SCENESETTER FOR U/S BURNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000263 SIPDIS DAMASCUS: FOR U/S BURNS FROM AMB JEFFREY E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S BURNS REF: ANKARA 87 Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Welcome to Turkey! With this cable, I'd like to update you on where the relationship stands. WHAT TO RAISE: -- Move forward on the Armenia protocols; an end to Turkey-Armenia reconciliation will harm, if not terminate, the Minsk Group process (para 3). -- Be prepared to support unified Security Council action to convince the Iranian government it is on the wrong course (para 5). -- Want to take our dialogue with you on missile defense to the next level; Undersecretary Tauscher is prepared to respond to your questions in detail (para 6). -- Appreciate your effort to restore civility to the dialogue with Israel; your success in maintaining balance in that relationship increases your credibility as a potential Middle East mediator (para 7). -- Welcome your creative approach on Cyprus and urge you to remain flexible and open in the search for a solution. Continue to support Talat's moves (para 8). -- Appreciate Turkish efforts in Afghanistan - the planned Jowzjan PRT, expanded security forces training, assumption of the RC-Capital command, coordination of development efforts with USAID (para 9). WATCH OUT FOR: -- An effort to recast USF-I CG Odierno's February promise to work with Turkey, Iraq and the KRG on the development of an "action plan" against the PKK presence in northern Iraq as a commitment to bring U.S. military force to bear directly on the terrorists. We will look for ways to strengthen our cooperation, but will not engage the PKK ourselves militarily (para 10). -- GoT suspicion that we have not been sufficiently energetic in addressing the banning of Sunni candidates from participation in the March 7 Iraq elections (para 11). -- Complaints the U.S. is setting too high a bar for Bosnia on its NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) and does not support increased Turkish activism in the Balkans (para 12). ¶2. (C) From Iraq to Afghanistan, we benefit greatly from our close cooperation with Turkey. Nonetheless, we confront two major challenges to the relationship over the next few months. The first is Turkish unwillingness to side unambiguously with the world community in condemning Iran's nuclear ambitions. The second is the government's reluctance, in the face of declining poll numbers and increasing rumors of an early election, to muster the political courage to drive ratification of the Armenia Protocols through parliament. TURKEY - ARMENIA -------------- ¶3. (C) Mindful of the Turkish public's sympathies with their "cousins" in Azerbaijan and the parliamentary opposition's desire to beat the ruling party with this stick, the government has been unwilling to seek ratification of the protocols President Gul signed last year with his Armenian counterpart without some progress on Nagorno-Karabakh. That progress is not forthcoming and, though we refuse to accept linkage of the protocols to the Minsk Process, the former's failure would likely damage, if not derail, the latter. By proceeding with normalization, opening the border and building people-to-people ties with Armenians, Turkey may be able to draw momentum out of the Armenian Diaspora's world-wide campaign to classify the events of 1915 as genocide. Just by launching a ratification effort, Prime Minister Erdogan would help us fend off for one more year a Congressional Armenian Genocide Resolution that could throw our bilateral relationship into the deep freeze and cripple our critical logistics lines through Turkey to Iraq and Afghanistan. ¶4. (C) We share our parliament-watching contacts' assessment that, absent something "definable" as progress on Nagorno-Karabakh, or a wink for Aliyev, Erdogan could not get all his own MPs, let alone the opposition, to vote for the protocols' ratification. IRAN -------------- ¶5. (C) Turkey remains profoundly fearful of the collateral damage to its economy that could result from sanctions or a hysterical Iranian decision to retaliate for their imposition by throttling its hydrocarbons exports. Turkey imports 36 percent of its oil from Iran (2008 figure). Iranian natural gas constitutes roughly 11 percent of Turkey's consumption (2008 figure). If Iran were to cut off that supply, some Turks could grow cold in their homes and angry at their government. Hoping to forestall sanctions, Foreign Minister Davutoglu has repeatedly attempted to mediate compromise between the Iranians and the woQd community. By the time of your visit, he will have just returned from February 16 meetings in Tehran. We have not discouraged his shuttle and telephone diplomacy, but his efforts have been without effect; he likely Qs exceeded his brief. Both he and Prime MinisteQErdogan, whose public dismissal late last year of the international community's case against Iran as "gossip" may have encouraged Iranian intransigence, should prepare themselves for hard work at the UN to craft effective sanctions that address Turkish equities. MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶6. (C) We have asked Turkey to host an AN/TPY-2 radar as part of the new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to European Ballistic Missile Defense. Erdogan, initially very hesitant, told POTUS and SECDEF he needs a NATO label to sell Turkey's participation to his public. After Romania's announcement of its willingness to host PAA assets and Iran's decision to further enrich its uranium stock, Turkey may be more flexible; Turks know the PAA can only protect Turkish territory if a radar is located here. Erdogan was much more forward-leaning with SECDEF this month than in December. U/S Tauscher looks forward to responding to Turkey's missile defense questions in detail. TURKEY - ISRAEL -------------- ¶7. (C) Though Erdogan and former Prime Minister Olmert often disagreed, they maintained an unmediated and mutually beneficial dialogue that ended suddenly when Israel launched its "Cast Lead" intervention into Gaza in December of 2008. Erdogan's vituperative criticisms of Israel thoughout 2009 have kept PM Netanyahu at a distance. Israeli diplomats here candidly admit their country needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Israel and are still working hard to circumvent Foreign Minister Lieberman's hostility to re-establishing a channel to the GoT's senior political level. The GoT showed remarkable restraint when it refused to be provoked by Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon's rude treatment of the Turkish ambassador in early January and chose, instead, to receive visiting Defense Minister Barak. You should encourage your interlocutors towards more efforts to restore civility to the dialogue with Israel. The GoT's success in maintaining balance in its relationship with Israel increases Turkey's credibility as a potential Middle East mediator. More generally, Turks' infatuation with the "Arab street" and rogue actors in the immediate aftermath of Cast Lead and Davutoglu's appointment may be waning as they witness the decline of their leverage as "a friend to all." CYPRUS -------------- ¶8. (C) A long brain-storming session at the Turkish MFA several weeks ago generated a series of creative ideas to avert an impasse in the Cyprus reconciliation talks, and a recent Turkish Cypriot proposal seems to have pushed the process somewhat forward. However, President Christofias remains less flexible and uncharismatic Turkish Cypriot "President" Talat faces a difficult re-election campaign this April. His opponent suggests he may abandon the goal of reconciliation with the Greek Cypriots, if this round of talks fails. We encourage Turkey's quiet support for Talat. Cyprus remains a key obstacle to the progress of Turkey's EU candidacy. AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶9. (C) Turkey's re-assumption of the RC-Capital command, its force contribution of nearly 1800 troops, Wardak province PRT, planned Jowzjan province PRT, increased security forces training effort and new collaboration with AID on Afghanistan development make it a major NATO and USG partner in the multi-national effort to consolidate stability and democracy in Afghanistan. Turkey's history, Muslim traditions and culture give it a special credibility with Afghans (but, at the same time, contribute to Turkey's extremely passive military posture there). We applaud Turkey's engagement and encourage its ongoing diplomatic effort, through the Ankara Process, to build trust between the Afghan and Pakistani leaderships. PKK ACTION PLAN -------------- ¶10. (C) USF-I Commanding General Odierno's unprecedented meeting here February 3 with the high-level Turkish inter-agency security affairs group constituted USG acknowledgment that the most serious impediment to realization of Turkey's potential as a post-USF-I force for stabilization in Iraq and countering influence to Iran is the continued PKK leadership harbor in northern Iraq. Odierno's visit alone improved Turkish morale, which had been shaken by the PKK's ambush and killing of seven soldiers December 7 in interior Turkey, far beyond the terrorists' normal area of operations, and by a surge of civil violence late last year in towns and cities across Turkey's heavily Kurdish southeast. Odierno accepted Turkey's request that USF-I facilitate the drafting of an action plan against the PKK in cooperation with the GoT, the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government. The fight to root the PKK out of northern Iraq has already been a long one. Key to ultimate success against the terrorists will be substantive KRG cooperation with Turkey, something we will encourage. Though we will continue to assist Turkey in many ways, especially by providing targeting intelligence, we will not engage directly in military action against the PKK. IRAQ -------------- ¶11. (C) In Davutolgu's words: "Iraq is an existential issue for Turkey." From the USG's perspective, Turkey has been, by far, the most constructive of Iraq's neighbors in contributing to its stability. Last October, Erdogan led a delegation of eight of his ministers to Baghdad where they signed nearly 50 MoUs and agreements that laid legal foundations for cooperation on counter-terrorism, commerce, hydrocarbons trade, transportation infrastructure construction, health care, and water management. Turkey wants the Iraqi experiment to succeed; however, the GoT fears we will leave before it can. A gathering Turkish suspicion is that we have been too low-profile, not energetic enough, in challenging the Accountability and Justice Commission's banning of key Sunni candidates from participation in the March 7 elections. Ambassador Hill is daily quietly prodding Iraqi political leaders towards a solution to the banning that does not disenfranchise Sunnis. We will remain reluctant to issue statements or act in a high-profile manner that might embarrass PM Maliki, who is a also a candidate and attracts the support of a significant segment of the population. BALKANS -------------- ¶12. (C) Turkey is seeking to leverage its credibility with Bosnia's Muslim population into influence in the Balkans generally. It fears the transition to a European Union Special Representative will cost it the voice it enjoyed with the Office of High Representative. We will continue to advocate a place for Turkey at the table. You may want to remind your interlocutors that, with regard to Bosnia's MAP, we want the government to be of sufficient functionality so that Bosnia can be a reliable Ally. Jeffrey "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"