BARAK AND DAVUTOGLU ON GAZA, SYRIA AND IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000110

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2015
TAGS: PREL TU IS
SUBJECT: BARAK AND DAVUTOGLU ON GAZA, SYRIA AND IRAN

REF: A. ANKARA 108

B. ANKARA 58

C. TEL AVIV 124

Classified By: A/POL COUNSELOR Jeremiah Howard; Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Israeli Embassy's readout on the January
17 Davutolgu-Barak meeting was markedly more downbeat than
that offered us by the Turkish MFA. Barak was cautiously
receptive to a GoT proposal that it be permitted to deliver
pre-fabricated housing units to Gaza. He discouraged
Turkey's hopes for an early resumption of its suspended
proximity talks between Israel and Syria. Barak was
satisfied with his dialogue with Davutoglu, but the Israeli
Embassy is unsure of next steps towards re-establishing a
reliable communications channel between the two governments'
political levels. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Israeli Embassy Spokesman Amit Zarouk January 21
provided detail on the 3.5 hour January 17 conversation
between FM Davutoglu and visiting Israeli Defense Minister
Ehud Barak that contrasted markedly with the Turkish MFA's
perception of the visit (REF A). Zarouk was much more
downbeat. He focused on the GoT's abiding interest in
gaining humanitarian access to Gaza and re-establishing
proximity talks between Syria and Israel.


3. (C) According to Zarouk, Davutoglu reaffirmed the GoT's
desire to lead a high-profile humanitarian assistance mission
into Gaza. Barak rejected assertions Gaza is gripped by a
humanitarian crisis. He said food, medicine, and other
essentials are being allowed in unhindered. He confirmed GoI
unwillingness to permit Turkish building construction
materials entry into Gaza. Davutoglu countered by requesting
Turkey be allowed to truck in 100 pre-fabricated housing
units. Barak was personally receptive and promised to
present the request to an upcoming meeting of the Israeli
"security" cabinet. He cautioned, however, the prevailing
pattern of anti-Israeli rhetoric emanating from the Turkish
government's political level had not predisposed Israeli
security affairs ministries in Turkey's favor.


4. (C) Barak implied HAMAS could expedite the lifting of the
Gaza blockade by releasing kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad
Shalit. Responding to Davutoglu's immediate offer of Turkey
as a back channel to HAMAS, Barak, noting the GoI's
preference that Ankara reinforce HAMAS' isolation, suggested
Turkey urge HAMAS directly and via Syria to accept "the deal
already on the table." Barak did not accede to Davutoglu's
request for details on the deal, fearing the Turkish
proclivity toward mediation would complicate the German and
Egyptian efforts already underway.


5. (C) Davutoglu pressed hard for GoI endorsement of a
renewed Turkish effort to mediate proximity talks with Syria,
claiming Erdogan's rising credibility with "the Arab street"
would enable him to "seal a deal." Barak countered Erdogan
has no credibility with the Israeli street. Given Erdogan's
repeated harsh criticism of Israel, the Israeli cabinet would
not soon consider a Turkish mediation role. Implying a
request to cease public attacks on Israel, Barak told
Davutoglu: "You must help me help you be in the process."


6. (SBU) Davutoglu reiterated Turkey's fear it would suffer
collaterally from sanctions or military action against Iran.
He claimed the international community had no alternative to
repeated negotiation efforts with Tehran.


7. (C) During prior conversations with Zarouk and Israeli DCM
Kanafi, the Israelis emphasized their hope the Barak visit
would re-establish the pre-Operation Cast Lead line of
communications between the two countries' political levels.
Kanafi had even speculated the visit might set the stage for
an Erdogan-Netanyahu relationship. Since the "sofa spat" of
last week (REF B),the Israeli Embassy now fears the former
bilateral intimacy may be lost for good. It is unsure of
what to do as a follow-up to Barak.


8. (C) Zarouk described Barak as "satisfied" with the visit.
Barak believes Davutoglu now understands Israeli positions.
Even if the Turkish domestic political reality prevents

Davutoglu from advocating the Israeli perspective publicly,
the Israeli Embassy hopes he can act as a brake on Erdogan.
The embassy believes Davutoglu worked hard on Erdogan to
contain the sofa spat. Nevertheless, a Barak-Davutoglu
relationship would be complicated because they are not
counterparts. Davutoglu belongs to Israeli FM Lieberman and,
Zarouk lamented, meaningful communications between them is
unimaginable.


9. (C) COMMENT: Fixing the Israeli-Turkish relationship will
take imagination and creativity; both are in short supply
among Israel's discouraged embassy staff here.
Jeffrey

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"