Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ANKARA121
2010-01-25 17:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

CHP DEPUTY CHAIR OYMAN ON EARLY ELECTIONS, MIL-GOV

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000121 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: CHP DEPUTY CHAIR OYMAN ON EARLY ELECTIONS, MIL-GOV
RELATIONS, ARMENIA AND FOREIGN POLICY

REF: A. ANKARA 87

B. ANKARA 107

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000121 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL TU SUBJECT: CHP DEPUTY CHAIR OYMAN ON EARLY ELECTIONS, MIL-GOV RELATIONS, ARMENIA AND FOREIGN POLICY REF: A. ANKARA 87 ¶B. ANKARA 107 Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a January 23 conversation with the Ambassador, Republican People's Party (CHP) Deputy Chairman Onur Oyman predicted elections in 2010 that would cost the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) its ability to govern without forming a coalition. AKP's likely partner would be the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP),not CHP. Oyman is pleased by Friday's Constitutional Court ruling that annulled the AKP-drafted law extending civil court jurisdiction over military personnel. He claimed AKP's campaign against the military is costing it support and contributing to the unease of Turkey's populace. The former MFA undersecretary criticized the AKP's signing of the Armenia Protocols and outreach to the Kurdish Regional Governent in northern Iraq. He regretted the attenuation of Turkey's relationship with Israel and the AKP's willngness to cozy up to unsavory Middle Eastern actors. He reitereated party leader Deniz Baykal's desire to visit Washington this spring. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Early Elections Coming, AKP Single-Party Government Out -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Oyman flatly predicted new elections in 2010, elections which will rob the AKP of its single-party government status. Oyman was not quite sure how the timing would work out in 2010 between the elections and Erdogan's proposed contitutional change package. (NOTE: The package would have to go to a referendum as AKP does not have the votes to pass it in parliament, absent major compromises to win opposition support. The package would almost certainly include a constitutional change to allow civilian court juridiction over military personnel following last week's Constitutional Court decision -- see below.) In any case, Oyman was sure a referendum would reject the AKP package. Oyman is basing his assessment of both the inevitability of early elections and an AKP loss on the dire economic situation, particularly unemployment (COMMENT: We are more sanguine on the general state of the economy, but agree continued high unemployment will be a big political problem). ¶3. (C) These woes in Oyman's view are complemented by AKP's horrible record of corruption and mismanage
ment, especially at the local level. Oyman recited his various recent travels in the hinterland and his many encounters with angry citizens. On the national level, Turkey, under AKP, is losing its Western moorings. Forced Islamization is threatening, and the relative international status of Turkish women is appalling (COMMENT: There he does have a point.) He contends one poll we also saw, which has AKP down to roughly 30% with CHP right behind, is a harbinger of AKP's coming electoral collapse. (COMMENT: But, in fact, other polls tell different stories, including one last week that pegged Erdogan's popularity holding at 40%. Many astute non-partisan contacts, most not fans of Erdogan's style, believe AKP could well receive another single-party government mandate). ¶4. (C) Oyman appeared less confident about the "day after," admitting that, even if AKP loses the parliamentary majority, it will still have a plurality. In that case, the most likely constellation would be an AKP-MHP coalition. While Oyman had few good things to say about the MHP, he did believe that a coalition with the MHP would be sufficiently diverse to block Erdogan's move toward a one-party authoritarian system. As for the CHP, it will never form a coalition with AKP and is thus resigned to remain the chief opposition party. He did not hold out much hope for a CHP-MHP coalition, and rather lamented the loss of Turkey's traditional moderate center right and moderate left wing poles. (i.e. the CHP, still the "moderate left" champion, albeit one many in the Socialist International can no longer abide, is left stranded, with the rest of the country flocking to the "brown shirt" MHP or the "turbans" of the AKP). ANKARA 00000121 002 OF 002 -------------- -------------- Constitutional Court Military Ruling a CHP Victory -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Oyman was understandably delighted with the unanimous Constitutional Court decision the day before that tossed out the AKP-drafted law allowing military personnel to be tried in civilian courts (REF B). Oyman, whose party had petitioned the court for the ruling, felt the law, in terms of it constitutionality and the manner it had been sprung on the Parliament, richly deserved its fate. He went on about AKP's anti-military campaign being another source of both its dropping popularity, and the general sense of discord and unease in the country. (COMMENT: What "uneased" us about Oyman's recitation was his rejection of any possiblity that the military might have over stepped its bounds with Ergenekan and various just-revealed "coup-exercise" plans. Essentially, in his view, the enemy (the military) of the CHP's enemy, AKP, is naturally the CHP's friend. No wonder the Socialist International shakes its head at these CHP guys.) -------------- Foreign Policy -------------- ¶6. (C) Foreign policy is in Oyman's view another area of AKP failure. He, of course, castigated the Armenian protocols in harsh language especially after the Armenian Constitutional Court's decision to endorse them, which opened the door to paranoid Turkish fears about being tricked by the wily Armenians. Oyman's alternative: Promising Turkish steps on a case-by-case basis in response to Armenian concessions. Ditto his criticism of the AKP's Kurdish outreach, both within Turkey and in Northern Iraq. More to our liking, he lamented the breakdown in relations with Israel and the AKP embrace of some of the Middle East's more unsavory actors. Along lines similar to REF A, he asserted that AKP diplomacy was overextended and failed to consummate substantially any of its ambitious goals. ¶7. (C) Naturally, the CHP wants the best possible relations with the U.S. (COMMENT: Despite panning many of the things we like about the AKP foreign policy.) He echoed in more concrete terms CHP Party chief Baykal's desire to visit Washington in the spring. But, as we told Oyman, Baykal's expectations -- or perhaps preconditions -- for a visit, such as time with the President, will be very hard to deliver. Jeffrey "Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"

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