MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000204 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/P, EAP/PD - THOMAS HAMM DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused February 26 news coverage on Saturday's legislative by-elections; on the government's plan to lower the business income tax rate for multinational corporations; and on other domestic political issues. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an op-ed in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" discussed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and said it is likely that Taiwan will be able to purchase F-16 fighter jets from the United States. A news analysis in the KMT-leaning "China Times," on the other hand, discussed the "strategic cultural difference" between China and the United States. End summary. A) "Arms Sales to Taiwan -- Fervent on the U.S. Side but Cold on Taiwan's Side" Fu S. Mei, the Director of Taiwan Security Analysis Center, opined in the mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 530,000] (2/26): "... The [prospect for the] F-16 fighter jets deal is not as pessimistic as some commentators believe to be, and the key lies in the decision-making timing. Not long ago, high-ranking U.S. Foreign Service officers told U.S. [arms] manufacturers that both the State Department and the Pentagon support this deal, pending a go-ahead from the National Security Council and the White House. According to the understanding of this writer, the Pentagon has received orders to draft a more detailed and broader classified report for the high-ranking decision makers. It takes approximately half a year to get such a document ready, namely, the assessment by the military agency will be ready in late summer and early fall. Judging from the pace for the ordinary inter-agency reviewing process, the Obama administration will not start the decision-making process for the F-16 fight jets deal until sometime between September to October at the earliest. "By then it will be time for U.S. mid-term elections, and the US$5 billion worth of F-16 fighter jets, which will be able to protect nearly 10,000 jobs year, could serve as a useful bargaining chip for President Obama (just the same as the time when former President George H.W. Bush sold F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan.) Should Washington agree to accept Taiwan's letter of intent [on the F-16 fighter jets deal] by the end of 2010, it will be nearly a year's time, dating back from its notification to the Congress of the arms sales to Taiwan in January, 2010, for U.S.-China relations to gradually become less tense and clear. If Taiwan were thus able to sign a contract [with the United States] by the end of 2011, the mass-production of the F-16 fighter jets will be able to start before the production line is closed for orders (supposedly in 2014). Such a development will benefit not only the United States (in its employment, economy, and follow-on exports) but also Taiwan (avoiding the soaring costs for re-opening the production line and ensuring the quality of the subcontractors' supply of components). ... "While the United States' relations toward Taiwan and China are tipping in favor of Beijing, the [Taiwan] government must seriously consider whether it should request that the United States return to the previous model of reviewing its major arms sales [to Taiwan] once every year. ... That way the island can use the mechanism to push high-ranking U.S. officials to regularly participate in and come to a decision on arms sales [to Taiwan]. ... Perhaps this [suggestion] may serve as a new direction to be pondered by [Taiwan's] newly-reshuffled National Security Council." B) "Sino-U.S. Military Exchanges -- Fighting but not Splitting" Journalist Qi Leyi wrote in an analysis in the KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 120,000] (2/26): "... Beijing's constant [public comments] is intentionally a political gesture [aimed at] preventing Washington from miscalculation on the one hand, and on the other, to prevent U.S. arms sales to Taiwan from being continuously upgraded and strengthened. In such a chess game, the United States is testing China's bottom line (on the contents of the arms sales),while China is testing the United States' determination (to defend Taiwan). Both sides know how to exercise restraint, because they are clearly aware that struggles between big countries are unavoidable, but the last thing they should do is fight and cut [ties with each other]. Once both sides put aside all considerations of face, it will be extremely difficult to mend the ties. ... "These essential differences [in political styles and cultural values] make it destined that a breakthrough in the strategic mutual trust between China and the United States will be difficult to achieve in a short period of time. Deep in its heart, Washington doubts that a dictatorship will use its vigorously developed military power for peaceful means, and China also has doubts that a Western power will tolerate the rise of a big Asian country. This is not a military issue, but about the differences in strategic cultures. Only when China and the United States genuinely understand each other on the level of strategic culture can the two possibly attain strategic mutual trust." STANTON