AU SUMMIT -- U.S. DELEGATION MEETS WITH CONGOLESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000331 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/C, AF/E, AND IO/UNP NSC FOR MGAVIN LONDON FOR PLORD PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020 TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL KPKO AU SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- U.S. DELEGATION MEETS WITH CONGOLESE FOREIGN MINISTER THAMBWE Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle. ¶1. (U) February 1, 2010; 2:45 p.m.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. Under Secretary Maria Otero Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson NSC Senior Africa Advisor Michelle Gavin Special Advisor Howard Wolpe Deputy Special Advisor Jim Yellin USAU Military Advisor Ellington (notetaker) Democratic Republic of the Congo Foreign Minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba ¶3. (C) Summary: On the margins of the African Union (AU) Summit in Addis Ababa, Congolese Foreign Minister Alexis Thambwe told the American delegation that both the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) have been diminished, but blamed United Nations Mission in Congo's (MONUC) tepid operational support on the fact that FDLR is not yet defeated. He cited three government demands on MONUC: the redeployment of all MONUC combat forces to Eastern Congo; MONUC-led defense sector reform; and a phased MONUC disengagement plan beginning with at least a symbolic withdrawal by June 30. Thambwe reported normalizing relations with Rwanda and Uganda, but sought USG intervention in the growing oil dispute between Angola and DRC. He predicted another LRA-type cycle of violence if Mbororo transhumance is not reined in by neighboring governments, and denied a government offensive against the Banyamulenge. Thambwe indicated that the GDRC wants to move forward on the National Command Training Initiative previously proposed by Wolpe. End Summary. ¶4. (SBU) In response to A/S Carson's solicitation of Thambwe's thoughts on developments in DRC, the security situation, and the future of the MONUC, the Foreign Minister characterized the past 15 months as mostly positive. He stated that while the FDLR and the LRA have not been defeated, they have been "diminished." Thambwe chastised MONUC for not providing sufficient operational support to the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) in its offensive against the FDLR, suggesting that the FDLR might have been defeated had MONUC not limited its support to rations and transportation. Things might have been different had MONUC intervened with all its military might, said Thambwe. Much-maligned MONUC -------------- ¶5. (C) Thambwe outlined three GDRC objectives regarding MONUC. First, all of MONUC's combat forces should be relocated to Eastern DRC. Thambwe blamed NGO pressure for MONUC's tepid support to Operation Kimia, and said that "if MONUC can't fight the FDLR, then they should go." While he admitted that without MONUC's presence the GDRC would have lost territory in the past, Thambwe claims that the security situation in the Kasais, Katanga, Bas-Congo and elsewhere no longer merits MONUC presence. ¶6. (SBU) Second, MONUC should "help us develop a real army." Thambwe blamed MONUC's lack of emphasis on defense sector reform for FARDC's ineffectiveness on the battlefield, and entreated the United Nations to train an unspecified number of brigades that would form the "backbone" of Congo's new army. ¶7. (C) Finally, Thambwe demanded a MONUC disengagement plan. He indicated that MONUC's withdrawal should be phased, but must begin with at least a symbolic departure by the June 30 independence day celebrations. Zero Tolerance? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) When pressed about conflict and sexual violence in particular, Thambwe admitted that there are small pockets where rape continues to be a problem. He invoked President Kabila's "zero tolerance" policy and claimed that military tribunals are investigating and prosecuting FARDC perpetrators, per Secretary Clinton's request. Regional Relations and Security in the East -------------- ¶9. (C) On regional relations, Thambwe said that things are going well with Rwanda. He reported that the presidents speak regularly, that ministers are in touch, and that the joint commission is operational. Thambwe reported similar success in Congo's relations with Uganda. He offered as an example of normalizing relations a hot-pursuit incident about three weeks earlier in which Ugandan forces chased rebels 22 kilometers into Congolese territory. Congo reportedly protested and the GOU apologized, the whole matter being sorted out within 24 hours, said Thambwe. ¶10. (C) In response to a question about Ugandan operations against LRA in Northeastern Congo, Thambwe denied that Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) are engaged in combat operations on Congolese territory. Only small UPDF intelligence units continue to operate against LRA inside Congo, he claimed, towing the party line. Thambwe reported that while most of the LRA has decamped to the Central African Republic, small groups of 5-6 LRA fighters continue to operate in the vicinity of Garamba National Park. Thambwe stated that he was not certain where Kony is located. ¶11. (C) Thambwe then launched into a rather emotional indictment of the Mbororo people, threatening to wage war on the pastoralists if neighboring governments fail to rein them in. (Comment: The Mbororo are a large subgroup of the Fulani or Peul ethnic group who span several countries in West and Central Africa. Mbororo people generally practice Islam, and often come into conflict with cultivators as they travel in search of water and pasture for their livestock. End Comment.) Thambwe explained that in years past Congolese peasants tolerated the seasonal migration of the Mbororo, but that recently the pastoralists are staying longer and are arming themselves. He warned implausibly that inaction now would lead to an LRA-type situation in a few years. Thambwe said that the GDRC would ask neighboring governments to recall the Mbororo, and seek AU diplomatic intervention at a meeting in March 2010. Failing that, Thambwe threatened military force. When Carson questioned the wisdom of this course, Thambwe relented a bit and suggested a police action instead. Carson reminded Thambwe that police actions have a nasty habit of escalating, and suggested as alternatives mediation through a regional body or an eminent personality. ¶12. (C) Asked about reports of a significant offensive on the Banyamulenge of Minembwe (South Kivu),Thambwe told Wolpe it was nothing more than a pro-integration element of the Banyamulenge community attacking another. One group is close to the GDRC and wants to integrate with the FARDC, and the other refuses, he explained rather unconvincingly. The only clashes in the Kivus these days are more police in nature, Thambwe claimed. (Comment: Non-GDRC sources separately told the American delegation of a FARDC offensive in Minembwe during the period January 23 to February 4 in which at least 13 villages were attacked and pillaged by government troops under the overall command of Colonel Gifaru, a former Hutu militia Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO) officer now integrated in the FARDC. The second in command is reportedly Colonel Manga. There were reportedly 4,000 government troops participating in the offensive, comprised of a brigade commanded by Colonel Kazungu, the 112th Integrated Brigade commanded by Colonel Santos who was injured in the course of the fighting and replaced by a Mai-Mai named Mwilambwe wa Mwilambwe Brown, and two separate battalions from Kalehe. End Comment.) The Western Front -------------- ¶13. (C) Thambwe stated that the GDRC's sole preoccupation in the west is Congo's continental shelf. Both DRC and Angola have petitioned the UN regarding their dispute over offshore petroleum reserves in the Cabinda area. Angola is a friendly neighbor, said Thambwe, and shares ethnic groups with Congo. The GDRC seeks a peaceful resolution to the dispute but, regardless of the outcome, Thambwe warned that the Congolese people would accuse their government of selling out to the Angolans. Thambwe suggested that a bilateral resolution was out of the question, despite the fact that the two governments had exchanged diplomatic notes on the dispute. Thambwe beseeched Carson for USG mediation, suggesting that the Congolese people would distrust the outcome of any other mechanism. We are seeking your "good offices," said Thambwe. This will help our president explain the eventual outcome to his constituency. Without USG intervention, the only alternative is international court which would take years and risk growing violence between the oil-producing neighbors. ¶14. (C) Carson recommended the International Arbitration Court, saying the best way to damage the USG's good relations with both the GDRC and the Angolan government is to get mixed up in an oil dispute between the two. Carson mentioned that DRC faces similar challenges in other places, namely Lake Albert and Lake Kivu. Thambwe added that there is also potential for conflict over Lake Tanganyika's natural resources. ¶15. (C) Thambwe insisted that the USG use its good offices before the GDRC resorts to jurisprudence, warning that it might be in U.S. interest to settle out of court or risk having American oil companies operating in Angola brought before an international court and accused of stealing Congolese oil. National Command Training Initiative -------------- ¶16. (SBU) In a sidebar with Wolpe, Thambwe indicated that the GDRC wants to move forward on the National Command Training Initiative previously proposed by Wolpe. Thambwe said that he had spoken with President Kabila who was in complete agreement. Comment: -------------- ¶17. (C) Thambwe was amiable, if not mendacious at times. In what is a Congolese national pastime, he blamed everybody else for Congo's woes, with particular condemnation for MONUC. MONUC probably would have been more helpful in anti-FDLR operations had FARDC consulted during the planning phase, and had the FARDC's behavior not been so objectionable. Thambwe's gave an overly optimistic assessment of the security situation in Congo, at the same time probably overstating the threat from the Mbororo. He also underestimated (and arguably seemed undisturbed by) the prevalence and severity of sexual and gender-based vilolence. Thambwe appeared to be extremely disingenuous regarding the FARDC's offensive against the Banyamulenge in South Kivu's high plains of Minembwe. ¶18. (U) U/S Otero and A/S Carson have cleared this cable. S/A Wolpe has not cleared this cable. YATES