ANAMBRA IMPRESSIONS -- PROGRESS, BUT MUCH WORK TO DO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000171 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/PDPA, DRL, INR/AA AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI KCRM KDEM NI SUBJECT: ANAMBRA IMPRESSIONS -- PROGRESS, BUT MUCH WORK TO DO REF: ABUJA 0149 AND PREVIOUS CLASSIFIED BY: James P. McAnulty, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy Abuja, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Many observers had expected a messy, even violent, vote going into the February 6 gubernatorial election in Anambra State. That the worst of Nigerian elections past did not materialize this time may be the most encouraging outcome of this vote. The peaceful, largely violence-free, process proved largely credible, albeit administratively flawed. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) poorly managed key elements of the elections, notably timely delivery of voting materials and maintenance of accurate voter registration lists. Voter apathy and disenfranchisement also overshadowed Anambra's election results, widely hyped as a "harbinger" for 2011. Despite flaws in the conduct of the election, however, most observers viewed the results as reflecting the will of voters. INEC's flaws affected the prospects of all candidates and did not seem to favor any individual contender. INEC will need to improve its capabilities dramatically when Nigeria conducts elections in 35 additional states in 2011. END SUMMARY. -------------- POSITIVE, PEACEFUL PROCESS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Incumbent Governor Peter Obi handily won re-election in the widely-anticipated gubernatorial election in Anambra State on February 6 (reftel). Obi (All Progressive Grand Alliance, AGPA) received 97,843 votes -- well ahead of his nearest rivals Chris Ngige (Action Congress, AC) with 60,240 votes and Chukwuma Soludo (People's Democratic Party, PDP) with 59,355 votes. Obi not only garnered the most votes among all 25 contenders but at least 25 percent of the votes cast in at least two-thirds of Anambra's 21 Local Government Areas (LGAs) (he actually won 18),as required by election laws to forestall a run-off election. ¶3. (C) Obi and his record in office proved popular, at least among those who voted, and the powers of incumbency certainly helped him. U.S. Mission Nigeria election observers noted that most obvious roadside billboards in and around the major population centers of the capital Awka and market town Onitsha featured Obi. His two main, well-funded rivals Ngige and Soludo of the more prominent (nationally) AC and ruling PDP may have cancelled out each other's efforts. When INEC announced election results at its Awka headquarters on February 7, the bystanders greeted the news with applause, calmness, and acceptance. ¶4. (C) Those who voted, and many others who tried, behaved commendably. The security situation over the February 5 to 8 period in Anambra remained peaceful, a noteworthy feat in a state known for roughness around elections. Authorities deployed over 23,000 Nigeria Police Force (NPF) personnel from around the nation to the state with a "thick as fleas" presence, which helped maintain calm and order. -------------- DELAYS AND SETBACKS -------------- ABUJA 00000171 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Despite assurances from INEC officials that they came prepared for the election, they badly bungled key aspects of the actual execution, with delays in delivery of voting materials and ballots to 326 wards and 4,627 polling stations across the state and distribution of inaccurate voter registration lists that left many unable to vote. INEC deserves nearly all the blame for late deployment and the ensuing chaos around the polls on Election Day, although some fault the police for not stepping up and providing an earlier presence near the polling stations. INEC officials claimed to election observers in the field that they did not want to leave ballots and election paraphernalia at polls unprotected. The wrangling continued and voting did not start in earnest until late morning or early afternoon, well after the original 0800 starting time. ¶6. (C) The single largest shortcoming involved the highly inaccurate voter registration lists. At many polling stations (including those in Onitsha, Awka, and in rural villages visited by U.S. observers),the lists proved inaccurate or badly out-of-date. People lined up, presented their voter registration cards, and showed up at their designated stations, only to be told that the list did not contain their names. This created a standoff for a while, but ultimately some INEC poll workers (with political party agents and election observers watching),made a judgment call to allow people in line to vote on a provisional basis, even if their name did not appear on the register. This defused tensions, although some polling stations lacked sufficient ballots for those in line or even any voting materials at all (such as one rowdy scene observed in Awka South). These would-be voters felt "disenfranchised" and promised to file protests. One domestic observer called INEC's poor delivery and administration of voting materials and lists "disgraceful." ¶7. (C) Even with all these administrative "hiccups" (per INEC's Anambra Commissioner),voting proceeded peacefully in most places once it started. Patient people already on queue were allowed to vote. Many stayed until later in the day to watch the counting, to ensure it went smoothly and ballot boxes would not be pilfered. They appreciated the presence of observers, and often smiled when the U.S. team randomly appeared at their remote site. Polling stations reported their results throughout Saturday night and Sunday morning up the chain to wards and LGA headquarters. By 0900 on Sunday, the last LGA read its results at INEC "Election Central." With the final count in, INEC declared Peter Obi of AGPA winner without need of a run-off. -------------- LOOKING TO 2011 -------------- ¶8. (C) In the end, voter turnout came in quite low (at around 16 percent),but people who did show up came determined to make democracy and elections work in Nigeria. INEC did not make the task for them any easier, as they did not mark polling stations clearly (at least for observers). Yet this should not have been a problem for Anambrans, as polling stations were supposed to be within walking distance of home and well-known to locals. A ban on driving across the state (except for official vehicles) should not have deterred people coming out to vote. Some may have been intimidated by the heavy NPF presence, fearing that the police might resort to intimidation or violent tactics if things went badly. These fears were largely unjustified, and the NPF was well-behaved. U.S. observers heard of but did not witness a few instances of poll-related violence, thuggery, and vote buying. -------------- ABUJA 00000171 003 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Was Anambra really the "harbinger" for 2011 as many anticipated? The contest turned out better than past ones in the state, and if such tranquility could carry over into 2011, then Anambra may have served as a useful rehearsal for the national vote. The more valuable lesson from Anambra, however, is that it exposed INEC's lack of efficiency and competence in key areas. INEC has considerable work to do, especially in updating voter registration lists, arranging for the prompt delivery of materials, and enhancing voter education to overcome voter apathy and low turnouts. ¶10. (U) ConGen Lagos prepared and coordinated this telegram with Embassy Abuja, which transmitted this telegram on behalf of ConGen Lagos. SANDERS