(S) US-UAE FURTHER COOPERATION TO DISRUPT TALIBAN FINANCE

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000009





NOFORN



E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07

TAGS: ECON, PTER, KTFN, AE, AF, EFIN

SUBJECT: (S) US-UAE Further Cooperation to Disrupt Taliban Finance



CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador, State Department, U.S.

Embassy Abu Dhabi; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)





(S//NF) Summary



1. (S//NF) SUMMARY. On December 15-16, 2009, Treasury Department

Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and

Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury

analysts, met with senior officials from the UAE's State Security

Department (SSD) and Dubai's General Department of State Security

(GDSS) to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in

the UAE. Prior to these meetings, GRPO and Treasury passed to SSD

and GDSS detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and

other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and

Pakistan. Mendelsohn praised the UAE for its contribution to

building a stable and moderate Afghanistan. He thanked the SSD and

GDSS for its commitment, per the directive of Abu Dhabi Crown

Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to disrupt any Taliban-related

financial activity that can be identified in the UAE. The UAE

services pledged full cooperation toward the shared goal and asked

for additional detailed and actionable lead information. In

particular, they asked for additional passport information,

telephone numbers, full names and aliases, and travel itineraries

for Taliban figures suspected of traveling to the UAE. END SUMMARY.



2. (S//NF) During the course of the two multi-hour intelligence

exchange sessions, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the

previously shared information suggesting that Taliban-related

finance officials have visited the UAE in order to raise or move

funds. The UAE security officials believe that the Taliban may draw

support from the sizeable Pashtun population resident in the UAE.

They asked for lead information the U.S. could gather with names of

individuals or entities in the UAE that may be supporting the

Taliban.



3. (S//NF) Officials from SSD and GDSS pledged that their

respective organizations would follow up on the information

provided, and work through intelligence channels to share

information and results and submit additional requests for

information.





Taliban/Haqqani Network



4. (S//NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the UAE has

taken to combat al-Qaida and the Taliban-to include sending troops

to Afghanistan-and highlighted the importance the USG places on

combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives

significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but

noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives

significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi

Arabia and the UAE. He further stated that the Taliban and Haqqani

Network are believed to earn money from UAE-based business

interests. Security officials from both SSD and GDSS agreed that

the Taliban and Haqqani Network are serious threats. Officials

from SSD added that Iran supports the Taliban with money and

weapons, helps the Taliban smuggle drugs, and facilitates the

movement of Taliban and al-Qaida members. SSD officials stated

that Iran's IRGC and navy are involved with these activities. GDSS

officials noted Iran's support to Taliban in Pakistan, adding that

GDSS believes that India also has supported Pakistani Taliban and

Pashtun separatists.



5. (S//NF) Treasury analysts provided information on Tayyeb Agha

and Mullah Jalil, two senior Taliban officials who have made

multiple fundraising visits to the UAE, according to U.S.

intelligence. The UAE security services were not familiar with

either individual and asked for additional identifying information,

including current passport information used by the individuals to

enter the UAE in order to track down their movements. (NOTE:

Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange

included telephone numbers, an e-mail address, and expired passport

information for crosschecking against Emirati immigration databases

on both individuals. END NOTE.) SSD confirmed it checked UAE

immigration systems based on the passport information provided and

found no matching records. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared

names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates

known either to reside in or travel to the UAE. SSD officials

stated that Taliban fundraisers may use fabricated travel

documents, and that Pakistanis/Afghanis often carry multiple

passports, but noted that individuals from Pakistan and Afghanistan

who apply for a travel visa now require an eye scan. The officials

said this system should help prevent a single individual from using

different aliases or passports. The services pledged to continue

their investigations and share further results.



6. (S//NF) GDSS officials noted its ongoing monitoring of the large

Afghan and Pakistani immigrant communities in Dubai and they

commented that the Taliban extorts money from UAE-based Afghan

businessmen. The same officials said the Taliban is also involved

in kidnapping for ransom, whereby Afghanistan and Pakistan-based

family members of the UAE-based businessmen are kidnapped for

Taliban profit. Some Afghan businessmen in the UAE have resorted

to purchasing tickets on the day of travel to limit the chance of

being kidnapped themselves upon arrival in either Afghanistan or

Pakistan.



7. (S//NF) The GDSS officials stated that hawaladars are usually

unwitting when they transfer money that ends up with the Taliban.

They further noted that Taliban financial supporters are likely to

transfer smaller amounts across multiple hawalas to minimize

suspicion.



8. (S//NF) SSD officials discussed the Taliban and Haqqani

Network's suspected use of front companies to raise and move money.

They were familiar with Haji Khalil Zadran, a Kabul-based Haqqani

Network financial facilitator who has visited the UAE, but were not

able to provide any details on him.



9. (S//NF) GDSS officials were familiar with Haji Abdul Bari, a

Dubai-based Afghan businessman, who reportedly provides funding to

the Taliban/Haqqani Network, according to U.S. intelligence. The

GDSS officials stated that they do not believe Bari is loyal to the

Taliban, and noted that he has cooperated with Pakistani

authorities, as well as with Afghan President Karzai. They pointed

out Bari's past visits from former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah

Zaif, but noted that such visits-which may have resulted in

financial support-have ceased. GDSS continues to monitor Bari,

although at present they do not believe that he is a Taliban

financial manager. Mendelsohn suggested that he may be a

pragmatist who maintains relationships with legitimate authorities,

but the USG has current information that suggests he is still

involved with the Taliban.



10. (S//NF) GDSS discussed at length the history of the Haqqanis.

They specifically highlighted Jalaluddin Haqqani's success in

exploiting images of civilian casualties in Afghanistan for

fundraising purposes.





(S//NF) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna



11. (S//NF) Mendelsohn also raised Afghanistan and Pakistan-based

extremist and terrorist groups, to include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)

and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ). UAE security

services were not familiar with the names of specific UAE-based LT

members shared by GRPO and Treasury, but promised to follow up on

the information. Mendelsohn raised the UAE-based NGO Dar al-Birr as

an organization suspected of supporting JDQ. GDSS was familiar with

the organization and pledged to investigate the matter.





OLSON