CHAD-SUDAN BORDER DEAL POSITIVE STEP, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000375 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, AF/PDPA, IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF, DRL/RSPRING NSC FOR MGAVIN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN BORDER DEAL POSITIVE STEP, BUT SUSPICIONS LINGER Classified By: Classified by CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During a February 1 meeting with U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Gration, Chadian Foreign Minister Faki hailed the 15 January Chad-Sudan agreement as a positive step, but warned of mistrust on both sides and in various levels of government. Faki said Chad was ready to agree to independent verification of the border agreement. He urged the United States to press the Government of Sudan to implement the agreement and push rebel groups to reach a deal on Darfur before elections. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan General J. Scott Gration travelled to Addis Ababa from January 27-February 2, 2010 to attend the AU Summit with the U.S. delegation. Chad-Sudan Agreement Positive, But Suspicions Linger -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) FM Faki praised SE Gration's efforts for bringing peace in the region and in Sudan. He said the SE's interventions allowed for Chad and Sudan to take significant steps to improve bilateral relations and the situation in Darfur. Specifically, he said that the SE weighed heavily on Sudan to reach the Chad-Sudan agreement of 15 January 2010. ¶4. (C) On 5 January 2010, after returning to Ndjamena from Khartoum on 25 December 2009, Faki met with Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim. Faki told Khalil that he was no longer welcome in Chad and the he needed to go to Sudan and become "part of the process there." AU-UN Joint Mediator Djibrill Bassole and Sudanese Presidential Adviser Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani came to Ndjamena and met with Khalil, giving him the message that there was no military solution to Darfur, that he should stop fighting, use Doha as a venue to agree to a ceasefire, and to join the other groups in Doha to form a lasting solution to the conflict in Darfur. In the 15 January communiqu on the agreement, Chad made a strong and clear statement that JEM was no longer welcome in Chad*- that JEM must make peace, join the process, and leave Chad. ¶5. (C) Though the agreement was positive, Faki said, suspicions linger. Faki said that Sudan's announcement of moving Chadian forces away from the border was "tentatively true". Faki claimed that Sudan gave Chadian rebels land mines and sent them to Chad to mine roads along the way, and that 6 vehicles had hit mines. Rebel groups, he said, are in Chad and in Central African Republic (CAR),which the CAR president raised as a problem directly with Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir. Faki said that he respects and trusts Dr. Ghazi, but that he does not trust the Sudanese security services or military, where Dr. Ghazi does not have influence. Even before Dr. Ghazi, he said, Chadian President Deby had good relations with former Sudan Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail. In Sudan, he said the president does not hold all the power, but that the army, intelligence services, and the party are all independent power bases. He cited by example an October 2009 report that Deby ordered 280 Chadian vehicles into Sudan, which Faki suspected were reported falsely by the Sudanese Minister of Defense to undermine peace. Having good interlocutors, Faki concluded, does not help. ¶6. (C) On Sudan's side, Faki said, Dr. Ghazi and Intel Chief Mohammad Attah accused JEM of continuing to cause trouble in Darfur. Faki denied these accusations, and told Ghazi and Attah that they could travel with him to the border to look together. He said that Chad is ready to provide proof they closed the borders and told the Government of Sudan that, if needed, they are ready to agree to third-party independent verification. ¶7. (C) Faki said that the Chadian defense and intelligence ADDIS ABAB 00000375 002 OF 002 chiefs would travel to Khartoum in early February to discuss the technical modalities of the agreement and plans to deploy troops to the border. Afterwards he said they could look at next steps, including border monitoring and third-party technical assistance with satellite and sensory imaging. He said that in considering third-party assistance, Dr. Ghazi said a new agreement would have to be signed, while Faki believed Chad and Sudan to agree to a third party using a "gentlemen's agreement." ¶8. (C) Faki said that people forget the origins of the rebellion, and focus instead on peace and respecting agreements. Historically, he said, there were reasons why the rebellion started in Darfur, but no reason why the Government of Sudan sponsored rebels in Chad to destabilize the Chadian government. Khartoum, Faki said, created the Chadian rebellion and imposed it on the Government of Chad. Khartoum wants people to think Chad did the same to the Government of Sudan, but it did not, Faki said. Faki described this as "a very important nuance from our point of view." Still, he felt that solving the problems of Darfur "once and for all" was most important, and pressuring the parties to make peace was the only way to secure the border. US Should Push Khartoum to Implement Agreement, Push JEM to Reach Deal on Darfur -------------- -- ¶9. (C) To help the agreement succeed, FM Faki said that SE Gration could "insist" that Khartoum respects the agreement and press on the rebels to "move more quickly" to resolve their issues before elections. Faki argued that JEM was not under Chad's orders, but that it had its own political agenda and authorities. He said that he would support SE Gration engaging with Khalil, and that as President Obama's representative, JEM listens to the Special Envoy even if they pretend otherwise. The Government of Chad can push and influence JEM, Faki said, but so must the United States. He pressed the Special Envoy to work with A/S Carson to form a unified USG position on Chad and Sudan. He urged the Special Envoy to visit Chad before the end of February to support the Chad-Sudan agreement. ¶10. (C) FM Faki briefly discussed Chad's position on the future of MINURCAT, saying that Chad asked the military force to leave, but wanted to keep the civilian side of the mission. He described MINURCAT as "ineffective." Participants in Foreign Minister Faki Meeting: -------------- ¶11. (U) General J, Scott Gration, U.S. special Envoy to Sudan Cameron Hudson, Director of Operations, Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Miriam Estrin, Special Assistant to the Special Envoy, Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan ¶12. (U) SE Gration's Office has cleared on this cable. YATES