ETHIOPIA: FORMER ONLF LEADER URGES U.S. MEDIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000291 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC SO ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: FORMER ONLF LEADER URGES U.S. MEDIATION IN SOMALI REGION CONFLICT REF: ADDIS ABABA 2977 Classified By: CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) According to a former leader from the early days of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),Ismael Sheikh Abdi, continued conflict between the ONLF and the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has resulted in the deterioration of humanitarian conditions in Ethiopia's Somali region over the past two years. Ismael said he believes the GoE-created obstacles to humanitarian assistance and trade with conflict areas has led to increased smuggling, raising additional security risks. He criticized the current ONLF leadership for planning and executing raids on humanitarian convoys and concludes that the ONLF's armed struggle is now doing more harm than good for the Somali population. Ismael speculated that the ONLF would be willing to negotiate an end to the conflict and urged the U.S. to mediate such negotiations with the GoE. End summary. ¶2. (C) During a late 2009 trip to Jijiga, capital of Ethiopia's Somali Regional State, PolOff met with Ismael Sheikh Abdi, an ethnic Ogadeni and former leader in the ONLF's political wing during the 1980s and early 1990s, i.e., before the ONLF split with the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). (Note: During the Derg regime, Ismael participated in the armed struggle against the government together with the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) led by present Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. In 1991 he was elected secretary general of the ONLF which, in alliance with the TPLF, effectively governed the Somali region until the adoption of the current constitution. When the EPRDF severed its alliance with the ONLF in favor of the Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP),Ismael left the government and the ONLF. End note.) High Expectations, Dashed Hopes -------------- ¶3. (C) In a 90 minute conversation, Ismael described the early days of the EPRDF government and the ONLF's role in governing the Somali region. He described strong cooperation between the ethnically segregated ONLF and the TPLF and an atmosphere of hope among Somalis that their participation in the government would lead to increased prosperity and security. Even at that time, Ismael recalled, divisions within the ONLF and a lack of clarity on many policies -- particularly relating to autonomy, independence, and relations with Somalia and ethnic Somalis throughout the Horn of Africa -- strained party cohesion. ¶4. (C) Over time, Ismael said, ONLF leaders realized that Meles had no intention of granting them greater autonomy in any form - independence, semi-autonomy, or even greater power within the EPRDF - leading to the eventual departure of the ONLF from government, and its replacement with the SPDP. Ismael candidly described the bitterness and hostility that led many in the ONLF to return to armed conflict. He acknowledged that the ONLF has achieved very little, politically or militarily, after years of fighting. He said his own frustration led him to leave political life altogether. Conditions Have Worsened, with Blame on Both Sides -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to the present, Ismael assessed that years of conflict, repression, and withholding of needed development programs and funding had left Ethiopia's ethnic Somalis worse off than they have been in many years. He claimed the GoE's counterinsurgency tactics over the past two years in particular had crippled the local population. He cited many of the same GoE abuses as other regional contacts (especially ethnic Ogadenis) cited in reftel, including warrantless arrests, detention without trial, and extrajudicial killing. According to Ismael, the GoE continues to utilize tactics similar to those it used in the aftermath of violent ONLF attacks on a Chinese oil facility in April 2007, albeit with lesser visibility. Ismael said the only exception to the GoE's continued use of these tactics is village burning and ADDIS ABAB 00000291 002 OF 002 rape, which have either ended altogether or reduced to such levels that indicate they are solitary incidents, rather than part of a coordinated GoE policy. ¶6. (C) Ismael said the GoE's concern that the ONLF is "taxing," stealing, and otherwise benefiting from humanitarian relief supplies brought into the region by the UN and NGOs is entirely legitimate, but he emphasized that it is the local people who are suffering from a curtailing of humanitarian assistance within conflict zones and the closure of trade routes between the Somali Regional State and neighboring Somalia. He added that with the formal closure of these routes, cross-border smuggling has increased, thereby raising the risk of illegal movement of people and arms across the Ethiopia-Somalia border. Ismael: Somalis Want Peace, Prosperity - Not Independence -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Asked to describe the current policy goals of the ONLF, Ismael responded that he was not in direct contact with ONLF leaders, but said he believed most Ethiopian Somalis (including ONLF members and supporters) want to be able to trade legally and prosper financially, improve the quality of their lives, live in peace, and be respected by their government and military. They want an end to extrajudicial arrests, killings, and trade blockages. Demands for independence made by the ONLF years ago, Ismael said, were very different from its current agenda, and were in hindsight highly unrealistic. He underscored that the ONLF's armed insurgency, and the local population's support for the use of violence, is merely a means to an end; the end being peace, prosperity, and respect. While not optimistic that peace could be easily achieved, Ismael said if peace is acheived and the GoE promotes trade and development in the region, most ethnic Somalis would abandon the idea of independence or unification with Somalia. ¶8. (C) Ismael told PolOff he believed the ONLF would be willing to talk to the GoE and negotiate an end to violent insurgency if the situation in the Somali region improved. The GoE would have to recognize the ONLF as a legitimate organization, at least for the purpose of holding talks, if not as a political body. Ismael noted such talks would likely have to be facilitated by a third party who was respected and viewed as neutral by both parties. He stated that the U.S. was the ideal - and possibly only - candidate to facilitate such discussions, and urged the U.S. to consider taking on the role of mediator. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite his former affiliation with the ONLF and strongly held views about the illegitimacy of the GoE's counterinsurgency tactics, Ismael was candid about the unrealistic nature of the ONLF's past demands, the ONLF's failure to achieve any appreciable military or political success despite years of fighting, and the negative impacts of the ONLF's actions on the local population. It is unclear how much contact he currently has with ONLF leadership, and whether his assertions regarding the ONLF's agenda and desire for mediation represent their views, rather than views he or the local populace hold more broadly. End comment. YATES