FM TO SANDERSON: TSA LIST "POISON IN RELATIONS"

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000115 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - NARDI E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON KPAL KGHG SENV ML SU AG SUBJECT: FM TO SANDERSON: TSA LIST "POISON IN RELATIONS" Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce. Reasons: 1.4 (b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a meeting with visiting NEA DAS Sanderson January 25, Algerian Foreign Minister Medelci objected to TSA's placing Algeria on a list with supporters of terrorism and countries where U.S. troops were at war, arguing that this was at variance with Algeria's solid commitment to fighting terrorism and its close security partnership with the US. It was a poison in our relations; the only acceptable solution was to take Algeria off the list. He expressed concern over Mali's failure to act against AQIM and said Algeria hoped to get the Arab Maghreb Union to set up an economic community and a trade and investment bank. In an upcoming African summit, Algeria would seek a resolution in favor of the Copenhagen accord on climate change. On regional conflicts, he thought Sudan was at a crossroads where its leaders were leaning towards reconciliation, whereas Somalia now needed international help from outside the continent to solve its conflict. He expressed support for US Middle East peace efforts and said that "guarantees" from the major powers could help restart negotiations. DAS Sanderson expressed appreciation for Algeria's support for the Palestinian Authority. DAS Sanderson emphasized that the US valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria and said the TSA measures were not directed against Algeria or any country but at countering a new threat to aviation security. End summary Air Security -------------- ¶2. (C) Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci welcomed NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson to a meeting at the Foreign Ministry January 25. He was accompanied by MFA Americas Department Director General Sabri Boukadoum, MFA Director General for Protocol Fouad Bouattoura, and another aide. The Ambassador, Pol-Econ Chief Bosshart (notetaker) and Pol-Econ officer Wazir accompanied the DAS Sanderson. Medelci recalled that he had had very good meetings in Washington the previous month with the Secretary and others and had discussed a balanced agenda, including economic development and cooperation against terrorism. He said Algeria had a true friend in the US, which Algeria trusted. There was now a new "spirit" between our two countries, ¶3. (C) Medelci then pointed to a "fly in the soup," the TSA listing of Algeria among the countries whose citizens required enhanced screening at US airports. This decision was a blow to relations between our governments that was seen very negatively by the public. Even Algeria's security professionals were baffled by the move. Medelci said the listing was at odds with President Obama's Cairo speech calling for more solidarity between the West and the Muslim world. This discriminatory act by the US undermined Algerian confidence in the US. ¶4. (C) DAS Sanderson recalled that the Secretary and NEA A/S Feltman had explained the U.S. position on this sensitive issue: this was a response to an attempt to bring down an airliner. The decision was under continuous review and would evolve as the threat did. We could not make a commitment to any concrete change but would take into account Algeria's point of view. These measures in no way reflected USG appreciation of our two countries' vital cooperation. "Poison in our Relations" -------------- ¶5. (C) Medelci was unmoved. He condemned the TSA measures as inconsistent with the improved spirit of cooperation in our relations and unjustified by the actual level of Algeria's security efforts. Algeria had taken all necessary measures to ensure the security of its territory and its airports and should not have been put on this list, which was discriminatory. He called it a "poison" in our relations. Medelci acknowledged Sanderson's statement that the policy was under continual review. And while he obviously understood that Sanderson's visit was intended to recognize and assuage Algerian concerns about the TSA listing, he nevertheless pointedly told her that she had come on a mission impossible. What Algeria wanted, he said, was to be off the list, no more, no less. The minister said the US had had special measures in place for years, so why announce a list of 14 countries? This was what was upsetting - and what, he asked, is the value-added in terms of control, operationally? This too needs to be explained to public opinion. "If No Progress, We Will be Forced to Respond" -------------- ¶6. (C) Medelci said the Algerian position could not simply be declaratory. If things don't progress, he said, "we will be forced to respond." The FM said the GOA had been trying to do the maximum with the US, but all of this could be affected, including our strategy against terrorism. It did not want this fly in the soup to cause the loss of all the rest. The minister said it was especially galling to Algeria that the US had joined France as the only two countries implementing harsher security measures specifically against Algerians, France being a country with which Algeria had many "unhealed wounds." (Note: The French Ambassador told DAS Sanderson the same morning that France's enhanced security measures, requiring passenger data to be passed to France prior to any flight's departure, had been in effect since February 2009. End note) Medelci concluded by wondering why the US had publicized the list of 14 countries when it already had strict airport security. ¶7. (C) DAS Sanderson said the new US procedures should not be seen as reflecting in any way on either the cooperation between our two countries or the value that we placed on it. The President had taken this difficult decision based on a grave and immediate threat. It was not meant to embarrass or humiliate countries, or to single anyone out, but to plug a gap in air security. We were well aware of the distress this caused to partner countries. Our intent, however, was to protect travelers of all countries. We anticipated making adjustments as the threat - and our assessment of it - evolved. The Secretary was sensitive to the impact of this decision on our relations. USG counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria was critically important. Sahel Security, Arab Maghreb Union -------------- ¶8. (C) Medelci declared that Algeria needed strong and durable ties with the US. The GOA looked forward to the upcoming Department of Commerce trade mission. Turning to security in the Sahel, he said threats in that region had to be managed, but he expressed concern that one country - Mali - was not acting against the threat as it should. The Secretary had spoken to him about the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Medelci explained that, following a meeting of AMU foreign ministers in Tripoli, Algeria was pursuing elements of a common strategic project that went beyond a simple free trade area. The first component was an AMU economic community. An American consulting firm was drafting a study of the concept. The second component was an AMU trade and investment bank, which would be based in Tunis and have a rotating directorship, with an Algerian being the first. This bank would finance regional strategic projects. The next meeting of AMU foreign ministers would take up these proposals. Morocco, African Conflicts, Middle East Peace -------------- ¶9. (C) Medelci acknowledged that Morocco was essential to regional security. Algeria wished to continue counterterrorism cooperation with its Moroccan brothers. The two countries' security services were working together. Medelci emphasized that Algeria was focused on Africa, especially on development and resolution of regional conflicts. Sudan was at a crossroads, with elections and an Arab initiative spearheaded by Libya to convince the parties to the Sudan conflict to reconcile. Sudan appeared to be listening and to understand. The situation in Somalia was less reassuring. Although African resources to resolve this conflict had yet to be exhausted, the situation required international contributions from outside the continent. Medelci expressed appreciation for US efforts on behalf of Middle East peace and hoped they would continue and be successful, although he believed they needed a new "technique" (which he did not articulate). Copenhagen and Climate Change -------------- ¶10. (C) The FM also stated that an African summit would consider the outcome of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. Algeria wanted that summit to reach a common, "comprehensive" position that would "take note" of the Copenhagen outcome and suggest further steps leading to the follow-up meeting in Mexico. ¶11. (C) DAS Sanderson recalled that she had reviewed AFRICOM Commander Ward's Algeria visit with the general. The US and Algeria had shared concerns about the Sahel and northern Mali. The USG recognized that the terrorism problem was regional and was ready to help with requested assistance. We hoped that the long awaited regional summit to discuss security in Bamako would take place. We should continue to exchange notes on Somalia and Sudan. The US and others recognized Algeria's efforts in the latter country. The Arab Maghreb Union was an important effort in regional economic cooperation and integration, which the US supported. The US hoped that Maghreb countries could bring down obstacles between them. DAS Sanderson expressed satisfaction that Algeria and Morocco were cooperating on counterterrorism. On the Middle East, A/S Feltman had appreciated Algerian engagement and particularly its support for the Palestinian Authority. Medelci concluded the meeting by hoping that negotiations would resume, a step that "international guarantees" would facilitate. ¶12. (U) Ambassador Sanderson cleared this message. PEARCE