plan to "lay down the law," in a clear, non-ambiguous way, to Andry "TGV" Rajoelina and the HAT. They continue to support the idea of early elections, even if imperfect, as the French are extremely pessimistic about the ability of sanctions, the Maputo/Addis Accords, and/or further negotiations led by Chissano to solve the political crisis. The French government has reduced its military aid to Madagascar, but does not plan to make further cuts to bilateral aid programs, even if EU funds are cut following the closure of discussions under the Cotonou Accord, now expected in March. End summary. No Sanctions, Elections Instead -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The French Ambassador, accompanied by three colleagues, hosted the U.S. Ambassador and three colleagues at a working lunch to discuss Madagascar's political crisis Feb 23. The French Ambassador questioned the utility of sanctions targeting the HAT, arguing that they wouldn't help solve the crisis, but may rather produce a counter-productive nationalist surge that reinforced TGV. He argued that 85 percent of the Malagasy population who are apolitical should not be punished by further economic deterioration due to the failures of a few politicians. He reiterated their belief that rapid elections, and the avoidance of a Cote d'Ivoire scenario, were the best, practical option for ending the crisis, and stated categorically that "there will be elections." The HAT has already begun revising the electoral lists. Although a rapid election could not be perfect, no election could be, even if the Malagasy had six years to prepare, the head of French Cooperation argued. The French Ambassador added that elections had been skewed under Ravalomanana and could easily be skewed again. Maputo Will Not Work -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The French Ambassador argued that TGV's compromise offer to the AU and the ICG already pushed him as far as he could go due to constraints within the fragmented HAT movement. He asserted that TGV would not participate in negotiations with the other three movement leaders that SADC mediator Chissano was to organize, as TGV fears meeting with those three more than he fears sanctions. He 
(like us) has heard nothing of Chissano's effort to organize a next round of talks in Addis starting next week. Thus, given the AU communique of Feb 19, he concludes that AU sanctions are now inevitable. He further argued that Ravalomanana was just as intransigent and would not make a deal to save his business interests here as he thinks he can have it all - money and power - by letting the situation further deteriorate and coming back later with increased popularity. French Support for TGV -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The French Ambassador adamantly rejected the notion that France is propping up TGV, and seemed unaware or disbelieving of the extent to which that view is held here. His DCM appeared outraged when the U.S. Ambassador asked whether or not TGV may resign. She indicated that he has no such intention and questioned why one would think he should. (Answer: sheer incompetence.) She reiterated her belief that TGV was the product of a popular uprising, while the French Ambassador argued that the opposition lacks the popularity or ability to rally crowds to its cause. The French Ambassador noted, and U.S. Emboffs agreed, that an agreement by all four leaders, Rajoelina, Ravalomanana, Zafy, and Ratsiraka, not to run for president in the next election would be an ideal solution. The mediators had proposed this idea, but it was rejected by Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka, and then Rajoelina, who had initially accepted it last April, recalled the French DCM. French Aid and Cotonou -------------- ¶5. (SBU) France cut budget support for Madagascar in December 2008 and does not intend to turn it back on in the current context. If the AU proceeds to sanctions, a negative response can be expected by the EU on frozen aid under the Cotonou Accord, said the French Ambassador. However, he explained that even a "negative response" would have positive implications as it would allow the EU to move forward with humanitarian assistance which is currently in limbo. Whatever the EU decides, France's bilateral aid will be unaffected, he added. Military Aid Quietly Reduced -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The French DATT explained that, in fact, France had discontinued all regional and operational support for the Malagasy military since the coup and only maintained 16 French personnel embedded in the Malagasy military. France has not made public announcements about such reductions here, however, and seems ANTANANARI 00000111 002 OF 002 unperturbed by the contribution their silence is making to negative public opinion here and elsewhere. He claimed that it was necessary to maintain the 16 personnel as they have been instrumental in avoiding violent clashes and maintaining stability for the past year. ¶7. (SBU) Comment: We agree with the French mainly in our current pessimism about the way forward. Where we disagree, strongly, is both about the utility of rushing to ill-prepared elections, which they favor, and about the propriety and effectiveness of deep French involvement in trying to solve this crisis for the Malagasy. We disagree with them that rapid, unilateral elections will solve anything, and doubt strongly that the opposition will accept the bones thrown their way. Furthermore, it is our perception that, the harder the French try to foster a solution (e.g. by making public their view that HAT Prime Minister Vital is an excellent choice), the worse matters become. Meanwhile, the Chinese are positioning themselves for future investment here by acquiring land and mining permits, having indicated at the Feb 18 ICG meeting in Addis that they will never apply sanctions on the HAT. France has made it clear that it does not intend to cut its lifeline, and the Chinese will no doubt continue to avoid taking any political stand that could negatively impact their economic interests. Thus, truly isolating the leaders of the HAT to force them to comply with the agreements that they signed looks unlikely. End comment. MARQUARDT