ALGERIAN CT CHIEF PRESSES NEA DAS SANDERSON ON TSA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000116 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - NARDI E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AG UN US SUBJECT: ALGERIAN CT CHIEF PRESSES NEA DAS SANDERSON ON TSA LIST Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce. Reasons: 1.4 (b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Meeting with NEA DAS Sanderson January 25, Algerian Counterterrorism Coordinator Kamel Rezag Bara objected that putting Algeria on the list of countries subject to enhanced airport screening is at variance with Algeria's solid commitment to fighting terrorism and its close security partnership with the U.S. Noting that Algerian public opinion viewed this measure negatively, he suggested the U.S. could have implemented the measure without publicizing it. DAS Sanderson stressed that this measure was aimed not against Algeria but at increasing safety for the flying public of all countries. Rezag Bara portrayed AQIM as a global threat to security and to Algeria's and Islam's central message of tolerance. The group was no longer a threat to the country as a whole but had a residual presence in the Kabylie and in the east. It enjoyed zero popular support, in part due to its kidnappings of locals for ransom. He said that Mali's continued reluctance to act against AQIM was a major Algerian worry and the reason for the postponement of the Bamako summit. He asked that the U.S. intercede with Bamako to move it to start fighting AQIM. He repeated a proposal made last October to set up a bilateral interagency "contact group" that would exchange security assessments. Algeria would seek to follow up UNSCR 1904 in the UNGA and perhaps seek a resolution in the OIC. Rezag Bara said that the two recent Guantanamo returnees would go before a judge in a matter of days. End summary. TSA Listing -------------- ¶2. (C) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson met Algerian Presidential Coordinator for Counterterrorism Kamel Rezag Bara at the Presidency in Algiers January 25, accompanied by the Ambassador, Pol-Econ Chief Bosshart and EconOff Wazir. DAS Sanderson emphasized that we had built a strong counterterrorism partnership with Algeria since 9/11, which was very important to the U.S. The USG was increasingly concerned by al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) presence in the Sahel. AQIM was one of the top priorities of the State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator. We had heard Government of Algeria concerns over the TSA listing of Algeria. This measure did not grow out of our relationship with Algeria but was a response to a new security threat. ¶3. (C) Rezag Bara agreed that the security partnership with the U.S. was important. However, the "listing" of Algeria as subject to enhanced airport screening ran contrary to that partnership. Such treatment would be understandable for state sponsors of terrorism; or countries in areas where U.S. troops were fighting like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan; or for countries in turmoil like Yemen and Somalia; or perhaps for Saudi Arabia, which had been the source of 19 of 22 terrorists involved in the 9/11 attack; or even Lebanon, because of Hizballah. But it was not understandable for Algeria or Libya. Libya was one of the first states to take action against Osama bin Ladin. (Note: In addition to sticking up for the only other Maghrebi state on TSA list, Rezag Bara is a former Algerian ambassador to Libya.) Algeria was a prime U.S. ally in fighting terrorism. How had this list been drawn up? he asked. Rezag Bara said it might have been acceptable to screen, for example, Algerians who had visited Yemen or Afghanistan, but not all Algerian nationals. He said he would not say more, but the government of Algeria really (he put emphasis on this last word) wanted the US to take Algeria off the list. At the end of the meeting, he suggested the U.S. could have fortified its already strong airport security measures in this or other ways, but without publicizing them. Sahel Security - and Mali -------------- ¶4. (C) Turning to the Sahel, Rezag Bara stated that al-Qa'ida posed a global threat to security, the unity of Islamic states, and to Islam itself and its message of peace and tolerance. Since AQIM was no longer a threat to Algeria's national security and stability as a whole, Algeria now focused on denying AQIM the use of "first periphery" countries -- Mali, Mauritania and Niger -- as sanctuaries. Algeria also looked to a "second periphery" of Chad, Burkina-Faso, northern Nigeria, and Darfur -- places where there were substantial Muslim populations and where Al-Qa'ida could seek to extend its influence. Mali was a major worry. AQIM leaders Abu Zaid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar had some 200 armed men and used hostage-taking to generate media attention and revenue to fund their operations. ¶5. (C) Rezag Bara spotlighted Mali as a particular problem in regional counterterrorism cooperation. He claimed it refused to coordinate or cooperate with Algeria on terrorism and lacked the will to deny terrorists the use of its territory as a sanctuary. The August 2009 Tamanrasset (Algeria) conference of regional military chiefs of staff had decided to coordinate counterterrorism operations and stand up mixed units to patrol sensitive areas. Algeria had agreed to help equip regional states. However, a shipment of radios Algeria had delivered to Mali late last August had still not been used. Algeria believed that Mali negotiated directly with terrorists or with persons representing them. Niger and Mauritania, by contrast, were cooperating. Rezag Bara said Algeria needed U.S. help to convince Bamako it could not negotiate an armistice with terror groups. The Bamako summit of regional leaders could not take place until there was a Malian commitment to cooperate against terrorism. There was no need for a summit whose success was not certain. Asked whether Algeria had given Mali development assistance, Rezag Bara replied that Algeria still had no permission from Mali to give development assistance to (Tuareg) areas in northern Mali. ¶6. (C) Rezag Bara said that the old Malian argument that the Tuareg threat prevents Malian movement against AQIM was no longer valid. Tuareg tribes were disarmed and no longer a source of rebellion. Mali also believed that the Tuaregs could not help in the fight against terrorism. Tuareg leaders visiting Algiers earlier in January had refuted that, telling Algerian officials that Tuaregs wanted only development assistance for their region and the integration of some of their forces into the Malian army. (Comment: Malian Tuareg leaders were in Algiers earlier this month, reportedly to discuss reviving the Algiers Accords of 2006. End comment) He said all Tuaregs who had been in Algiers -- including the radical Ag Bahanga -- had supported this position. Algeria wanted Mali to consider the Tuaregs not as a risk but as a partner against AQIM. But any Algeria support to the Tuareg areas would require Malian government support. Security in Algeria -------------- ¶7. (C) DAS Sanderson inquired about the security situation in Algeria. Rezag Bara replied that the GOA was still worried about the Kabylie and the east, where small groups of armed terrorists numbering 8-10 each still carried out attacks against the security services. However, they no longer had support among the local population, largely due to their practice of kidnapping local notables for ransom. The main threat was in the south and in the countries bordering the south. The government's security "doctrine" was to deny the terrorists the ability to act in cities. This strategy had succeeded. The government also intervened in prisons, mosques, schools and banks to deny these areas to the terrorists. Ransom Payments - UNSCR 1904 Not End of Story -------------- ¶8. (C) DAS Sanderson asked about Algeria's consultations with European countries on outlawing ransom payments to terrorists. Rezag Bara said his own consultations with the Russians in Moscow last October had produced agreement that ransom payments were a form of terrorist financing. The UK also agreed with this Algerian view, but the French had been less cooperative. In any case, UNSCR 1904 was an international legal norm making it unlawful for states to pay ransoms to terrorists. He conceded, however, that others could pay ransoms even if states could not. He noted that UNSCR 1904 was not the end of the issue. Algeria was deliberating not only the possibility of bringing the issue of ransom payments to the UNGA, but also how to sensitize EU partners, and whether to work via the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for issuance of an "Islamic legal position" on the taking of hostages and ransom payments. U.S.-Algeria "Contact Group" -------------- ¶9. (C) DAS Sanderson noted that State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator Benjamin had asked her to explore how we could set up the U.S.-Algeria "contact group" that Rezag Bara had proposed previously and how it would function. Rezag Bara said it should be an informal, bilateral, interagency dialogue on threat assessment. It would include high-level representatives from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Interior as well as defense and intelligence services. Algeria already had this arrangement with Russia, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands and was close to setting something up with the UK. The Algerians also included at different times representatives from customs, their financial intelligence unit, and other ministries as needed. To set it up, the U.S. Ambassador could write the GOA requesting that a U.S. interagency group visit Algeria, or that an Algerian interagency group visit Washington, to sign a memorandum of understanding on establishing the group. Rezag Bara emphasized that existing "contact groups" were informal discussion fora that did not make formal decisions. (On departing the meeting, he told the Ambassador he himself would be interested in a visit to Washington sometime before May.) Guantanamo -------------- ¶10. (C) DAS Sanderson thanked Rezag Bara for Algeria's acceptance of a number of Algerian citizens detained in Guantanamo. Carrying out the administration's commitment to close Guantanamo was a difficult job because many dangerous persons were held there. Rezag Bara replied that, beginning in 2005, Algerian officials had visited some 26 or 27 Algerian detainees in Guantanamo. Algeria welcomed the USG determination to close the facility, which he said was contrary to U.S. values. Algeria remained prepared to accept Algerians who were freed. Two recent returnees would be appearing before a judge within a day or two. But there had been reports that some did not want to go back. The GOA wished to confirm if this were so, and specifically, whether some Algerian nationals at Guantanamo had explicitly expressed a will not to go back. (Note: Rezag Bara stopped short of saying that Algeria would accept only those detainees willing to return, which had been Algeria's previous position and which would have rolled back recent statements by Medelci and others indicating the Algeria was prepared to cooperate with the US on all remaining detainee cases. End note) Morocco -------------- ¶11. (C) To a question about Algeria's counterterrorism cooperation with Morocco, Rezag Bara responded that the two countries cooperated operationally on threats to each other's country originating in the other. The meeting concluded with DAS Sanderson pointing to the upcoming visits of a Department of State Anti-terrorism Assistance group and a Department of Justice ICITAP delegation, which will work out counterterrorism training programs with Algerian officials. ¶12. (U) DAS Sanderson cleared this message. PEARCE