SCENESETTER FOR UNVIE AMB. DAVIES' FEB 22 VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000269 SIPDIS UNVIE FOR AMBASSADOR DAVIES E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 TAGS: PREL KNUC ETTC ENRG IR TU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNVIE AMB. DAVIES' FEB 22 VISIT TO ANKARA REF: A. ANKARA 163 ¶B. 09 ANKARA 1478 Classified By: DCM Doug Silliman, Reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Thank you for taking the time to come to Turkey. You will arrive very shortly after U/S Bill Burns will have left. Iran will be at the top of his agenda, but your visit will help us advance our efforts to press Turkey to support UNSC sanctions against Iran and drop its opposition to the NSG guidelines to restrict the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. WHAT TO RAISE: -- Iran: Highlight that Iran's continuing refusal to submit to UNSC resolutions increases concerns about its nuclear program and the likelihood of a regional arms race that would be profoundly destabilizing for the region, including for allies like Turkey; emphasize that international unity and support for both tracks of the "dual-track approach" will be essential to press Iran to change its course on its nuclear program. (Paras 2-6) -- Ask MFA Deputy U/S Cevikoz where Turkey stands regarding the NSG guidelines and whether the GoT has considered the USG offer to guarantee on a bilateral basis Turkey's nuclear fuel supply; Emphasize how these guidelines are important in addressing our shared concerns about nuclear proliferation while preserving the ability of countries to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy. (Paras. 7-9) WATCH OUT FOR: -------------- -- Your Turkish interlocutors may probe for signs of USG wiggle room on a TRR deal (para. 2) -- The Turkish press at the roundtable event (para. 10-11) Iran Nuclear Issue -------------- ¶2. (C) Turkey continues its attempts to salvage the TRR deal. FM Davutoglu is personally engaged in this effort and has reportedly traveled to Iran five times in the last four months, most recently on February 16. We have not discouraged his shuttle and telephone diplomacy, but his efforts have produced no tangible results -- the latest evidence being Iran's February 17 letter to the IAEA -- but have given Iranian leaders an excuse to claim they are acting constructively to find a compromise on a TRR deal. As long as Iran continues to string Turkey along with the TRR deal, Turkish leaders will resist engaging in discussions about sanctions or new action at the UNSC. Indeed, your Turkish interlocutors may probe for signs of USG wiggle room on a TRR deal, unwilling to accept that a deal short of the October 1 redlines is not possible. ¶3. (C) The Government of Turkey has stated publicly that it is opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran -- often in the same breath as its opposition to "any countries in the region having nuclear arms." Turkish officials understand that a nuclear-capable Iran would shift regional balances in profound and dangerous ways. Yet, officials do not believe Iran would use these weapons even if they acquired the capability and would not, in any case, target Turkey. ¶4. (C) The Turks are skeptical about the effectiveness of sanctions, are terrified of any military action against Iran and are ultimately worried about how new sanctions might hurt Turkey's economy (many believe Turkey bore a disproportionate burden in enforcing sanctions that targeted Saddam's regime). During February 16 meetings in Washington, MFA U/S Sinirlioglu struck a familiar refrain: "We do not support a nuclear-armed Iran, but we do not believe in the merit of a sanctions regime due to our experience in the recent past with sanctions causing collateral damage." ¶5. (C) Turkey remains dependent on Iran to meet about 35 percent of its oil imports and 10 percent of its gas imports and uses Iran as a transit route for Turkish goods to access Central Asian markets. FM Davutoglu during his press conference with Mottaki on Feb 16 said that Turkey hopes to increase bilateral trade to 30 billion dollars (from current levels of about USD 5 billion -- the bulk of which is comprised of Turkish import of Iranian hydrocarbons),a symbolic pledge rather than a realistic projection, but still very telling. ¶6. (C) Turkish officials, however, are also aware of the need for the international community to back up its talk about getting tough with Iran. Sinirlioglu told Ambassador on Feb 1 that: "If we say something and cannot follow up it will be perceived as weakness." He also added that the international community's failure to act would also weaken the position of the opposition inside Iran. According to Sinirlioglu, Iranian opposition has indicated to the GOT that a strong international response is the only way to show Iran that the international community is serious (ref a). You should emphasize the importance of backing our talks with action and the need for unified, international action, including sanctions, to force Iran to change its dangerous behavior regarding its nuclear program. NSG ENR Guidelines -------------- ¶7. (C) Turkey remains opposed to the NSG draft guidelines to restrict the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology (ENR) and believe the guidelines would unfairly limit the "inalienable right" of non-nuclear weapon states to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to include enrichment. Turkish officials continue to argue that a distinction should be made between NPT and NSG countries "in good standing" and "problematic countries" and that the two should not be lumped together. ¶8. (C) During a September 2009 visit to Ankara, ISN DAS Kang proposed a forward leaning package of incentives that would guarantee Turkey's nuclear fuel supplies in order to address concerns Turkey may have about not being able to access nuclear fuel on the international market (ref b). The Turks pledged to consider it, but have not provided a formal response to the offer. ¶9. (C) Turkey is aware that it is not the lone hold out and that South Africa also continues to have reservations about the guidelines. Ankara may not be willing to seriously consider dropping its opposition to the guidelines until it is completely isolated. Even then, statements by PM Erdogan trumpeting the rights of NPT members to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in his recent discourse related to Iran likely also reflect a maximalist view of what Turkey should be allowed to do as a NNWS NPT member. Turkish officials have told us that while Turkey has made no decisions about pursuing nuclear enrichment, they would like to keep the door open to this possibility, especially given Turkey's intent to develop a nuclear power sector to meet its energy needs. Press Event -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The roundtable on February 22 to which members of the think tank community and columnists are invited will now also include representatives from diplomatic missions (minus Iran),some senior MPs and a foreign policy advisor from the Prime Ministry. The event has now become a bit larger than originally envisioned, but would still serve to get our message out on the Iran nuclear program. The event is hosted by a think tank called the International Strategic Research Organization, headed by Dr. Sedat Laciner, who is close to elements of the ruling Justice and Development Party. You should assume that the event is on the record and that the Turkish press will try to find angles and may take your comments out of context to help sell newspapers. ¶11. (SBU) The following is a list of hard questions that could come up during the press event: -- Does the USG support Turkey's efforts to achieve a deal on TRR? Why is the U.S. unwilling to show more flexibility on the original proposal? -- Why is the U.S. so focused on Iran when Israel already has nuclear weapons and whether it is fair for the international community to focus only on Iran? -- How can anyone trust U.S. intelligence assessments on Iran when the intelligence on Iraq was so wrong? -- Does the U.S. believe Iran has renewed its nuclear weapons program? -- Why is the U.S. so insistent on pursuing sanctions when it does not believe Iran's claims about its ability to enrich to 20 percent? -- Is Iran really violating IAEA provisions and its international obligations? -- What does the U.S. hope to achieve with new sanctions given their lack of effectiveness thus far and whether the Chinese are on board with new UNSC sanctions? -- Why is Congress seeking to pass the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act now and why did the U.S. impose new sanctions on Iran? Does this signal a unilateralist approach by the U.S. on the issue of Iran? Has the U.S. considered the likely impact of the petroleum-related sanctions on the Iranian people rather than the regime? -- Is the military option still on the table? If so, how can we expect Iran to negotiate in good faith when it is under the constant threat of attack? Jeffrey "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"