Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10ABUDHABI53
2010-02-03 08:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
Moving the MLAT Issue with the UAE
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHAD #0053 0340859 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 030859Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0239 INFO RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000053
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/RAP, NEA AND INL
PASS ONDP FOR DIRECTOR
OSD FOR WECHSLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PREL KTIA EFIN PTER AE
SUBJECT: Moving the MLAT Issue with the UAE
REF: ABU DHABI 0164
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000053
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/RAP, NEA AND INL
PASS ONDP FOR DIRECTOR
OSD FOR WECHSLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PREL KTIA EFIN PTER AE
SUBJECT: Moving the MLAT Issue with the UAE
REF: ABU DHABI 0164
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (SBU) This is an action request, see para 7.
2. (SBU) We have greatly expanded our law enforcement cooperation
with the UAE over the past five years, and are likely to enhance it
further, not least because of the increasing importance of law
enforcement issues in Afghanistan. Our law enforcement team in
Mission UAE has built good contacts with UAEG authorities, but we
have reached the limits of what we can do with informal working
arrangements. We need an MLAT.
3. (SBU) After a flurry of hope that the UAE might have reversed
its longstanding policy of linking an MLAT to two other agreements
(an Extradition Treaty and a Treaty on Legal and Judicial
Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters),the Minister of
Justice reconfirmed to Ambassador that the UAE insists on
negotiating a package of three (reftel).
4. (SBU) As we understand it, Washington is eager to negotiate an
MLAT, sees no major obstacles to a civil/commercial treaty, but has
reservations about negotiating an extradition treaty when, as is
the case in the UAE, the host nation refuses to extradite its own
nationals. Because of its stance on extraditing nationals, the UAE
has been low on the priority list for US negotiating teams. We
believe that decision should be revisited, for two interrelated
reasons.
5. (SBU) First, the peculiar demographics of the UAE. Eighty
percent of the overall population (and 90 percent of the workforce)
is expatriate. This means that a properly crafted bilateral treaty
would cover 80-90 percent of the population. This would seem to be
of significant value to the USG.
6. (C/NF) Second, amongst the expatriate population are
significant numbers of Indians, Pakistanis, and Afghans (probably
over 2 million in total). While most are simple laborers, the fact
is that there is likely to be hidden in their midst supporters of
the Taliban and LeT, drug kingpins, and Indians with links to the
Bombay underworld. Moreover, Iranian proliferators, Hamas
facilitators, and Russian money launderers (some of whom are
indicted in pending USG cases) are to be found. While Dubai is the
hub for legitimate commerce in the Gulf, it is, unfortunately, also
a hub for illegitimate trade. An MLAT would give us more tools to
exchange information on law enforcement issues, including those
related to terrorism , the illegal arms trade and illicit finance.
7. (SBU) Action Request: we request that through the Illicit
Finance Task Force, the Interagency review the decision not to
pursue an extradition treaty with the UAE.
OLSON
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/RAP, NEA AND INL
PASS ONDP FOR DIRECTOR
OSD FOR WECHSLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/03
TAGS: PREL KTIA EFIN PTER AE
SUBJECT: Moving the MLAT Issue with the UAE
REF: ABU DHABI 0164
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (SBU) This is an action request, see para 7.
2. (SBU) We have greatly expanded our law enforcement cooperation
with the UAE over the past five years, and are likely to enhance it
further, not least because of the increasing importance of law
enforcement issues in Afghanistan. Our law enforcement team in
Mission UAE has built good contacts with UAEG authorities, but we
have reached the limits of what we can do with informal working
arrangements. We need an MLAT.
3. (SBU) After a flurry of hope that the UAE might have reversed
its longstanding policy of linking an MLAT to two other agreements
(an Extradition Treaty and a Treaty on Legal and Judicial
Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters),the Minister of
Justice reconfirmed to Ambassador that the UAE insists on
negotiating a package of three (reftel).
4. (SBU) As we understand it, Washington is eager to negotiate an
MLAT, sees no major obstacles to a civil/commercial treaty, but has
reservations about negotiating an extradition treaty when, as is
the case in the UAE, the host nation refuses to extradite its own
nationals. Because of its stance on extraditing nationals, the UAE
has been low on the priority list for US negotiating teams. We
believe that decision should be revisited, for two interrelated
reasons.
5. (SBU) First, the peculiar demographics of the UAE. Eighty
percent of the overall population (and 90 percent of the workforce)
is expatriate. This means that a properly crafted bilateral treaty
would cover 80-90 percent of the population. This would seem to be
of significant value to the USG.
6. (C/NF) Second, amongst the expatriate population are
significant numbers of Indians, Pakistanis, and Afghans (probably
over 2 million in total). While most are simple laborers, the fact
is that there is likely to be hidden in their midst supporters of
the Taliban and LeT, drug kingpins, and Indians with links to the
Bombay underworld. Moreover, Iranian proliferators, Hamas
facilitators, and Russian money launderers (some of whom are
indicted in pending USG cases) are to be found. While Dubai is the
hub for legitimate commerce in the Gulf, it is, unfortunately, also
a hub for illegitimate trade. An MLAT would give us more tools to
exchange information on law enforcement issues, including those
related to terrorism , the illegal arms trade and illicit finance.
7. (SBU) Action Request: we request that through the Illicit
Finance Task Force, the Interagency review the decision not to
pursue an extradition treaty with the UAE.
OLSON