USAU: SOMALIA MINISTERIAL TURNS HEATED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000342

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MCAP AU
SUBJECT: USAU: SOMALIA MINISTERIAL TURNS HEATED

REF: NAIROBI 191

Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b, d).

This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle.


1. (SBU) Summary: A regular meeting of AMISOM
troop-contributing countries (TCCs) is fraught with
recriminations and increased frustration, particularly on the
part of the Somali Minister of Defense. Ethiopia announces
what appears to be a landmark diplomatic breakthrough that
would bring Alhus Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ) into the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) fold, integrating
fighting forces and sharing regional administration. The
agreement is expected by month's end. Senior military
officials warn of al-Shabaab preparations for a USS Cole-type
attack aimed at shutting down operations in the Port of
Mogadishu and worry about 9/11-type threats against AMISOM.
The Force Commander repeated requests for maritime
interdiction assets, passenger screening technology for the
Mogadishu Airport, air defense radar, attack helicopters,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and technical assistance in
developing and executing a media campaign. The United
Nations asks prospective donors to get off the fence and help
create a "fragile government from a failed state," warning
the international community that this missed opportunity
could condemn Somalia to a future that is frighteningly
similar to its recent past. End Summary.

Detente
--------------


2. (SBU) At the monthly ministerial meeting on the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),Ethiopian Vice Minister
for Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu made a rare appearance to
brief Ministers of Defense from troop-contributing countries,
the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, and
partners on a recent diplomatic breakthrough. Tekeda reported
that the government of Ethiopia (GOE) had recently
facilitated a watershed agreement between the TFG and ASWJ in
which the two parties agreed to coordinate their activities,
integrate their security forces, and share regional
administrative duties on the basis of the TFG's charter and
the Djibouti Process. TFG and ASWJ negotiators agreed to
continue reconciliation efforts with all parties seeking
peace in Somalia in order to broaden the TFG's base. They
also agreed to establish a National Advisory Council of Ulema
(Muslim scholars) with the objective of preserving Somali
religion. Tekeda added the caveat that while the two parties
had agreed to cooperate while in Addis Ababa, neither had
signed the agreement, each having to return to their
respective constituencies for final approval. Tekeda
anticipated formal signature before the end of February, and
appealed to the international community to support this
process. (Comment: While Tekeda probably understated
Ethiopia's role in brokering the February 13 agreement, not
everyone is as optimistic about its chances for success. The
ASWJ is not monolithic, and its representatives at the Addis
talks may not represent all ASWJ factions. End Comment.)

Maritime Insecurity
--------------


3. (C) AMISOM Force Commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha,
reported a looming maritime threat that demands immediate
international attention. AMISOM has proof that al-Shabaab is
preparing at least two small boats with explosives to conduct
a USS Cole-type attack with the aim of rendering the Port of
Mogadishu unusable by large resupply vessels. Mugisha
reminded the assembly that AMISOM's maritime assets were in
poor repair and not up to the task of harbor protection, much
less escorting ships for the final five vulnerable miles to
port. Per Mugisha, the Somali Coast Guard also has capable
mariners, but absolutely no functioning vessels. Mugisha
expressed frustration that this shortcoming has been debated
for a year, with international promises of assistance but no
fulfillment of the pledges. In response, the United Nations
Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) representative reminded the

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audience that certain AU member states possess maritime
surveillance assets and encouraged collective diplomatic
pressure on these states to make those assets available to
AMISOM.

Death From Above
--------------


4. (SBU) Mugisha also elucidated an aerial threat. AMISOM,
he said, has air defense guns but no capability to detect
approaching aircraft. He asked not only for radar, but also
for unmanned aerial vehicles to assist with force protection
and aerial surveillance. Mugisha also appealed for basic
airport security equipment to screen passengers, alluding to
9/11 type threats to his headquarters.

Still Losing the Propaganda War
--------------


5. (SBU) Despite now having three radio broadcast stations,
Mugisha lamented that only the TFG-controlled station was
operational. Even the TFG's radio, he implied, is not
effective because of a lack of technical capacity to prepare
and deliver timely messages designed to divide the enemy and
tout the successes of the TFG and AMISOM. (Note: In the past
year, the USG and the UN have both provided hardware and
limited training for two radio stations in addition to the
TFG-owned radio. However, sources told USAU separately that
politics and an inept public information officer within the
office of the Special Representative for the Chairperson of
the Commission (SRCC) are preventing the radios from going on
the air. UNSOA has the authority and money set aside for
technical assistance and messaging, but is lacking only a
signature from the SRCC.)


6. (SBU) Mugisha stated that his forces are constantly
accused of disproportionate response and collateral damage in
the extremist-dominated media. AMISOM needs help in
operationalizing its radio and develop its media campaign,
said Mugisha.


Boss Rants
--------------


7. (SBU) Somali Defense Minister Abdulla Boss Ahmed amplified
Mugisha's frustration with the worn-out promises of the
international community and the incessant debates at the AU.
He directed most of his anger at the AU and the European
Union (EU),blasting partners for failing to make good on the
majority of promises made at the March Pledging Conference in
Brussels, and then blaming the AU for holding up transfer of
the pittance that had been paid. The security sector, said
Boss, is the most important sector. None of the
international community's other initiatives will succeed in
Somalia without a foundation of security. How is it that
only about $3 million of the pledged $38 million has been
received by the TFG?


8. (SBU) Boss claimed to have 9,980 "former TFG" troops under
arms in Mogadishu, as well as 2,000 ASWJ fighters loyal to
the TFG. Only 5,000 of these troops receive stipends,
however. Boss warned of impending mutiny if the
international community continues to pay only a fraction of
the Somali National Forces (SNF). Boss also appealed for
international assistance for Ogadeni fighters staging in
Kenya. He indicated that it would be beneficial to open a
second front with these fighters, but that they lack
equipment and ammunition.


9. (SBU) Boss, as well as the UN Deputy Special
Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG),made it
clear that any future training of SNF is predicated on one
year's post-training salary. Boss stated that he would not
even allow Somali trainees to be selected and transported to
Uganda unless the EU could guarantee pay for their graduates.
Training without salary is simply throwing fuel on the fire,
said Boss.

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Burundian MoD Weighs In
--------------


10. (SBU) Burundian Minister of Defense Germain Niyoyankana
expressed similar frustration as Boss, albeit in a more
diplomatic fashion. The situation in Somalia is worsening
daily, he said. "We say the same things at every meeting. We
make resolutions, yet nothing changes," he said. Meanwhile,
the enemy is getting stronger and its influence is growing.
Niyoyankana spoke of a recent television spot on France 24 in
which al-Shabaab paraded vehicles in broad daylight. The
column included armored vehicles, he said, reminding the
audience of the adverse psychological impact such a brazen
display can have on the Somali populace. Some of our
stronger partners ought to be able to strike such a convoy,
said Germain looking at the U.S. delegation. Alternatively,
the international community should provide AMISOM with attack
helicopters to interdict al-Shabaab convoys. This appeal for
attack helicopters was echoed by the Deputy SRSG.


11. (SBU) Niyoyankana also appealed for UN equivalent
stipends for AMISOM peacekeepers, in an effort to attract new
TCCs. He asked UNSOA to consider direct flights from
Bujumbura to Mogadishu to avoid Burundian personnel getting
stranded at Entebbe. Niyoyankana asked Peace and Security
Commissioner Lamamra for a long-overdue update on the status
of the AU's inquiry into the March 2009 crash of the Ilyushin
IL-76, stating the outcome was holding up payment of the
death benefits to the families of the three Burundian troops
who perished. Finally, Niyoyankana questioned rhetorically
who really owns the USG-procured equipment, suggesting that
it was unclear whether the donated equipment really belongs
to Burundi or is merely a loan for the peace operation.

Uganda's Complaints
--------------


12. (SBU) Ugandan Minister of State for Defense Jeje Odongo
reiterated pleas for UN reimbursement for lethal equipment
owned by TCCs. He also asked for more lethal equipment
donations for AMISOM troops. Odongo put the UN on the spot
for a response to a long-standing IGAD request for a naval
blockade and no-fly zone to disrupt al-Shabaab resupply
efforts. (Note: In May 2009, the AU endorsed an IGAD request
for a UN naval blockade on the ports of Kismayo and Merka, as
well as no-fly zones in the vicinities of airports at KM50,
KM90, Balidoogle, Waajid, Hudur, Isaley, Johwar, and the Gedo
Region.)

UNSOA's Appeal
--------------


13. (SBU) Deputy SRSG Charles Petrie reported that the TFG
has survived a year despite minimal outside assistance, and
has emerged stronger for its effort. He explained that the
TFG provided direction at the December 2009 International
Contact Group in Jeddah, and that its leadership there had
resulted in the February 2010 breakthrough with the ASWJ.
This success may entice skeptical potential donors to get off
the fence and help create a "fragile government from a failed
state." He implored the international community not to miss
this opportunity. Otherwise, the future of Somalia is
condemned to look like it has for the past 20 years.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) USAU notes the rare, perhaps unprecedented,
appearance of Ethiopian Vice Minister Tekeda at the regular
meeting of AMISOM TCCs, as well as his doubtful claims of
Ethiopia's understated role in brokering the agreement
between the TFG and ASWJ. Perhaps more significant, however,
was the shift in tone by some of the more regular attendees.
USAU has never seen Somali Minister of Defense Boss so
visibly frustrated, to the point that he lost his diplomatic
decorum. The Burundian and Ugandan Ministers were more

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diplomatic, but also expressed unusual frustration, calling
into account both the AU and the UN for bureaucratic snafus
and unanswered requests.


15. (C) Shortcomings noted by Mugisha provide opportunities
for USG assistance. The Department of Homeland Security, in
conjunction with the regionally-based Offices of Regional
Affairs, could respond to Mugisha's demand to improve airport
security with basic equipment like magnetometers, x-ray
machines, and explosive detection screening systems. They
might also take advantage of this request to include Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
(PISCES) in the security upgrade package for Mogadishu
Airport to capture immigration data and assist in terrorist
interdiction. Sources tell USAU that the Mogadishu Airport
manager would be amenable to security upgrades.


16. (C) Another opportunity raised by Mugisha's complaints of
extremist-dominated media might be to use funding and
authorities resident in the Nairobi-based military
information support team (MIST) to assist the AMISOM and the
SRCC's office with messaging, website improvement, durable
messaging goods, and possibly exploiting SMS text messaging
support of AMISOM information operations. USAU also notes
that internal political wrangling under the previous SRCC may
still be affecting UN support to AMISOM information
operations. UN sources tell USAU that they require only the
SRCC's signature on a MOU before they can unleash millions of
dollars of support that would provide technical specialists
to develop and produce media messaging from a remote site in
Nairobi.
YATES